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CASE NOTE
ABDULLAHI V. PFIZER: SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS A NONCONSENSUAL
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION CLAIM ACTIONABLE UNDER ALIEN TORT
STATUTE
Anna Alman*
ABSTRACT
United States courts struggle to determine what international
human rights violations and against what violators could be raised
under the Alien Tort Statute by non-U.S. citizens. In 2009, the Second
Circuit's majority in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. found that nonconsensual
medical experimentation on humans violated a universally accepted
norm of customary international law. The court found that the
jurisdictional grounds under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") existed so
that non-U.S. citizens could bring these claims to U.S. district courts.
By integrating the principles outlined in Sosa, the court formulated
clear criteria for determination of whether an alleged transgression of
international law constitutes a norm of the law of nations and thus
represents a triable issue under the ATS. The Abdullahi case also
demonstrates a clear potential for international medical research to be
exploitive in nature. If global medical research is to be safely
accomplished, the international community will be forced to address the
issue through application of international and comparative law. This
case note provides in-depth analysis of the Abdullahi case and explores
its implications on future ATS litigation.
INTRODUCTION
It is universally accepted that administering medical experiments
on human subjects without their knowledge or consent is unethical and
immoral. For most people, the subject of nonconsensual
experimentation on humans brings up memory of the atrocious Nazi
medical experiments conducted on concentration camp prisoners,' or of
* University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. '12. The author thanks Professor
Brittany Glidden for her insightful comments, Julie Nichols for her editing suggestions,
and my husband John Lear for his amazing support.
1. United States v. Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181-82 (1949) [hereinafter
Brandt].
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the Tuskegee experiments on poor African-American men. 2 Despite
agreement that such experimentation is unacceptable and is prohibited
within the United States,3 the role of domestic courts in adjudicating
these and other violations of international law remains uncertain and
highly controversial. 4 Specifically, United States courts have struggled
to determine what international human rights violations could be
raised by non-U.S. citizens or aliens and what violators could be sued
under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").6
In January 2009, in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., the Second Circuit's
majority found that nonconsensual medical experimentation on humans
violated a universally accepted norm of customary international law.6
The Abdullahi suit was brought by Nigerian children and their
guardians alleging that Pfizer conducted medical experimentations of a
new drug on the children without their informed consent during a
bacterial meningitis outbreak in Nigeria in 1996.7 Plaintiffs asserted
that, as a result of the new drug trials on two hundred children, eleven
children died, and many others were left with permanent blindness,
brain damage, loss of hearing, or paralysis. 8 The Second Circuit found
that jurisdiction existed under the ATS, allowing the foreign plaintiffs'
claims of nonconsensual medical testing to proceed.9 Significantly, the
Abdullahi court allowed private causes of action to be brought under
the ATS as long as "the violations occurred as the result of concerted
action" by the private individuals or organizations working together
with the state government. 10
This case comment provides in-depth analysis of the Abdullahi case
and explores the implications of the Abdullahi decision for future cases
brought to U.S. federal courts under the ATS. First, Part I surveys
formation and significant developments of the ATS. Second, Part II
provides the factual background and the procedural history of the case.
Third, Part III examines the majority's holding and reasoning as well as
discusses the dissenting opinion. Finally, Part IV addresses
implications of the Abdullahi decision on the ATS jurisprudence and
post-Abdullahi developments.
2. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/index.html.
3. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012); see also
21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2012).
4. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States,
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 472-73 (2010).
5. Id. at 473; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
6. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Abdullahi].
7. Id. at 169-70.
8. Id. at 169.
9. Id. at 187.
10. Id. at 188-89.
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The Alien Tort Statute
The First Congress originally passed the ATS in 1789 allowing non-
U.S. citizens to sue "for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or treaty of the United States."" The statute grants federal
jurisdiction for suits alleging (1) torts committed anywhere in the world
(2) against a non-U.S. citizen who brings the action (3) in violation of
the law of nations. 12 Some courts and legal scholars consider the ATS
as having a "strictly jurisdictional nature" in the sense that the
statutory provision grants jurisdiction to federal courts without a
substantive power to create new causes of action.13 At the time of
enactment the ATS had a practical application for a limited set of
actions that asserted violations of the law of nations. 14 Specifically, the
ATS has been traditionally limited to claims for crimes against
ambassadors, violations of the right to safe passage, and crimes of
piracy.15 Because of the scarce legislative history and conflicting
historical interpretations of the ATS, non-American citizens randomly
invoked the statute to seek redress for violations of international law in
U.S. federal courts until 1980.16
While the ATS is a simple statute on its face, courts have struggled
to identify the requirements that a non-U.S. citizen must satisfy in
order to bring an ATS claim in a U.S. federal court. 17 Starting in 1980
with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a number of cases attempted to clarify and
expand its statutory application to allow for new causes of action.18 In
Filartiga, after comprehensive examinations of numerous sources of
customary international law condemning the acts of torture, the Second
Circuit concluded that the right to be free from torture was proscribed
by the law of nations. 19 Because torture committed by state officials or
under the color of official authority violated universally accepted norms
of international law, the torture claim by non-U.S. citizens could be
brought under the ATS.20 Implicit in this finding is the notion that "a
state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 n.10
(2004) (explaining that the statute has been modified slightly since its initial enactment
in 1789) [hereinafter Sosa].
12. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Kadic].
13. Sosa, supra note 11, at 713.
14. Id. at 720.
15. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 173.
16. Sosa, supra note 11, at 712-13; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-
88 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Filartiga].
17. See Sosa, supra note 11, at 720-21.
18. Id. at 724-25; Kadic, supra note 12, at 241-44; see Filartiga, supra note 16, at 880.
19. Filartiga, supra note 16, at 884-85. In Filartiga, the relatives of a victim brought
the ATS action against a Paraguayan Police General who kidnapped and tortured to
death the 17-year old victim in retaliation for the family's political activities.
20. Id. at 880.
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concern."2' The Filartiga court found that there was an international
consensus against the use of torture supported by numerous
international treaties and accords. 22 The issue of whether torture is a
norm of customary international law actionable under the ATS was
resolved. The ATS question after Filartiga became: What does it take
for a well recognized norm of international law to qualify as the "law of
nations" in order for a U.S. federal court to exercise federal
jurisdiction? 23
Fifteen years after the Filartiga decision, the Second Circuit
addressed another ATS issue of who could be held liable under the
ATS. 24 The court in Kadic v. Karadzic held that "certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."25 In Kadic,
a group of victims of Bosnian war brought claims of crimes of genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, forced prostitution, and
forced pregnancy against the self proclaimed Bosnian-Serb leader. 26
The Kadic court emphasized that private persons might be found liable
under the ATS for violations of international humanitarian law,
genocide, and war crimes. 27 In addition, the court found the plaintiffs
satisfied the state action requirement for other crimes by showing that
the Bosnian-Serb leader acted under color of law because he acted in
concert with the state officials of the former Yugoslavia. 28 Later, some
courts also held that because the ATS contains no express exception for
corporations, the statute grants jurisdiction over torture claims against
corporate defendants. 29
Finally, in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the scope of
the ATS. In the seminal opinion, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Justice
Souter outlined the framework for determining whether a claim
properly asserts a violation of a norm of customary international law,
21. Id. at 881.
22. Id. at 882-84.
23. Id. at 880-81; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the ATS creates a cause of action for violations of specific,
universal and obligatory international human rights standards).
24. Kadic, supra note 12, at 239.
25. Id.; see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)
(finding that private parties, both individuals and corporations, may be liable for a
violation of the law of nations under the ATS).
26. Kadic, supra note 12, at 237.
27. Id. at 239-40.
28. Id. at 245.
29. The language of the statute limits who may sue and for what violations, but it
does not limit who may be sued. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303,
1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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thus supporting a cause of action under the ATS.so In order for a
violation of the law of nations to be actionable under the ATS, the norm
prohibiting such violation must be "defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms" such as
transgression of the rights of ambassadors, piracy crimes, and
violations of safe conducts or passports. 31 The Supreme Court explained
that torts in violation of the customary international law could be
defined by common law because nothing has precluded federal courts
from "recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of
common law."32 Nevertheless, because the understanding of federal
common law drastically changed in 1938 when the watershed opinion in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins rejected the concept of federal "general"
common law, the Supreme Court warned courts to exercise caution
when finding actionable norms under the ATS. 33 Thus, the Sosa court
called for judicial restraint in creating new private causes of actions
under the ATS emphasizing potential encroachment on the
decisionmaking region of Legislative and Executive branches. 34
In a nutshell, the federal courts can allow new private causes of
actions for international law violations to be brought under the ATS but
only when these norms have been accepted by civilized nations and are
shown to be analogous to the historic crimes against ambassadors,
piracy, and violation of safe conducts. 35 The Court explained that the
ATS affords jurisdiction to a very limited set of actions asserting
violations of international legal norms that are (1) specific, (2)
universal, and (3) well-recognized by most civilized nations that
consider these norms obligatory.36 While the Supreme Court admitted
that federal courts do have a capacity to adjudicate enforceable
international legal norms, it also called for "great caution" in applying
the law of nations and creating new private causes of actions under the
ATS. 37
CASE SUMMARY
In 1996, Pfizer, Inc., one of the world's largest pharmaceutical
companies, took advantage of a large outbreak of bacterial meningitis in
Nigeria, using it as an opportunity to test an unapproved and
30. Sosa, supra note 11, at 720, 724-26.
31. Id. at 724-25.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 726; see also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 68 (1938).
34. See Sosa, supra note 11, at 727.
35. Id. at 725.
36. Id. at 732.
37. Id. at 728-29.
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potentially harmful medication.38 In order to get the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration's ("FDA") approval for the use of Trovafloxacin
Mesylate ("Trovan") on children in the U.S., Pfizer conducted a medical
research study for the new antibiotic on two hundred Nigerian children
sick with meningitis.39 Pfizer sent American doctors to conduct
experiments together with Nigerian doctors at the Infectious Disease
Hospital, a public hospital located in Kano, which is in the north of
Nigeria. 40 The company's goal was to obtain the FDA's approval of
Trovan through its comparison with another antibiotic Ceftriaxone.41
Financial analysts predicted at that time that Trovan would bring the
company a billion U.S. dollars in revenue if approved by the FDA.42
While Ceftriaxone is a well-established and FDA-approved antibiotic for
safe and effective treatment of bacterial meningitis in both adults and
children, preliminary animal trials of Trovan revealed severe side
effects, including degenerative joint disease, liver damage, and
abnormal bone conditions.43 Undeterred by these initial alarming
findings, Pfizer proceeded with the experiments. The researchers
divided the sick children in two groups: one group received the new
drug Trovan, while the other group received Ceftriaxone.44
This experiment was conducted without the patients' consent or
knowledge that they were experiment subjects. Plaintiffs claimed that
both American and Nigerian doctors working for Pfizer intentionally
failed to inform the children and their parents that the medical
experiments were being conducted. The doctors also failed to advise
Plaintiffs about the serious health risks involved in the drug studies.
Possibly the most appalling allegation of all was that the doctors failed
to inform Plaintiffs that a safe and effective alternative treatment for
meningitis was available at the same hospital through the non-
governmental organization "Doctors Without Borders."45 In their
lawsuit, Plaintiffs also alleged that Pfizer deliberately administered
lower doses of Ceftriaxone to the second group in order to boost the
effectiveness of Trovan in comparison to Ceftriaxone.46 Moreover, the
Pfizer doctors neglected to provide any follow-up medical care to the
38. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2010) (No. 09-34).
39. Id.
40. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 169.
41. Id.
42. Joe Stephens, Where Profit and Lives Hang in Balance, WASHINGTON POST (Dec.
17, 2000), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
07/02/AR2007070201255.html.
43. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 169.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 170.
46. Id.
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treated children after the conclusion of the medical experiments.47
Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the Trovan medical trials, eleven
children died and many others were left to suffer paralysis, brain
damage, or permanent sight or hearing loss. 4 8 Following the medical
experiments on the Nigerian children, the FDA never approved Trovan
for use on children and eventually severely restricted use of Trovan
even for adults. 49 Trovan was completely banned by the European
Union in 1999.50
Following these events, the injured children and their families
sought legal relief. In 2001, the injured Nigerian children and their
guardians brought a tort action against Pfizer under the ATS asserting
violations of customary international law (the Abdullahi action).51
Meanwhile, another group of plaintiffs brought a suit against Pfizer in
a federal court in Nigeria under the Nigerian law (the Adamu action).52
However, the Nigerian lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiffs due to alleged corruption in the Nigerian legal system and the
plaintiffs' inability to obtain legal redress in Nigeria.53 The Adamu
plaintiffs then brought a lawsuit in the U.S, which was then
consolidated with the Abdullahi action.54 The district court granted
Pfizer's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the ATS.
The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds of forum non
conveniens on the condition that Pfizer agreed to litigate the lawsuit in
Nigeria.55 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissals to the Second Circuit,
which reversed and remanded on appeal for the reasons explained
below. 56
Majority's and Dissent's Opinions
In Abdullahi, the Second Circuit majority undertook a
comprehensive analysis of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS
within the parameters outlined by the Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa.
By integrating the principles identified by the Second Circuit in
Filartiga, Kadic, and Flores57 with those provided by Sosa, the court
47. Id. at 169-70.
48. Id. at 170.
49. Company News; Suspension of Trovan Drug in Europe Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 1999), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/12/business/company-news-
suspension-of-trovan-drug-in-europe-is-urged.html.
50. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 170.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 170-71.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 171.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 168-69.
57. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Flores].
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formulated clear criteria for determination of whether an alleged
transgression of international law constitutes a norm of the law of
nations and thus represents a triable issue under the ATS.
The Second Circuit clarified that a norm of international law
actionable under the ATS must be a norm that is (1) universally
adhered to by States out of sense of legal obligation, (2) specific and
definable, and (3) of "mutual" concern to States as opposed to "several"
concern to individual States.68
Sources of International Law
The court started its analysis with the examination of various
sources of international law.5 9 In determining whether nonconsensual
medical experimentation rises to the norm of international customary
law, the Second Circuit referred to the four sources listed in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: (1) "international
conventions" or treaties expressly accepted by States; (2) "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; (3) "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"; and (4)
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations" as a secondary source of legal rules.60
As evidence of customary international law prohibiting nonconsensual
medical experimentations on human subjects, Plaintiffs cited the
Nuremberg Code,6 1 the World Medical Association's Declaration of
Helsinki, 62 the Ethical Guidelines by the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Services, 63 and article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").64
The court admitted that none of the international legal authorities,
except the ICCPR, had been ratified by the U.S., and thus these
authorities, taken individually, would not have binding legal power in
U.S. federal courts. Nevertheless, the court also said that these non-
obligatory international legal norms "may, with time and in conjunction
with state practice, provide evidence that a norm has developed the
specificity, universality, and obligatory nature required for ATS
58. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 174.
59. Id. at 174-75.
60. Id. at 175 (citing Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1 U.N.T.S 993).
61. Id. (citing Brandt, supra note 1, at 181-82).
62. Id. (citing World Med. Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, arts. 20, 22 (June 1964) (amended through
October 2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/l0policies/b3/17c.pdf).
63. Id. (citing Council for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv., International Ethical Guidelines
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, guideline 4 (3d ed. 2002), [hereinafter
Council for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv.], available at http://www.cioms.ch/publications
/guidelines/guidelinesnov_2002).
64. Id. (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]).
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jurisdiction." 65 The court further clarified that the scope of inquiry must
be not whether each source of international legal authority is binding by
itself but rather whether "a greater range of evidence" has been
considered and whether the probative value of all the sources taken as
a whole amounts to sufficient evidence of the current state of customary
international law.6 6 Thus, even international agreements that are not
self-executing or that have not been ratified by the United States can
constitute evidence of the norm of customary international law broadly
accepted by the international community. 67
Principles of Universality
In order to properly bring a claim under the ATS, plaintiffs must
assert a violation of a norm of customary international law that is
universally accepted around the world as a binding legal obligation. 68
The court concluded that the prohibition of nonconsensual medical
experimentations, originally identified at the Nuremberg war crimes
trials, clearly represented such norm.6 9 The court's strongest reasoning
for finding the international agreement to prohibit nonconsensual
experimentation came from the fact that at least eighty-four countries
now require the informed consent from participants for purposes of
medical experimentations. 70  Through the advancements of
international conventions as well as development of domestic
regulations, the informed consent norm "has become firmly embedded
and has secured universal acceptance in the community of nations."71
Principles of Specificity
The court also stated that a norm of customary international law
must be "sufficiently specific." To be "sufficiently specific," the norm
must be analogous to the 18th-century paradigms of crimes against
ambassadors, piracy, or infringement on the right of safe conduct. 72
According to the victims' allegations, Pfizer failed to inform any of the
children or their guardians of the nature and risks of the medical
experiments despite the fact that the company was well aware of the
informed consent requirements. In other words, Pfizer doctors acted
knowingly and purposefully when they nonetheless proceeded with
65. Abdullahi, supra note 6, 176 (citing Filartiga, supra note 16, at 883).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 177.
69. Id.; see also ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 7; Brandt, supra note 1, at 181-82; Council
for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv., supra note 64, at guideline 4.
70. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 181.
71. Id. at 183-84.
72. Id. at 184.
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medical research.73 The court found that the Nigerian victims alleged
ample facts that Pfizer knowingly and purposefully conducted the
medical experiments in a harmful manner.7 4 Thus, the allegations
against the Pfizer doctors, if proven true, would preclude any
assumptions of simple negligence in failure to inform the participants of
the nature and risks of the medical experiments.75 The court concluded
that prohibition of nonconsensual medical testing is "sufficiently
specific" the same way the customary international law prohibits
piracy. 76
Principles of Mutual Concern
The court also required examination of a norm of customary
international law from the perspective of the "mutual concern" to
States. When nations act in concert with each other out of a sense of
mutual concern, the nations make it their intention to prohibit certain
conduct that they collectively find reprehensible. Unlike matters of
"several concern" that involve issues in which individual States are only
"separately and independently interested," matters of "mutual concern"
encompass the objective of maintaining international peace and
stability. 77 In other words, matters of "mutual concern" compel nations
to cooperate with each other on eliminating mutually unwanted conduct
through the means of international conventions and agreements in
order to preserve international security and public health. 78
By conducting involuntary medical experimentations, the court
found that Pfizer threatened international efforts to prevent the spread
of contagious diseases across the international borders by fostering
mistrust and opposition not only to future drug trials but also to vital
public health programs organized by pharmaceutical companies. 79 For
example, after the reports about the Trovan medical trials resulting in
alleged deaths of the children came out in Nigeria, the local population
boycotted polio vaccination efforts in 2004, in part because of the
Trovan drug experiments.80 The resistance to polio vaccinations in
Nigeria resulted in the spread of the disease across Africa and the
73. Id.; but see Viet. Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 121-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that because the plaintiffs did not allege that the
chemical was sprayed with the purpose to injure human population, "they fail[ed] to make
out a cognizable basis for their ATS claim.").
74. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 184-85.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 184.
77. Id. at 185 (quoting Flores, supra note 58, at 249).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 186.
80. See Poliomyelitis in Nigeria and West/Central Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June
18, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/csr/doni/2008_06_18/en/index.html.
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Middle East.8 ' In addition, the court found that nonconsensual medical
trials conducted by American drug companies could contribute to
growing anti-U.S. sentiments around the world, further threatening the
already-volatile international security.82
The State Action Requirement
The court looked to the "color of law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to determine whether a state action requirement was satisfied.8 3
When a private individual acts together with state officials or with
substantial state aid, the individual acts under "color of law."84 The
Second Circuit concluded that a private cause of action under the ATS
could proceed as long as the private individual or organization "acted in
concert with" the state actor under the color of law.8 5 In Abdullahi, the
court found sufficiently close relationship between Pfizer and the
Nigerian governmental representatives who allegedly were involved in
every stage of the drug trials.86 Because the alleged illegal conduct took
place with substantial help of Nigerian doctors in a public hospital
provided to Pfizer by the local government specifically to conduct the
medical trials, the court concluded that the illegal conduct was the
"concerted action" between the American drug company and the
Nigerian government.8 7
The Dissenting Opinion
Although Judge Wesley agreed with the framework the majority
used to analyze claims under the ATS, he rejected the notion of private
cause of actions brought under the ATS.8 8 Judge Wesley maintained
that the correct application of Sosa framework to Abdullahi facts would
not result in the jurisdictional grant for nonconsensual medical
experimentations claims against private actors.8 9 He insisted that
nonconsensual medial experimentation "more closely resembles the acts
for which only state actors may be held responsible."9 0 Judge Wesley
reasoned that international law would only allow federal court
jurisdiction over private actors under the ATS when the conduct in
question is beyond the reach of any state, such as in crimes of piracy.
81. Id.
82. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 187; see also Timothy S. Jost, The Globalization of
Health Law: The Case of Permissibility of Placebo-Based Research, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
175, 175 (2000).
83. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 188.
84. Kadic, supra note 12, at 245.
85. Id.
86. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 188.
87. Id. at 188-89.
88. Id. at 192-93 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 209.
90. Id. at 206.
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Because violations of medical experimentation fall under the
jurisdiction of domestic courts, these crimes cannot be incorporated by
analogy to crimes against ambassadors, piracy, and violation of safe
conducts as to reach private, non-state actors under the ATS. 91 With
respect to the sources of customary international laws accepted as
evidence by the majority, Judge Wesley concluded that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs was merely aspirational and insufficient to
uphold ATS jurisdiction for the private right of action. 92
Implications of Abdullahi Decision
It is undisputed that administering involuntarily medical
experimentation on humans without their consent is unethical, morally
reprehensible, and illegal. The controversy centers on whether such
conduct is a recognized norm of international law actionable under the
ATS. In reaching its conclusion that a nonconsensual medical
experimentation constitutes a norm of customary international law
actionable under the ATS, the Abdullahi majority carefully followed the
Sosa framework to the extent Sosa provided guidance. The Supreme
Court in Sosa affirmed that the ATS is purely jurisdictional. At the
same time, it did not preclude federal courts from recognizing new
norms of international law, even absent express statutory authority.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Sosa provided some
guideposts for determination of customary international law norms, the
Court evaded laying out a clear and functional framework clarifying
what causes of actions could be actionable under the ATS. The matter is
further complicated by the fact that Congress has not clarified the scope
and implications of the ATS.93
Although the Abdullahi opinion has been broadly criticized, 94 there
are two reasons to believe that the Second Circuit decided the case in
accordance with the framework outlined in Sosa. First, the Supreme
Court has denied the Pfizer's petition for a writ of certiorari, thus
rejecting an opportunity to overrule or correct the ATS framework set
forth by the Second Circuit in Abdullahi.95 The Supreme Court's denial
could also mean that either the factual basis of the case was not
adequate to warrant the Court's review of the ATS or that the issue was
not sufficiently important to the Court. In any case, the denial of the
91. Id.
92. Id. at 194-95, 198.
93. Flores, supra note 58, at 246.
94. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Dennis M. Coyne, International Pharmaceutical Mistrials: Existing Law for the Protection
of Foreign Human Subjects and Proposal for Reform, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 427, 428 (2011).
95. Warren Richey, Supreme Court Allows Drug Test Case Against Pfizer to Proceed,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 29, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.comlUSA/Justice
/2010/0629/Supreme-Court-allows-drug-test-case-against-Pfizer-to-proceed.
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writ of certiorari means that the Abdullahi decision stays as the
mandatory authority for the ATS claims within the Second Circuit's
jurisdiction.
Second, the fact that Congress has not acted in response to the
Abdullahi decision by expressly prohibiting suits by victims of
nonconsensual medical experimentations under the ATS might be a
good sign. Following the court's decision in Filartiga, Congress passed
the Torture Victim Protection Act in 1991 ("TVPA"), which specifically
allowed individuals to bring civil actions suits against "any individual
who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture."9 6 Moreover, the House
Report on the TVPA expressly referred to the Filartiga case with a
comment approving the Filartiga court's reasoning.9 7 In other words, by
passing the TVPA, Congress authorized the cause of action for torture
that has been recognized in Filartiga under the ATS. 98 It is reasonable
to draw parallels with the Filartiga case and anticipate that Congress
would be influenced by the Abdullahi decision holding that the
involuntarily medical experimentation contravenes the universally
accepted norms of customary international law.
It is important to note what issues the Abdullahi decision did not
address. While the Second Circuit in Abdullahi focused on whether
nonconsensual medical experimentation constituted a norm of
customary international law, the court did not address another
important matter: who could be sued as a violator under the ATS. Most
recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in
another Second Circuit's ATS case also brought by Nigerians. In Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian plaintiffs brought claims
against the multinational oil company alleging extrajudicial killing,
torture, and crimes against humanity.99 The plaintiffs claimed that the
company collaborated with the Nigerian government to commit these
violations of customary international law in response to the plaintiffs'
legitimate protests against oil exploration and production destroying
the local environment. The Second Circuit majority held that
corporations, unlike States and individuals, could not be held liable for
human rights violations. The court explained that although
corporations are considered "persons" under U.S. domestic law, such
liability under domestic law does not create a norm of customary
international law actionable against corporations under the ATS. Faced
with a high probability that the Supreme Court would affirm the
96. Flores, supra note 58, at 246-47 & n.21.
97. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85.
98. Kadic, supra note 12, at 241.
99. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
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Second Circuit's decision in favor of the corporate defendants resulting
in future inability of non-U.S. citizen victims to bring ATS claims
against corporations, the Abdullahi plaintiffs agreed to settle with
Pfizer. 100
CONCLUSION
The rapid globalization of medical research of new drugs and
heated debates around ethics of international medical research have
exposed the vulnerability of human research subjects in developing
countries suffering from widespread poverty, lack of education, and
corrupt authorities. The Abdullahi case demonstrates a clear potential
for international medical research to be exploitive in nature. If global
medical research is to be safely and ethically accomplished, the
international community will be forced to address the issue through
application of international and comparative law. 101 The Abdullahi
decision sends a plain message of intolerance of nonconsensual medical
testing to not only large multinational pharmaceutical companies but
also the international community at large. While Congress has yet to
pass any legislation codifying the Abdullahi approach and creating a
statutory cause of action for nonconsensual medical testing under the
ATS, the Abdullahi opinion could serve as a catalyst for congressional
action. The growing ATS litigation will help further assimilation of
international human rights law into the U.S. legal system and will
likely lead to further developments of new norms of customary
international law actionable under the ATS.
It is important to remember that the ATS is not just a monetary
redress, but also an avenue to tell the story of injustice for victims and
publicly name the perpetrators of abuse. Even though the ATS is a civil
statute, its goal is nevertheless to bring those guilty for serious human
right violations to answer for their actions. The ATS litigation also
facilitates better understanding of the role of international legal norms
within the U.S. legal system. The cases brought under the ATS also
help create a record of human rights violations precipitating changes in
the countries where violations took place. Most importantly, ATS
litigation helps bring worldwide awareness to human rights causes or
create political pressure necessary for changes to prevent future abuses.
100. See Sue Reisinger, Pfizer Settles Lawsuits Over Drug Trials on Children in
Nigeria, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticle
CC.jsp?id=1202482854504 (discussing that while the settlement is confidential, Pfizer
established the trust fund that would pay a maximum of $175,000 per child to those able
to prove death or permanent disability due to the Trovan drug trial).
101. See Jost, supra note 83, at 175-76; James V. Lavery, Putting International
Research Ethics Guidelines to Work for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 319, 320-22 (2004).
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The Filartiga court emphasized that "for purposes of civil liability,
the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."102 Whether through
the Abdullahi court's application of the ATS, a Supreme Court's
opinion, or a Congressional act, the American society has the
responsibility to ensure that the medical researchers, both individuals
and corporations, conducting nonconsensual harmful medical
experiments on human beings abroad become the "enemies of all
mankind."
102. Filartiga, supra note 16, at 890.
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TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC VISION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE LEXMERCATORIA
Jonathan Bellish*
Globalization has led to a shift in power away from states and
towards the private sector, which has resulted in multinational
corporations taking a place among the most powerful international
actors. This phenomenon has had many positive consequences, but it
has also resulted in human rights, labor, and environmental abuses in
developing nations. Such abuses are inconsistent with the way these
multinationals behave at home and have led to a subsequent call for
increased corporate social responsibility ("CSR') through enforceable
norms. Though there is substantial agreement as to the contents of CSR
norms, there is little such accord where enforcement is concerned. Some
have suggested that binding CSR norms will ultimately emerge from
multinational corporations themselves along the lines of the lex
mercatoria. This article seeks to counter that argument by suggesting
that, even if the traditional narrative of the lex mercatoria is true-an
assertion upon which considerable doubt has been cast-modern
multinational corporations are not likely to take the lead in developing
and enforcing such norms. This is because, while lex mercatoria norms
tend to increase profits and reduce liability, CSR norms tend to shrink
margins and expose corporations to an additional form of liability.
From this assertion, the article concludes that political and
macroeconomic developments are likely to overtake legal and normative
developments, particularly those emanating from the corporate suite, in
leading to corporate responsiveness to a broader community of
stakeholders.
I. INTRODUCTION
When an American court hears a medical malpractice tort claim, it
applies the professional standard of care to the doctor's actions to
* Jonathan Bellish, 2012 J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law, with certificates in public and private international law from The Hague Academy of
International Law. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support, with a
special thanks to Kathryn for her tireless help and thoughtful suggestions throughout the
drafting process. Finally, I would be remiss to forget Professor Ved Nanda who continues
to be an invaluable mentor.
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determine liability.I This standard requires the court to look into the
prevailing practice of doctors who are similarly situated to the
defendant to determine whether or not the doctor-defendant was
negligent in a particular case. Centuries from now, when legal
historians look back at the widespread application of the professional
standard of care as applied to doctors in the United States of America,
they are unlikely to conclude a multi-state, American lex doctoria
created independently binding legal norms governing a doctors'
treatment of patients, despite the prevalence of different state courts
using the doctor's custom to determine legal liability. Rather, these
historians will conclude that twenty-first century courts applied the
legal standard of reasonableness, looking into the custom of doctors as
factual matter to support their legal argument, as was indeed the case.
Yet the existence of mercantile custom and the explicit insertion of
that custom into medieval mercantile disputes have led to the
conclusion that there was an international lex mercatoria that created
independently binding legal obligations. Some scholars have even gone
so far as to use the concept of the lex mercatoria to characterize norms
of corporate social responsibility ("CSR"). This paper argues that, even
if the prevailing characterization of the lex mercatoria is historically
accurate, an extension of this characterization to norms of corporate
social responsibility is unfounded. To characterize corporate social
responsibility norms as a new lex mercatoria is to ignore the
stubbornness of the shareholder primacy model of the corporation as
well as the practical effects of CSR norms on a given corporation.
Where actual implementation is concerned, market-driven CSR
norms have been the most successful in shaping corporate behavior.
This is mainly because multinational corporations find themselves
outside the reach of home country laws, 2 host country laws, 3 and
international law. These corporate actors generally adhere to the
1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.102(1) (2012) (defining the professional standard of care
as: "The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be
that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding
circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar
health care providers."); Bearce v. Bowers, 587 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex. App. 1979), (citing
Bowles v. Bourdon, 219 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1949)) ("In order for this [medical
malpractice] suit to have reached the jury, Bearce was required to present competent
evidence by a doctor of the same school of practice as Dr. Bowers that the treatment
complained of was negligence . . . . Therefore it was necessary for Bearce to establish
through a medical expert a professional standard of care so the jury could determine
whether Dr. Bowers' treatment deviated from that standard so as to constitute negligence
or malpractice.").
2. "Home country" refers to the country where the multinational corporation is
incorporated.
3. "Host country" refers to the country in which the multinational corporation
operates.
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shareholder primacy model of the corporation in which managers' only
goal is to maximize shareholder returns. Some scholars view the
success of market-driven CSR norms to suggest that the larger world of
corporate social responsibility is properly seen as a new lex mercatoria.4
Under this characterization, CSR norms will become so widespread that
they crystallize into independently binding legal norms later applied by
government-sanctioned courts.5 The application of modern market-
driven CSR norms, as well as the respective natures of lex mercatoria
and CSR norms more broadly, makes it unlikely that this optimistic
phenomenon will materialize.
Because ancient lex mercatoria norms fall directly in line with a
corporation's desire to maximize profits and minimize liability and CSR
norms tend to cut into profits and expose the corporation to new forms
of liability, the marketplace embraced the former but will reject the
latter to the extent that it impedes shareholder value. Nonetheless,
exploring the contrast between the lex mercatoria and corporate social
responsibility remains a useful exercise. Such exploration helps to
illuminate both the need for binding CSR norms and the fact that such
norms are more likely to come from the broader international
community than from within the executive suite.
Part II describes the varying interpretations of the lex mercatoria
and ultimately characterizes it as a blank canvas upon which scholars
and commentators may paint their own desires for the concept. Part III
describes the history, evolution, and enforcement mechanisms for
establishing corporate social responsibility norms, as well as their
respective merits and shortcomings. Part IV looks at the application of
market-driven CSR norms and concludes that, though they have been
the most successful in coercively binding corporations to norms of
corporate social responsibility on a large scale, such market-driven CSR
norms are better explained by the shareholder primacy model of the
corporation than a deviation from that model in favor of social
responsibility. Market-driven CSR norms tend to emerge in the
presence of a consumer base that explicitly values corporate social
responsibility over low price, in the wake of an egregious and widely
publicized CSR atrocity, or both, and as such are likely to be adopted by
4. See Reza Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, in
EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW 347,
374-79 (Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak eds.,1998); Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social
Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334,
357 (2009); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Soft Law, Hard Markets: Competitive Self-Interest and
the Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Multinational Corporations, 33
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 933, 951 (2008). But see Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 118-20 (2004).
5. See sources cited supra note 4.
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a small minority of corporate actors. Part V argues that, because of a
dubious historical foundation and opposite financial and economic
consequences, CSR norms are not likely to develop along the supposed
lines of the lex mercatoria. Instead, Part VI asserts a continued need
for the international community to develop coercive, binding CSR
norms to deal with the worst abusers and suggests that macroeconomic
and political developments are likely to overtake legal developments
and in the creation of binding CSR norms. Part VII concludes.
II. THE BLANK CANvAs THAT IS THE LEXMERCATORIA
Lex mercatoria, or "the law merchant," refers to a set of mercantile
customs that began voluntarily within the merchant community but
eventually crystallized into binding norms.6 The concept of the lex
mercatoria is one of the most obscure concepts in international law. In
fact, only two certainties surrounding the lex mercatoria and its history
truly exist. The first certainty is that "[i]nternational trade is in some
measure a constant thing."7 The story of the lex mercatoria has its
roots in medieval Europe, but it is a matter of historical fact that the
Europeans traded with the Arabs during the Crusades and "before the
Arabs came the Romans, and before the Romans the Greeks, and before
the Greeks the Phoenicians."8 As long as human beings have been able
to travel across borders they have engaged in international commerce.
The second certainty is that cross-border merchants had a set of
customs through which they dealt with one another, and this set of
customs became known as the lex mercatoria. Indeed, the concept of lex
mercatoria is recognized in The Hague and Vienna Conventions on the
International Sale of Goods9 and is explicitly incorporated into the
United States' Uniform Commercial Code. 10 More recently, the concept
of lex mercatoria has played a central gap-filling role in international
arbitration." The application of lex mercatoria is seen as preferable to
national law because of the uncertainty and one-sidedness inherent in
6. Christine Stammel, Back to the Courtroom? Developments in the London
Reinsurance Market, in EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 84-85.
7. WYNDAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT: BEING AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE AND FAIRS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 1-2 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1986).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex
Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 113
(Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987); Karyn S. Weinberg, Equity in International Arbitration: How
Fair is 'Fair'? A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J.
227, 229 (1994).
10. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant. . .
11. Weinberg, supra note 9, at 252.
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the latter. 12 These two certainties, the existence of ancient
international trade and the fact that a body of law came to govern that
trade, are clear, but drawing a logical connection between these
certainties and characterizing that connection has proven to be highly
problematic. Attempts over many centuries to characterize the lex
mercatoria have been so disparate that the concept has essentially
become a blank slate upon which scholars and practitioners project
their beliefs about the nature of international trade and the regulation
of such trade.
A. The Character of Lex Mercatoria
The centuries-old debate surrounding the lex mercatoria has been
riddled with ambiguities regarding the definition, importance, contents,
and current state of the concept.
1. Definitional Ambiguity
An American court has defined the concept not as a set of laws, but
rather principles and custom that result from "general convenience"
and "a common sense of justice."' 3 One scholar defined lex mercatoria
as the sum total of customary international law, interstate, and state
law relating to international trade. 14 Still another views it as a set of
general principles of commercial law, which operates in a similar
fashion as "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as
described in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. 15
2. Ambiguity in Attributed Importance
With such definitional ambiguity, it should come as no surprise
that there is disagreement regarding the importance of the lex
mercatoria. On one end of the spectrum lies the notion that lex
mercatoria is an inexorable part of transnational commercial law
because domestic laws were not written with international trade in
mind and are too deeply intertwined with a national culture, history,
and values system to serve as the governing principles for international
relationships.16 On the other end of the spectrum lies the belief that lex
mercatoria simply does not exist as a historical matter.' 7
12. Id.
13. Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508-09 (N.D. 1924).
14. Goldman, supra note 9, at 113.
15. Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 747, 749-50 (1985).
16. Tom Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 36 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
17. Georges R. Delaume, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at 130-31.
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3. Diverging Lists of the Lex Mercatoria's Elements
The prevailing wisdom among scholars is that it is impossible to
produce an exhaustive list of the elements making up the lex
mercatoria.18  However, this has not stopped such scholars from
attempting to do so. Some lists are relatively short, 19 and some are
quite long, 20 but, in the end, any purportedly complete, substantive list
18. E.g., Lando, supra note 15, at 749.
19. Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826-33 (1988) (listing elements of lex mercatoria as: 1. A sovereign
government may make and be bound by contractual agreements with foreign private
parties; 2. The corporate veil may be pierced to prevent a beneficial owner from escaping
contractual liability; 3. Force majeure justifies non-performance of a contract such that
the loss is borne fairly by the parties; 4. Contracts that seriously violate bonos mores or
international public policy are invalid; 5. Equitable compensation constitutes the primary
remedy for damages; 6. The right of property and of acquired vested rights is generally
inviolable-a State may not effect a taking without equitable compensation; 7. A party
may not receive unjust enrichment).
20. The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First
Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 174-77
(Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987) (listing the elements of lex mercatoria as: "1. A
general principle that contracts should prima facie be enforced according to their terms:
pacta sunt servanda. The emphasis given to this maxim in the literature suggests that it
is regarded, not so much as one of the rules of the lex mercatoria, but as the fundamental
principle of the entire system; 2. The first general principle is qualified at least in respect
of certain long-term contracts, by an exception akin to 'rebus sic stantibus.' The
interaction of the principle and the exception has yet to be fully worked out; 3. The first
general principle may also be subject to the concept of abus de droit, and to a rule that
unfair and unconscionable contracts and clauses should not be enforced; 4. There may be
a doctrine of culpa in contrahendo; 5. A contract should be performed in good faith; 6. A
contract obtained by bribes or other dishonest means is void, or at least unenforceable. So
too if the contract creates a fictitious transactions designed to achieve an illegal object; 7.
A State entity cannot be permitted to evade the enforcement of its obligations by denying
its own capacity to make a binding agreement to arbitrate, or by asserting that the
agreement is unenforceable for want of procedural formalities to which the entity is
subject; 8. The controlling interest of a group of companies is regarded as contracting on
behalf of all members of the group, at least so far as concerns an agreement to arbitrate;
9. If unforeseen difficulties intervene in the performance of a contract, the parties should
negotiate in good faith to overcome them, even if the contract contains no revision clause;
10. 'Gold clause' agreements are valid and enforceable. Perhaps in some cases either as
gold clause or a 'hardship' revision clause may be implied; 11. One party is entitled to
treat itself as discharged from its obligations if the other has committed a breach, but
only if the breach is substantial; 12. No party can be allowed by its own act to bring about
a non-performance of a condition precedent to its own obligation; 13. A tribunal is not
bound by the characterization of the contract ascribed to it by the parties; 14. Damages
for breach of contract are limited to the foreseeable consequences of the breach; 15. A
party which has suffered a breach of contract must take reasonable steps to mitigate its
loss; 16. Damages for non-delivery are calculated by reference to the market price of the
goods and the price at which the buyer has purchased equivalent goods in replacement;
17. A party must act promptly to enforce its rights, on pain of losing them by waiver. This
may be an instance of a more general rule, that each party must act in a diligent and
practical manner to safeguard its own interests; 18. A debtor may in certain
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of the contents of lex mercatoria is likely to be more reflective of the list
creator's perspective than the lex mercatoria itself.
4. Differing Conceptions of the Lex Mercatoria's Current State
The uncertainty that shrouds lex mercatoria also extends to the
current state of the concept as well. One scholar sees the lex mercatoria
primarily as an historical concept now controlled by positive law and
accordingly "well settled."21 Others see it as an ever-present, ever-
evolving concept. 22 And still another views it as a complete illusion. 23
In sum, there is virtually no agreement surrounding the lex mercatoria,
as reflected in the concept's definition, importance, substantive
contents, and current state. There is similar discord surrounding the
lex mercatoria's history.
B. The History of Lex Mercatoria
To the extent that there is any common wisdom surrounding the
history of lex mercatoria, that wisdom says that it came about in Italy
in the central part of the Middle Ages and was founded on Roman and
canon law. 24  Then, around the turn of the seventeenth century,
European courts began to recognize a "novel principle"; mercantile
custom could actually create an independent, binding legal obligation
irrespective of relevant positive law.25 Thus, what once was voluntary
custom became binding law in and of itself. There are, however,
credible and widely read historical accounts that both extend and limit
this prevailing historical narrative.
1. Extending the Traditional Narrative
One historical characterization extends the traditional narrative
around the lex mercatoria by asserting that it pre-existed the middle
ages and began at least as early as the writing of the Hebrew Bible.
Bewes's The Romance of the Law Merchant first advanced this view.26
Bewes believed that by the time medieval Europeans began to
incorporate the lex mercatoria into their own customs, that body of
mercantile custom was already "centuries standing" in the Arab
circumstances set off his own cross-claims to extinguish or diminish his liability to the
creditor; 19. Contracts should be construed according to the principle ut res magis valeat
quam pereat; 20. Failure by one party to respond to a letter written to it by the other is
regarded as evidence of assent to its terms").
21. See FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 208 (1992).
22. Id, at 213 (describing the work of Berthold Goldman).
23. Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613, 623 (1989).
24. BEWES, supra note 7, at 1.
25. J. H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295, 295-98 (1979).
26. BEWES, supra note 7, at 2.
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world.27 Bewes uses both historical accounts and the prevalence of
Arabic in the English language of commerce as evidence of medieval
European trade with the East,28 and he uses the first certainty
surrounding the les mercatoria - that "[i]nternational trade is in some
measure a constant thing" - as evidence that mercantile customs long
pre-existed such trade. 29 Bewes goes so far as to ask whether it was not
possible that "the practice of insurance existed [in ancient times] but
left little trace,"30 but ultimately resigns himself to the notion that,
while the West is indebted to the East for some of its mercantile law,
"how much [it] shall perhaps never know."31
2. Questioning the Extent of the Traditional Narrative
Another, more tempered, conception of the lex mercatoria questions
the traditional narrative by suggesting that different cultures
recognized the concept at different times. According to this version of
the lex mercatoria, Medieval Northern Europeans were familiar with
the term, but sixteenth century Italian Merchants were not.32 While
the proponent of this argument cited many Northern European
references to lex mercatoria as such, he was unable to find a single
reference to lex mercatoria in Benvenuto Stracca's De mercatura, which
is as surprising as it is revealing. 33 Written in 1553, De mercatura is
thought to be the first comprehensive treaty on commercial law. 34 If
the lex mercatoria was as important and omnipresent as the prevailing
narrative suggests, it almost certainly would have been mentioned in
the seminal sixteenth century European treatise on commercial law.
This is especially true when one considers that an Italian wrote this
treatise, whose countrymen supposedly played a crucial role in the lex
mercatoria's dissemination throughout Europe. 35 More basically, cross-
border universality is an integral characteristic of the lex mercatoria.
Thus its notable absence in De mercatura calls into question lex
mercatoria's existence more generally.
3. Denying the Traditional Narrative
The final historical characterization of the lex mercatoria takes the
opposite position of Bewes's and argues that the lex mercatoria is
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at vi.
32. Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at
the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (2004).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 27-28.
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essentially an historical fiction propagated by those seeking to
romanticize the merchant class. One scholar notes that "[m]uch early
writing on the [lex mercatoria] was characterized by an ideological,
almost mystical zeal. It was advocatory rather than descriptive or
analytical."3 6 In fact, the Right Honourable Sir Richard Atkin, in his
Forward to Bewes' Romance of the Law Merchant lamented that
merchants were not associated with notions of romance and celebrated
Bewes's book's potential to "not only create an interest in the past, but
give a vision of the romance that attends the commerce of the
present."37
One scholar took a purely historical approach to the issue and came
to the conclusion that the lex mercatoria, as understood today, is mostly
the product of legend.3 8 According to this author, the lex mercatoria
was not a body of mercantile laws but rather an expedited process
utilized by men who understood the inefficiencies of traditional courts
and mutually agreed to avoid those inefficiencies. 39 He bases this
argument on, inter alia, an examination of the oldest English treatise
on lex mercatoria, published in the late thirteenth century, which states
that the only difference between lex mercatoria and the common law are
the speed of the process, the liability of pledges to answer, and the
denial of wager of law as a means of establishing a negative. 40
According to this scholar, the lex mercatoria did not create any new
obligations, but was merely a convenient way to discharge pre-existing
obligations. 41 Contrary to the popular narrative, "[m]ercantile customs
were either local facts [to be proved as such] or they were the common
law of England," and the speedy procedural aspects of the lex
mercatoria were never adopted by English courts. 42
Upon an examination of the debate surrounding the nature and
history of the lex mercatoria, the concept seems more like a Rorsach test
where scholars and practitioners project their own views of
international commercial law than a concrete historical and sociological
phenomenon from which similarly concrete lessons may be drawn. The
lex mercatoria can be a millennia old mercantile tradition still operating
as the central animating force of international commercial law today,
an historical relic of mercantile convenience with no contemporary
relevance, or anything in between. Depending upon what one wishes to
36. Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria-Hoist with its Own Petard?, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (2004).
37. The Right Honourable Sir Richard Atkin, Forward to BEWES, supra note 7, at iv.
38. See Baker, supra note 25, at 320-22.
39. Id. at 300, 303.
40. Id. at 300 (discussing LEX MERCATORIA as printed in THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF
BRISTOL 57-58 (F. B. 'Bickley ed., Bristol 1900, vol. 1)).
41. Id. at 303.
42. Id. at 321.
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assert about the lex mercatoria, he or she can find a plethora of
scholarly and legal writing to support that preferred position.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Unlike the lex mercatoria, the principle of corporate social
responsibility ("CSR") has both a clear history and relatively
straightforward contents. The debate surrounding CSR instead lies in
how the international community can ensure that corporations live up
to the widely agreed upon principles of corporate social responsibility.
More than any single incident of corporate misbehavior, macroeconomic
forces accompanying globalization led to the widespread acceptance of
the need for workable CSR norms. Between 1990 and 1997, the amount
of capital spent abroad increased by over five hundred percent. 43 This
increase came largely as a result of the proliferation of information
technology and its ability to allow corporations to benefit from global
supply chains like never before.44
While this phenomenon has led to benefits for the developing world
in terms of a closing knowledge and resource gap, 45 it has also given
multinational corporations unprecedented power relative to the
countries in which they operate. Because MNCs' resources tend to
dwarf those of their host countries, 46 they tend to behave in ways that
fall below standards of their domestic counterparts in dealing with the
communities where they do business. 47 This seemingly perpetual
asymmetry between multinational corporations and developing
countries has led to an increased risk of corporate abuses abroad. As a
result, the international community has worked hard to define the
contents of corporate social responsibility and compel corporate and
sovereign stakeholders to accept those contents both nominally and in
practice.
A. History of Corporate Social Responsibility
The notion that corporate action could be considered an
international criminal offense originated after the end of World War
43. See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of
Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with
Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451, 474 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Data, Data Everywhere, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443.
45. STIGLITZ, supra note 43, at 453.
46. See id. at 476 (noting that "[t]he annual revenues of General Motors are greater
than the GDP of more than 148 countries; while Wal-Mart's revenues exceed the
combined GDP of sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa and Nigeria").
47. See id. at 476-79.
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11.48 At the Subsequent Nuremburg Trials held in 1945 and 1946 and
conducted by a United States military commission, corporate officers of
the I.G. Farbin trust, the Flick trust, and the Krupp firm were indicted
for crimes against humanity, war crimes, complicity in the crime of
mass murder, and aiding and abetting the inhumane acts performed by
the S.S.49 In the United Kingdom in 1946, a British Military Tribunal
convicted businessmen Karl Weinbacher and Bruno Tesch for aiding
and abetting murder for their manufacture of gas used in Nazi
concentration camps.5 0 There, what was once thought a politically and
legally neutral act, namely the manufacture and sale of a commodity,
became an act through which indirect criminal liability could run.5 1
Though the Nuremburg Trials were an important first step towards
internationally recognized and enforced rules on corporate social
responsibility, corporate actors continued to act with relative impunity
for the next half-century.52
Unlike international human rights more generally, new legal
norms dealing with corporations did not immediately begin to emerge
following the Nuremburg Trials. Nonetheless, the idea that
corporations should consider stakeholders other than its shareholders
soon took hold. Less than a decade after the Nuremburg Trials,
economist Howard Bowen coined the term "corporate social
responsibility."5 3 According to Bowen, the notion of corporate social
responsibility was not antithetical to the shareholder primacy model
because he was convinced that economic benefits would flow from a
corporation's introduction of broader societal goals into its decision
making process. 54
Bowen's work, combined with a marked increase in international
trade, ultimately led to early efforts at corporate social responsibility in
the form international treaties and domestic legislation. These early
efforts were the result of developing countries' worries that their
national control would be diluted by the introduction of foreign direct
48. See Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maa, Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and Its Challenges,
8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 699, 701 (2010).
49. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, vols. 6 (Flick), 7-8 (I.G. Farben), 9 (Krupp).
Nuremberg (1951), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLawlNTs-war-
criminals.html.
50. United Nations War Crimes Comm'n, The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch
and Two Others, 1 L. REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93-102 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflLaw-ReportsVol-1.pdf.
51. Id. at 102.
52. See Kaleck & Saage-Maa, supra note 48, at 702.
53. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 41, 48-49 (2010).
54. Id.
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investment but still saw such investment as the only means towards
economic progress.55 This early period is exemplified by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD's)
Voluntary Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the first of
many voluntary codes of conduct, created in the early 1970's.56
Because these early efforts at CSR were not particularly effective in
shaping corporate behavior, the 1980's and 1990's were characterized
by "a self-regulating, profit-maximizing, shareholder-focused brand of
corporate governance."5 7 This period was fraught with ecological and
social calamities that eventually led to increased pressure for a more
binding brand of corporate social responsibility. Some well-known
examples of corporate malfeasance that took place during this period
include Unocal's criminal behavior in Myanmar, the Bhopal disaster in
India, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Nike's widespread use of
"sweatshops" in Asia.58 These atrocities were handled in an ad hoc
fashion, with tactics ranging from public pressure in the case of Nike,5 9
to federal liability in the Ninth Circuit in the case of Unocal.6 0 While
the debate as to precisely how to create and enforce CSR norms that
meaningfully affect corporate behavior continues, the need for such
norms was painfully clear by the turn of the twenty-first century.
B. Character of Corporate Social Responsibility
1. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility
Strictly speaking, no legally authoritative definition of corporate
social responsibility exists.6 1 However, a survey of several definitions
demonstrates a common understanding as to the general nature of the
concept. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization
defines CSR as "the way a company achieves balance or integration of
economic, environmental and social imperatives while at the same time
addressing shareholder expectations." 62 The Canadian government
notes that CSR applies to firms operating at home and abroad, and that
a key feature of CSR lies in the way a corporation engages with its
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, governments, NGOs and
55. Id. at 49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id. at 51; Kaleck & Saage-Maa, supra note 48, at 702.
59. See Nike FAQs, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, http://www.globalexchange.org/sweatfree/
nike/faq (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
60. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA, & CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (Chip Pitts ed. 2009).
62. What is CSR?: Defining the Concept, UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION, http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o72054 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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IGOs.63 The European Commission largely echoes the United Nation's
definition in its focus on social and environmental concerns but
explicitly describes CSR as a voluntary concept. 64 The Department of
Business, Innovation, and Skills of Great Britain adds a cost-benefit
analysis to the European Commission's definition when it describes
CSR as "voluntary actions that business can take, over and above
compliance with minimum legal requirements" with the aim of
"maximising [economic, social, and environmental] benefits and
minimizing the downsides." 65  Broadly speaking, corporate social
responsibility encompasses what John Elkington referred to as "the
triple bottom line" of "people, planet, and profit."66  In pursuing
corporate social responsibility, corporations should consider the social
and ecological impact of their business practices without ceasing to be a
profit-generating entity.
2. The UN's Ten Principles of CSR
The most comprehensive and legally significant instrument
detailing the contents of CSR is the United Nations Global Compact's
Ten Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility.67 The Ten Principles
were officially launched on July 26, 2000 and have been endorsed by
over 8,000 entities, including 135 countries, 68 making the Ten
Principles the most widely acceded to voluntary CSR initiative in the
world.6 9 The Ten Principles are drawn from several multilateral
treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption.70 Reference to these treaties not only bolsters the legal
63. Corporate Social Responsibility, INDUSTRY CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/
csr-rse.nsfleng/home (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
64. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Promoting a European
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 1, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com200l_0366en01.pdf.
65. DEP'T FOR Bus. INNOVATION & SKILLS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 5
(2009), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file50312.pdf.
66. JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST
CENTURY BUSINESS, at iv (1998).
67. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited, Oct. 7, 2011)
(hereinafter Ten Principles).
68. UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited,
Oct. 7, 2011).
69. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited, Oct. 7, 2011).
70. Ten Principles, supra note 67; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); LO Declaration on
560 VOL. 40:4
2012 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH LEX MERCATORIA 561
significance of the Ten Principles but also reminds states of their
already existing obligations to human rights, labor rights, the
environment, and non-corrupt business practices.
Where human rights are concerned, the United Nations Ten
Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility states that corporations
should support the protection of internationally recognized human
rights and ensure that they are not complicit in the violation of such
rights.7 1 Regarding labor rights, the Ten Principles calls for business to
uphold the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining,
eliminate all forms of compulsory, forced, and child labor, and eliminate
all forms of discrimination in employment. 72 With respect to the
environment, the Ten Principles state that businesses should take a
precautionary approach to the environment that seeks to promote
greater environmental responsibility and diffuse environmentally
friendly technologies.73 Finally, the Ten Principles clearly states that
corporations "should work against corruption in all its forms, including
extortion and bribery."74
In sum, while the Ten Principles are nominally agreed upon, the
breadth of agreement may result from the fact that they are voluntary
and bind neither nation states nor corporations. In addition, the
widespread agreement fails to even address the question of how these
principles should be implemented. Indeed, where enforcement is
concerned, the debate surrounding CSR begins to appear similar to that
surrounding the lex mercatoria. There is such a wide spectrum of views
on the enforcement of CSR norms - ranging from a purely voluntary
approach to CSR to the establishment of corporate criminal liability in
the International Criminal Court - that a proponent of any position can
find ample support for that position in academic literature.7 5
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233;
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (June 14, 1992); United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4; U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, (Oct. 31, 2003).
71. Ten Principles, supra note 67.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based
Remedies for International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 106
(2004) (exploring "(1) marketplace activism (influence over or via capital structure and
sales of the corporation), (2) internal self-regulation (codes of conduct), and (3)
shareholder activism"); Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal
Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 909, 910
(2010) (claiming "full justification to impose on corporations the rules of international law
applicable to natural persons, especially the most basic ones concerning genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, and to regard them as accountable for respecting these
rules").
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The key distinction between the disagreement surrounding
corporate social responsibility and that surrounding the lex mercatoria
is that the former consists of complementary options while the latter
consists of mutually exclusive versions of the same story. The existence
of voluntary CSR norms does not impede other efforts to shape
corporate behavior, such as economic sanctions or civil liability. Each
method of ensuring corporate compliance with internationally
recognized social norms supplements the others. Conversely, the lex
mercatoria is either an historical phenomenon in which voluntary
norms were codified into binding law or is not. It is either in a state of
flux or is totally settled. Thus, when considering the debate around
methods for implementing CSR norms, one should view the debate as a
menu of options and not a choice between competing views on the same
subject.
C. Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility
Norms
Each option advanced as a means toward implementing corporate
social responsibility norms seeks to balance practical efficacy with
political feasibility, and each approach inevitably favors one over the
other. The range of policy options can be divided into four categories:
international regulation, domestic regulation, civil liability, and
market-driven self-regulation.7 6 A brief description of each category is
warranted to provide the context in which market-driven norms of
corporate social responsibility exist and to illustrate the practical
difficulty in imposing binding norms of corporate social responsibility
upon corporations.
1. International Regulation
As a means for creating binding CSR norms, international
regulation is the most ambitious and legally challenging option.
Proponents have therefore been unsuccessful in creating binding norms.
The most ambitious of all international corporate regulations is
international corporate criminal liability. 7 To establish such liability,
Article 5 of the Rome Statute would have to be amended to expand ICC
76. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the International
Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 177 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
77. See, e.g., Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 910; Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporations and
the International Criminal Court: The Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare, 19
CRIM. L.F., 115, 150 (2008) ("Arguments in favour of the better regulation of
multinational corporations in their global activities, such as those outlined above, might
support a reform of the ICC to include corporations in its jurisdiction in furtherance of the
stated objectives of the Court, and so it is with such questions that the future reformers of
the ICC Statute should be concerned.").
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jurisdiction to include legal, as well as natural persons.78  This
approach has not been successful, not only because of a lack of political
will in developed countries to expose their corporations to such
liability,7 9 but also because international human rights law has
developed according to the notion of state primacy in which states bear
primary responsibility for the protection of the human rights of their
citizens.8 0  Furthermore, this approach is antithetical to the
shareholder primacy model of the corporation, which states that a
corporation's duty is to maximize shareholder profit.81 Shareholder
primacy is more than a dominant theoretical model for the corporation;
it is seen by some as legal requirement for boards of directors in the
United States of America.82
As a result of these doctrinal challenges, most of the international
efforts consist of voluntary norms for corporations and multilateral
agreements directed at states, exemplified by the UN's Global Compact
discussed above. 83 While internationally developed sets of CSR norms
represent an important part of the discussion, as they are indeed one
option, in practice they create little opportunity for binding norms.
A third approach to international regulation of multinational
corporations comes in the form of multilateral treaties, which avoid the
complication of state primacy plaguing voluntary codes of corporate
conduct, as they are aimed directly at states. The four most prescient
treaties to CSR are those explicitly referenced by the Ten Principles:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor
Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 84 These treaties fail to
result in binding norms emanating from the host state for precisely the
same reason that corporate social responsibility is a problem in the first
place - namely that host governments lack the capacity to protect their
78. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/codlicc/statute/romefra.htm.
79. See Jordan Sundell, Note, Ill-Gotten Gains: The Case for International Corporate
Criminal Liability, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 648, 676 (2011) (describing significant political
challenges).
80. Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 933.
81. Id.
82. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.").
83. Ten Principles, supra note 67.
84. See id.
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citizens from corporate abuses. Thus, where these multilateral treaties
are needed most, the relevant state parties do not enforce them.
2. Domestic Criminal Regulation
In addition to calls for international regulation of MNCs, developed
nations have used domestic mechanisms, including judicial action and
legislation, to affect the actions of corporations doing business abroad.
For example, a Dutch criminal court convicted businessman Frans van
Anraat of aiding and abetting war crimes for supplying the Iraqi
government with chemicals needed to manufacture mustard gas used
against the Kurdish population.85  More recently, the Hamburg
Consumer Protection Agency filed charges of unfair competition in
Heilbronn district court claiming that German discount retailer Lidl
falsely advertised its products by claiming that it provided fair labor
conditions to its workers in Bangladesh when an investigation
uncovered that the claim was far from true.86
Domestic regulation of multinational corporations has also taken
the form of legislation and executive orders, and some go so far as to
call for developed countries to apply its corporate laws to the local
parent companies of corporations operating overseas. 8 7 While this
approach has not gained political traction, domestic legislation has been
successful to a certain degree in regulating the actions of multinational
corporations. The most important and successful example of such
legislation is the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
makes it illegal for any corporation that is publicly traded in the United
States to bribe a foreign official.88 This effort, initially seen as a
hindrance to American multinationals, has become a model global
standard. 89
85. Public Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, LJNAU8685, The Hague District Court, 23 Dec.
2005 at 13; BA6734, Gerechtshof s-Gravenhage, 2200050906-2, judgment of 5 Sept. 2007.
86. Consumer complaint demands fair working conditions, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/lidl-case/
articles/consumer-complaint-demands-fair-working-conditions.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2011).
87. See, e.g., Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity
in Human Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 899, 903 (2008).
88. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq (1998).
89. Angel Gurria, OECD Sec'y Gen., Towards Coherence in International Economic
Law: Perspectives at the 50th Anniversary of the OECD (Mar. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_474720441_1_1_1 ,0.h
tml ('The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, which is based on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, has outlawed foreign bribery in 38 countries. OECD's recognized 'gold
standard' and strict monitoring mechanism puts key competitors closer in line with best
practices."); Letter from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington to the U.S.
House of Representatives (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com
/doc/78161873/CREW-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-FCPA-Letter-to-Congress-01- 12-12
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The executive branch also has a role to play in ensuring compliance
with human rights norms abroad. This role takes the form of trade
sanctions, the most coercive method of ensuring compliance.90 These
trade sanctions commonly occur when a developed country, regional
organization, or inter-governmental organization learns of widespread
human rights violations occurring in a country and impose trade
sanctions upon that entire nation.91 These sanctions can be
implemented quickly and at little or no cost, 92 but they have also been
criticized for stifling a state's ability to pursue other human rights
objectives.93 In short, domestic regulation of multinational corporations
are highly effective where they have been forcefully implemented, but
such regulation is sparse and ad-hoc in nature, making them
unacceptable for proponents of universally binding norms.
3. Domestic Civil Regulation
The third category of enforcement mechanisms for corporate social
responsibility norms is a regime of civil liability. The Alien Tort Claims
Act ("ATCA") in the United States exemplifies this regime.9 4 The ACTA
was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and vests original
jurisdiction in United States District Court allowing an alien to bring a
claim for the violation of the law of nations or a United States treaty.95
In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the ATCA could be invoked for human rights violations in Filartiga
u. Peiia-Irala.96 There, the court held that a Paraguayan government
official violated the Act when he tortured a citizen of Paraguay.9 7 Then,
in 1997, the Northern District of California held that a corporation
could be brought to court under the ATCA when it found that Unocal
was complicit in human rights abuses perpetrated by Myanmar's
(describing the FCPA as having led to a "leadership role in curbing corruption both at
home and abroad").
90. See Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and Multinational
Corporations: The EU-ACP Context, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 382 (2009).
91. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 9, 1985) (imposing
trade sanctions on South Africa in response to apartheid); Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (imposing trade sanctions in Sudan in response to
violence perpetrated by the government).
92. Amao, supra note 90, at 394.
93. Id. at 386.
94. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350).
95. Id.
96. Filartiga v. Peita-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. Id.
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military on its behalf.98 The Ninth Circuit later affirmed the case,
opening the statute for use to enforce corporate social responsibility. 9
However, in the 2004 landmark case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
the United States Supreme Court defined the jurisdiction of the ATCA
quite narrowly. 100 There, the Court held that the ATCA was
jurisdictional in nature but was meant to be immediately operable upon
passage. 101 Looking to the legislative history of the statute, the court
found that it was meant to create a common law cause of action for
piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringement on the rights of
ambassadors. 102 It held that new causes of action could arise under the
common law if the norm that was allegedly violated was of sufficient
universality and specificity such that it mirrored the three eighteenth
century norms contemplated by Congress. 103
Though a United States Circuit court has held that the ATCA can
apply to corporations in the post-Sosa era, 104 the final disposition is
pending before the Supreme Court. Moreover, even if successful on the
merits, its reach appears to be limited to violations of international law
norms approaching, if not reaching, the status of jus cogens. Moreover,
even if the plaintiff is able to establish a violation of sufficient gravity to
be covered by the ATCA, he or she must properly serve the defendant
with process in the United States and overcome an almost certain
forum non-conveniens challenge - both significant obstacles in
themselves. 105 While there are alternatives to the ATCA, they all pose
significantly greater jurisdictional challenges than the American
statute, making the ATCA the strongest option for challenging
corporate human rights violations in civil court. 106 Because the civil
realm is limited only to the gravest violations of human rights and is
subject to significant jurisdictional challenges, it is not a practicable
option for enforcing corporate social responsibility on a global level.
4. Market-Based Regulation
The final class of CSR enforcement mechanisms comes from the
marketplace itself and is the direct focus of this paper. Examples of a
98. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
99. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 710 (2004).
101. Id. at 710, 725.
102. Id. at 724.
103. Id. at 725.
104. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. Bahareh Mostajelean, Note, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act:
The Success (or Is It Failure?) of Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations
That Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 497, 502-03 (2008).
106. See id. at 505-14 (including the Brussels Convention, the United Kingdom's
common law judicial system, and France's Civil Code as potential legal sources that could
be used to bring a MNC to court for violations of human rights).
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market-driven approach to corporate social responsibility include
rights- sensitive branding, unilateral codes of conduct, voluntary
submission to auditing, and shareholder pressure. 107 Although this
category of norms has the strongest practical foundation, the reach of
these efforts is fairly narrow and actual compliance with the underlying
norms is mixed, even when the efforts are successfully implemented.
The basis of the advocacy for a market-based regime of CSR norms
is an apparent absence of alternatives that do not offend international
human rights law, corporate law, or both. 0 8 Externally imposed CSR
norms offend the traditional notion of shareholder primacy "by
requiring management to develop an expertise in human rights law and
exercise de facto control over abuses generally committed by
governments, raising costs without raising revenues."10 9 These top-
down norms similarly offend the notion of state primacy in human
rights law, the idea that states have the primary responsibility to
protect human rights, absent extraordinary circumstances defined by
national agreement. 110 These points are relatively straightforward but
nonetheless bear repeating. The fundamental nature of shareholder
primacy and state primacy in corporate and international human rights
law, respectively, cannot be overstated. A market-driven approach
accordingly seeks to avoid the problem arising from shareholder
primacy altogether and make the state primacy model largely
irrelevant. At present, it is the most practical and realistic of all
approaches.
4a. Rights-Sensitive Branding
The first subset of market-driven CSR norms is rights-sensitive
branding, which seeks to attract "a profitable contingent of consumers
[who are willing to] pay a premium for some assurance that the goods
they purchase are not produced or marketed in violation of the rights of
workers and communities."' Some prominent examples of rights-
sensitive branding include Starbucks' "fair trade" coffee, Chiquita's
"ethical banana" (marketed in Europe), and the well known "Kimberly
Process" aimed at reducing the prevalence of conflict diamonds on the
world market.112 While these efforts prove that some consumers are
willing to pay higher retail prices for goods they believe to be
manufactured and marketed in a way that is consistent with these
107. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 180-85.
108. See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 933-34.
109. Id. at 933.
110. Id. at 933-34.
111. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 181.
112. Id. at 181-82.
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consumers' ideals, "translation into corporate practice [has been]
episodic at best."1 13
4b. Unilateral Codes of Conduct
In a similar vein, corporations seeking to show their customers that
they hold themselves to high standards when it comes to human rights,
labor rights, and environmental protection may adopt unilateral codes
of conduct. Firms as diverse as Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, and Liz
Claiborne have adopted these unilateral codes of conduct.114 Critics of
these codes argue that they are little more than public relations
strategies or attempts to preempt host countries from issuing tougher
regulation. 115 However, empirical studies show these unilateral codes
have led to real change, especially when coupled with external
monitoring mechanisms.e1 6 Unilateral codes of conduct are especially
effective when they are implemented by a company high on the supply
chain that extends the code to suppliers as a condition of doing
business.1 1 7 However, there is no way to enforce these codes of conduct,
and frequently, it is impossible to know if the corporations advancing
these codes are even attempting to comply with them.
4c. Social Accountability Auditing & Certification
The third subcategory of market-driven CSR norms is social
accountability auditing and certification, which occurs when a
corporation partners with an NGO to develop verifiable standards in
the workplace and submits itself to periodic auditing to ensure that the
corporation in fact meets those standards."s This approach seeks to
remedy some of the deficiencies in ensuring compliance associated with
declaratory unilateral codes of conduct. The SA 8000, developed by
Social Accountability International and seeking compliance with
standards in child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of
association, freedom from discrimination, disciplinary practices, work
hours, compensation, and management systems, serves as a prime
113. Id. at 182.
114. Id. at 183.
115. Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private" and
"Public" Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 619 (2011).
116. See, e.g., Richard Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?
Lessons from Nike 19, 37-38 (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy
Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 24, 2006); Anne Landman, Absolving
Your Sins and CYA Corporations Embrace Voluntary Codes of Conduct, PR WATCH (Sept.
4, 2001), http://www.prwatch.org/node/7724.
117. See Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 499, 509-10 (2008) (using Gap, Inc.
as an example).
118. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184.
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example. 119  Participants in this system voluntarily submit to
announced and unannounced surveillance audits to ensure
compliance. 120 Other examples include the ISO 14001 and the ISO
9000, which seek compliance with environmental standards and quality
control norms, respectively.12 1 However, these accountability audits are
only as good as the auditors themselves. The Enron debacle, in which
Arthur Andersen, Enron's accountant, actively worked to conceal fraud
and destroy evidence, is a striking example of the limitations on relying
upon accounting measures to ensure compliance.122  The Arthur
Andersen scandal shows the degree to which corporations can
manipulate their records to dictate the outcome of an audit.
4d. Ethical Investment by Shareholders
The final category of market-based mechanisms to promote
compliance with corporate social responsibility norms is ethical
investment organizations through which interested shareholders and
institutional investors apply shareholder pressure to coerce
corporations into heeding social norms.123 This form of market-based
pressure is the purest of all four, as it falls directly in line with the
shareholder primacy model of the corporation. In this instance,
corporations pursue CSR norms not because they feel a duty to third
party stakeholders, but because their own shareholders have demanded
it. The most famous example of such shareholder pressure is the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund. 124 The second largest pension
fund with assets in excess of $300 billion,125 the Norwegian Fund has
used its formidable economic sway to disinvest from Singapore
Technologies because of the "large degree of probability" that it was
producing anti-personnel mines through a subsidiary, 126 and to exclude
Kerr-McGee from its portfolio for actions taken off the coast of the non-
self-governing territory of Western Sahara. 127  Similarly, certain
investment vehicles like the FTSE4GGOOD Index series have been
created to measure the performance of companies that meet globally
recognized CSR norms so that "consultants, asset owners, fund
119. See Soc. ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L, SOcIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000, at 5-8 (2008),
available at http://www.sa-intl.org/_dataln_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184.
122. See Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant
Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 447 (2003).
123. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184-85.
124. See Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational
Corporations for Human Rights Violations-The Case of Norway's Sovereign Wealth
Fund, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 577, 582 (2008).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 584.
127. Id. at 591.
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managers, investment banks, stock exchanges and brokers [can assess]
or creat[e] responsible investment products."128 In the end, however,
"[t]hese indices are necessarily partial, because they include only 'high
impact' and only particular areas of corporate responsibility, some of
which have little to do with human rights."129
Because these market-driven approaches to binding corporate
social responsibility norms are enforced by the marketplace and not by
governments, they have been met with considerably more practical
success than their more coercive counterparts. This has led some to
argue that the best hope for binding CSR norms comes not from
governments but from corporations themselves.
5. The Argument That Market-Driven Norms Are a New Lex
Mercatoria
The strongest proponents of a market-driven approach to corporate
social responsibility argue that CSR can and should be seen as a new
lex mercatoria.130 The argument, advanced most notably by Professor
Ralph G. Steinhardt, is that the true character of the lex mercatoria is
highly representative of the aspirations that proponents of enforceable
corporate social responsibility norms have for the future of the
concept.131 According to Professor Steinhardt, the lex mercatoria
"blurred the distinction between self-interest and altruism," was
transnational in scope, grounded in good faith, reflective of market
practices, and ultimately codified into binding legal norms.132
Steinhardt argues that corporate social responsibility and the lex
mercatoria share the same "genetic marker" implying that corporate
social responsibility will evolve in much the same way as the lex
mercatoria.133 Thus, Steinhardt predicts that the seemingly soft
notions of corporate social responsibility will evolve into hard legal
norms because a merchant's self-interest will depend on his respect for
the interests of others. Thus, at the core of this private law ultimately
rests public values. 134
Professor Steinhardt is right in arguing that corporations have in
fact submitted voluntarily to CSR norms without the help of
governments and that "the justifications for this 'human rights
128. FTSE4GOOD Index Series, FTSE: THE INDEX COMPANY,
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good-IndexSeries/index.jsp (last visited, Oct. 17,
2011).
129. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 185 n.14.
130. See, e.g., Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 947-48; Pitts, supra note 4, at 357; Engle,
supra note 4, at 118.
131. See Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223; Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 950.
132. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223-24.
133. Id. at 225.
134. Id.
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entrepreneurialism' are multiple and mutually reinforcing." 13 5
However, this author argues that rather than developing as a result of
an emerging understanding among merchants that respect for CSR
norms is essential to collective mercantile success, binding norms of
corporate social responsibility will result from pressures entirely
outside the corporate suite and will ultimately come in the form of
clauses in bilateral investment treaties. A close examination of existing
CSR norms shows that rather than blurring self-interest and altruism
in a way that derogates from the shareholder primacy model, every
current example of market-driven CSR can be easily explained by
simple self-interest on the part of the corporation.
IV. MARKET-DRIVEN CSR: SELF INTEREST IS A PRECONDITION FOR
ALTRUISM
Proponents of corporate social responsibility as a new lex
mercatoria offer the notion that the lex mercatoria "effectively blurred
the distinction between self-interest and altruism" in support of their
position. 136 The idea behind this argument is that merchants have
historically been willing to bind themselves to lex mercatoria norms
that favored the general interest, and they can accordingly be expected
to bind themselves in a similar fashion to corporate social responsibility
norms in the future.
Professor Steinhardt himself admits that, while the benefits of lex
mercatoria norms flowed primarily to the mercantile community itself,
the benefits of corporate social responsibility norms flow to a "labour
force or a society or even an idea."137 Yet Professor Steinhardt and
other proponents maintain that lex mercatoria and CSR norms are
sufficiently similar such that CSR norms will develop into a new lex
mercatoria. A closer look into the types of corporations and situations
that have given rise to voluntary CSR norms suggests that the
shareholder primacy model is alive and well and that short-term
corporate self-interest is the most natural explanation for the
development of market-driven CSR norms.
Current examples of market-driven CSR further suggest that such
norms are not likely to develop outside of three specific, and relatively
rare, scenarios. These scenarios include servicing the "right" customer
base, atoning for a prior CSR atrocity, or servicing the "right" customer
base after a CSR atrocity.
135. Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 937.
136. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223.
137. Id. at 225.
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A. Servicing the "Right" Customer Base
The first scenario involves corporations that are dealing in branded
goods and servicing a customer base that is not price sensitive and
highly values-sensitive. The second scenario consists of companies
dealing in low-cost goods or commodities that are atoning for an
egregious and widely publicized CSR-related disaster within the
industry. The third scenario is actually a combination of the first two
and occurs when a significant and widely publicized CSR disaster
occurs in an industry that services non-price sensitive, highly values-
sensitive customers. Though this third class is quite small, it is there
where the most meaningful CSR norms have developed. Because these
three scenarios are more easily explained by the shareholder primacy
model than by a sudden shift towards altruism, the empirical claim that
MNC's have in fact increased compliance with CSR norms does little in
the way of advancing the notion that CSR norms are capable of fully
developing into binding law, from the bottom up, along the supposed
line of the lex mercatoria.
The first scenario results in voluntary codes of conduct and rights
sensitive branding lines coming from companies like Starbucks,138
Jonathan's Organics,139 Avon Cosmetics, 140 Ben & Jerry's,141 and Whole
Foods Market. 142 The first thing to note about these examples is that
they are all premium brands. If one were to line up all of a grocery
store's coffee, produce, and ice cream by price per ounce, Starbucks,
Jonathan's Organics, and Ben & Jerry's products would all be at or near
the expensive end of the line. Customers buying high-end goods such as
these are willing to pay a premium for their product. Thus, the
economic effects of adhering to CSR norms are passed from the firm to
the consumer where they are happily accepted. Moreover, these high-
end goods providers are competing with other high-end goods providers.
Ben & Jerry's competes with Hiagen-Dazs; Starbucks competes with
Seattle's Best. Because a significant segment of the affluent consumer
group values social responsibility above price,143 companies selling
high-end, branded goods are able to gain market share through their
adoption and promotion of their adoption of CSR codes.
138. See Products: Coffee, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/products-
partners/coffee (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
139. See Products: Fruits & Vegetables, FAIR TRADE USA,
http://fairtradeusa.org/products-partners/fruits-vegetables (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
140. See Products: Body Care, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/products-
partners/body-care (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
141. See Products: Cocoa, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/products-
partners/cocoa (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
142. See Products: Wine, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/products-
partners/wine (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
143. See Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 181.
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The implementation of market-based CSR norms under this first
scenario does indeed have positive consequences for those outside of the
firm, but to call the adoption of these norms "altruistic" goes too far. A
company develops a rights-sensitive branding line for a high-end
product in order to gain share of a market whose consumers are already
willing to accept a higher price; it is a wholly self-interested decision.
B. Atoning For a Prior Atrocity
The second scenario under which corporations aggressively adopt
CSR norms, namely corporations in an industry marred by egregious
and well-publicized human rights or environmental disasters, is equally
self-interested. The most significant examples of this phenomenon can
be seen in Shell Nigeria, 144 Exxon Mobil,14 5 and Union Carbide, who
were responsible for the atrocities committed against the Ogoni people,
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, and the Bhopal disaster, respectively.
Whereas the first class of corporate actors undertake CSR
initiatives to attract new customers by going above and beyond the
industry standard when it comes to corporate social responsibility, this
second class seeks to retain existing customers by proving that the
current industry standard is acceptable to the broader public when it
comes to CSR. The firms in this second class are primarily seeking to
restore their reputational accountability so that they can continue to be
competitive. 146 The measures taken under the second scenario are even
less altruistic than those taken under the first, as the corporation sees
them as being necessary for survival rather than a marketing strategy
designed to gain market share. Moreover, the actions taken by this
class more commonly take the form of charity and community support,
rather than norms designed to regulate business practices. 147
C. Atoning For a Prior Atrocity in the Minds of the "Right"
Consumer
Finally, there are certain scenarios where human rights atrocities
surface in an industry supplying goods to affluent consumers who are
more concerned with the assurance that their values are reflected in the
products they consume than about the price they must pay for the goods
themselves. The two key examples of this third scenario involve the
144. See Environment and Society, SHELL NIGERIA, http://www.shell.com.ng/homel
contentIngalenvironment society/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
145. See Safety & Environment, EXXON MOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com
/Corporate/safety.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
146. Jackson, supra note 53, at 91 (noting that this system of reputational
accountability is only effective when coupled with a system of civil liability).
147. See, e.g., SHELL NIGERIA, supra note 144 (focusing on education and healthcare in
the region).
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diamond industry and the textiles industry and have resulted in some
of the most robust examples of enforceable CSR norms to date.
The Kimberly Process was created in response to news in the 1990's
that a large number of diamonds bought in the developing world were
being used to fund conflicts in African nations such as Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Angola. 148 The egregious nature of the African conflicts led
the United Nations to announce the launch of the Kimberly Process in
2002.149 The Kimberly Process, which went into effect on January 1,
2003, requires that each participating country track each exported
diamond back to the mine from which it came or to the source of import
by implementing national laws that ensure compliance, designate
import and export authorities, establish control systems, provide
certificates for each diamond, ensure that diamonds are shipped in
tamper-resistant containers, and collect relevant data on their
activities. 150 The Process has been highly successful in reducing the
prevalence of conflict diamonds to less than 1 percent of the global
market.15 1 Similarly, the apparel industry has responded to harsh
criticism regarding labor conditions at suppliers' factories by developing
robust CSR schemes. For example, Nike employs a team of around 100
inspectors who grade suppliers on labor standards and work with
managers to address issues as they arise.152 Similar programs have
been implemented by Gap, Inc.153 (the parent company of Gap, Old
Navy, and Banana Republic Clothing lines), as well as Levi Strauss,
Co. 15 4 Like the Kimberly Process, these initiatives have been quite
successful in shaping corporate behavior.
A proponent of CSR as a new lex mercatoria might argue that the
Kimberly Process and the changes in the garment manufacturing
industry are particularly salient examples of corporate altruism. In
actuality these examples merely point out that the two already-
mentioned forces of CSR - a non-price sensitive, highly values-sensitive
consumer base and the presence of a well-publicized CSR atrocity - are
more potent together than they are alone. Purchasers of diamonds and
branded clothing generally have a high level of disposable income and
148. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 1-2
(2006) [hereinafter GAO Report].
149. Tina Muscarella Gooch, Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the
Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J.
189, 193 (2008).
150. GAO Report, supra note 148, at 9.
151. Vivienne Walt, Diamonds Aren't Forever, FORTUNE, Dec. 7, 2006,
http://money.cnn.comrJmagazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/12/11/8395442/index.htm.
152. Nike's New Game Plan for Sweatshops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 20,
2004), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_38/b3900011_mzOO1.htm.
153. Backer, supra note 117, at 511.
154. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 183.
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are likely to be aware of, and bothered by, the idea that their purchases
are fueling bloody African conflicts or unconscionable labor conditions.
Diamond and branded textile producers are under constant pressure
outside the corporate suite to improve their practices as a result of
reports of conflict diamonds and sweatshops. The directors and
managers inside the corporation know that their consumers are more
likely to walk away from their product as a result of these corporate
abuses than for having to pay a marginal premium to ensure that such
abuses do not occur.
None of this is to say that the above-mentioned efforts are negative,
or even unimpressive. Much of the beauty of the free market capitalist
system can be found in these "win-win" situations, and such scenarios
should be sought after and implemented at every turn. But altruism is
defined as the "disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of
others,"155 and accordingly, current examples of market-driven
corporate social responsibility fail to fit the definition. They are all
driven primarily by corporate self-interest and can be explained using
the shareholder primacy model of the corporation.
One cannot look at an action from the outside and decide if it is
self-interested or altruistic. Not all actions with a positive social effect
are altruistic, just as not all actions with a negative social impact are in
the corporation's self-interest. To decide whether a corporation's
decision is altruistic or self-interested, one must look into the
circumstances surrounding the decision and characterize the decision
with reference to those circumstances. Here, the requisite
circumstances appear to be a corporation looking to gain market share
in a segment actively seeking CSR, the presence of a widely reported
disaster within a given industry, or both. As such, self-interest appears
to be a precondition for altruism in the corporate context. These three
scenarios will never make up more than a small corner of all global
business, ensuring that adherence to CSR norms such that those norms
are effectively binding will remain primarily the responsibility of those
outside the corporation.
V. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT A NEw LEXMERCATORIA
Even apart from the fact that all current examples of market-
driven CSR are more easily explained through the shareholder primacy
model of the corporation than by a novel introduction of altruism into
that model, there are two important conceptual flaws to the argument
that corporate social responsibility shares a common fate with the lex
mercatoria. The first is that the entire argument rests upon a premise
that is far from certain - namely that lex mercatoria norms developed
155. Definition of Altruism, in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/altruism.
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exactly in the way that the traditional narrative suggests - an assertion
upon which considerable doubt has been cast. Also, lex mercatoria and
corporate social responsibility norms have the opposite practical effect
on firms with respect to effect on the price of goods sold, ease of
business administration, and changes in exposure to liability. These
flaws suggest that what Professor Steinhardt referred to as a shared
genetic marker is much more superficial, and that corporate social
responsibility norms are not likely to develop in the same fashion as the
supposedly ancient and independently-binding norms of the lex
mercatoria.
A. A Narrow View of History
Upon surveying the historical landscape of the lex mercatoria,156
two basic historical characterizations emerge. The first is that the lex
mercatoria began as a set of medieval mercantile customs, but at a
certain point in the sixteenth century, courts began to recognize these
customs as binding - even if applying the common law directly would
lead a different result.157 The second is that what is called the lex
mercatoria actually refers to an extrajudicial practice through which
educated men, each of whom saw the other as a relative equal, settled
disputes. Mercantile customs were local facts to be proved as such,158
and when the law, as applied to the particular facts of a case, led to a
particular result, governmentally sanctioned courts reached that result.
The difference between these two arguments is one of causation.
Under the first argument - the traditional view of the lex mercatoria -
the existence of reliable, equitable, and workable mercantile custom
actually caused that custom to be codified into law. Judges actively and
explicitly incorporated mercantile custom into the common law and
applied it as such to the parties before it. Under the second, alternative
view of the lex mercatoria, this causal relationship does not exist. The
lex mercatoria is more properly considered an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, or even a means of extrajudicial settlement,
than an independent body of law. If the so-called lex mercatoria is
merely an example of an extrajudicial settlement mechanism or a court
applying facts to law, it is wholly irrelevant to the modern issue of
corporate social responsibility. 15 9 The argument that CSR should be
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. Baker, supra note 25, at 297.
158. Id. at 321.
159. This article is not about which historical characterization is correct; the argument
that CSR norms should be seen as a new lex mercatoria fails on independent economic
and financial grounds. It is worth noting, however, that the alternative history of the lex
mercatoria is on stronger logical footing that the traditional view. The strongest
argument in favor of the traditional view appears to be that mercantile laws were found
to be so similar in so many jurisdictions for such a long time. This is indeed a remarkable
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seen as a new lex mercatoria only makes sense if the traditional
historical view of the lex mercatoria is ontologically accurate.
Thus, the argument that corporate social responsibility is properly
viewed as a new lex mercatoria is built upon an unsound foundation.
But even if one is willing to concede the historical portion, the overall
argument still crumbles. The desired norms of corporate social
responsibility and the identified norms of the lex mercatoria are
foundationally different, such that while the latter were economically
destine not only to emerge, but to bind the stakeholders, the former will
almost certainly require substantial outside pressure before they
become binding.
B. Polar Opposite Business Effects
Lex mercatoria norms benefitted merchants by reducing liability
and lowering overhead costs, which in turn allowed them to lower prices
and satisfy consumers. On the other hand, CSR norms expose
corporations to a new form of liability and raise overhead costs, which
lead to an increase in aggregate prices, making all but the most well-off
and socially conscious consumers unhappy. If one accepts that
corporations are primarily profit-maximizing, liability-minimizing
entities (which, as Section IV, infra suggests, is the case), it is easy to
see how lex mercatoria norms developed without any governmental
pressure. It is also easy to see why CSR norms are not likely to develop
in the same way.
1. Lex Mercatoria Norms Reduce Liability
The two primary characteristics of lex mercatoria norms are "good
faith and dispatch."160 This focus on equity and expeditiousness served
in no small part to make the merchant's business easier to run from a
purely practical standpoint, which ultimately reduced the cost of goods
sold. Several examples of identified lex mercatoria norms prove this
point.
One such example is the lex mercatoria norm that stated that each
partner in a partnership was an agent for the partnership and could
thus bind the partnership even when acting alone. 16 1 This allowed each
partner to conduct business on behalf of the partnership without the
other's presence. Partners could cover twice the area in the same
fact, but this author believes that such universality is most simply explained not by courts
adopting custom as independently-binding law for the first and only time, but by: 1)
Medieval merchants of different nations met with each other at trade fairs as a matter of
historical fact; and 2) economic efficiency is equally apparent to educated people of reason,
regardless of nationality, and the merchant was among the most well off class of medieval
and ancient society.
160. BEWES, supra note 7, at 19.
161. Id. at 20.
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amount of time rather than duplicating all of their efforts due to a legal
requirement that both partners accede to every transaction undertaken
by the partnership.
Similarly, the lex mercatoria said that an employee of the merchant
was but a "piece of machinery causing legal relations between his
principle and the third person," having "no independent rights or
liabilities of his own."162 This lex mercatoria norm performed a similar
function to the preceding norm, except that it allowed for an employee
to do business on behalf of the merchant rather than allowing a single
partner to do business on behalf of the entire partnership. Thus, where
the Roman law imposed an economically inefficient burden on
merchants, lex mercatoria norms were created and mutually agreed
upon in order to bypass that legal burden, lower overhead costs, lower
the cost of goods sold, and increase profits.
2. CSR Norms Increase Liability
Conversely, violations of corporate social responsibility norms
almost always arise out of perceived impediments to easy business
administration. Sadly, these impediments underlie every instance of
egregious CSR abuses. Royal Dutch Shell's actions in Nigeria illustrate
the problem, though unfortunately there is no shortage of historical
examples.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Wiwa v. Anderson, and Wiwa v.
Shell Petroleum Development Company are three lawsuits brought
against the Dutch oil company for complicity in the summary execution,
crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment, arbitrary
arrest, wrongful death, assault and battery, and infliction of emotional
distress performed by the Nigerian government against the Ogoni
people. 163 Royal Dutch Shell began drilling for oil in the Ogoni area of
Nigeria in 1958.164 This drilling led to the severe contamination of the
water and agricultural land relied upon by the region for survival. 6 5
For many years, the Ogoni people staged protests against Shell's
activities in the region, which the Nigerian government repeatedly
quashed through violent means. 166 The violence perpetrated by the
Nigerian government for Royal Dutch Shell's benefit culminated in
1995 when "the company and its subsidiary colluded with the Nigerian
government to bring about the arrest and execution of the Ogoni 9,"
who were hanged after a military trial premised upon obviously
162. Id. at 21.
163. Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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trumped up charges. 167 Royal Dutch Shell was brought before a United
States District Court for violations of the ATCA and settled their case
for $15.5 million.168
It is difficult to argue that Royal Dutch Shell would have saved
money had they acceded to the demands of the Ogoni people. For some
perspective, in 1997, Royal Dutch Shell was exporting 899,000 barrels
of oil per day out of Nigeria. 169 Using 1997's average oil price of $18.97
per barrel,170 Royal Dutch Shell exported $6,224,720,950 worth of oil
from Nigeria in 1997, or $17,054,030 per day. Thus, the $15,500,000
settlement paid to the Ogoni, when converted into 1997 dollars, 171
amounts to 68 percent of one day's worth of Nigerian oil production. To
satisfy the concerns of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell
would have had to either reduce the pace of extraction such that
environmental degradation was eliminated, or, if that was not feasible,
stop production altogether. Either way, meeting CSR standards in this
particular case would have entailed an increase in overhead cost
coupled with a decrease in volume, thereby narrowing profit margins by
much more than the ultimate cost of settlement.
3. Following Lex Mercatoria Norms Leads to Lower Prices
Inexorably connected to lex mercatoria's and CSR's effect on cost of
goods sold is their effect of the ultimate price of goods sold. Specific lex
mercatoria norms, such as those allowing a single partner to bind the
partnership and an employee to act solely as an agent of the merchant,
not only reduce overhead cost but also allowed efficiencies to be passed
on to customers in the form of lower prices in order to increase market
share. Similarly, the expedited process favored by the lex mercatoria,
used in medieval commercial courts, and, according to the traditional
narrative, adopted by traditional courts, served to minimize the costs of
disputes. To be clear; merchants could choose to utilize these savings to
pad their profits rather than lower their prices, but the aggregate effect
of competition suggests that, when all firms in an industry are able to
enjoy the same set of savings, they will compete with each other on
price over the long term.
4. Following CSR Norms Leads to Higher Prices
Contrast the economic results of adherence to lex mercatoria norms
with that of modern adhering to modern CSR norms, which is
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. INT'L Bus. PUBL'NS, USA, DOING BUSINESS AND INVESTING IN NIGERIA GUIDE:
VOLUME 1 STRATEGIC AND PRACTICAL INFORMATION 113 (2011).
170. History of Illinois Basin Posted Crude Oil Prices, IOGA.CoM,
http://www.ioga.com/Special/crudeoilHist.htm (last visited, Oct. 20, 2011).
171. $11,693,494.68, using 2.38% inflation.
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ultimately to raise prices. When a company changes its business
practices to respect more fully the human rights of the population, the
labor rights of workers, and the environment, it must inevitably spend
money to make these changes. Corporations can either take these
additional costs out of their profits or they can pass them onto
consumers. Absent market pressure to take the former course,
corporations, as profit-maximizing entities, are likely to do the latter.
Some have argued that respecting labor rights will ultimately result in
increased productivity and that respecting human rights and the
environment will lead to a stable market. 172 While true, these savings
can only begin to be realized after the corporate culture has changed
and employees and the host country's society at large respond to that
change. Most companies take a shorter view and see CSR norms as
drivers of increased costs.
5. Lex Mercatoria Norms Limit Potential Liability
The final foundational difference between lex mercatoria norms and
CSR norms is that the former reduces liability while the latter
increases liability. The limited partnership is supposedly a creation of
the lex mercatoria and illustrates this difference. The limited
partnership, in which a general partner is fully exposed to personal
liability while the limited partner is exposed to liability only up to his
investment, was created to avoid the prohibition on usury while
simultaneously allowing the limited partner to control, and thereby
reduce, his exposure to liability.1 73 Similarly, the lex mercatoria norm
allowing for interest to be charged under the head of damages on an
unpaid account, 174 as well as the norm stating that an unpaid vendor
has a lien on the goods sold against the original buyer, even if that good
has been passed to a subpurchaser,175 serve primarily to ensure that
liability for the good sold remained with the purchaser and not the
seller. Together, they represent a reduction in liability from the
perspective of the merchant.
6. CSR Norms Expose Corporations to New Forms of Liability
CSR norms lead to the opposite result of increased liability because
ascension to CSR norms represents a corporation's de facto acceptance
of new forms of liability. Where before corporations were able to act
with impunity when taking environmental and humanitarian shortcuts,
172. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold & Laura P. Hartman, Beyond Sweatshops: Positive
Deviancy and Global Labor Practices, 14 Bus. ETHICS 206, 222 (2005); ASIAN DEV BANK,
CORE LABOR STANDARDS 11 (2006), available at http//ap-irnet.ilobkk.or.thlresources/core-
labor-standards-handbook-1/.
173. BEWES, supra note 7, at 77.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Id. at 20.
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acceptance of binding CSR norms constitutes acceptance on the part of
the corporation that of a requirement to take on liability for a class of
wrongs that were not previously likely to result in such liability. Given
that the primary function of a corporation is to shield the individuals
running the corporation from liability, it comes as no surprise that
corporations were quick to adopt liability-minimizing lex mercatoria
norms and have resisted the imposition of liability-increasing CSR
norms.
Simply put, corporations are creatures seeking to minimize liability
and maximize profitability. Even outside the question of whether
efforts to minimize liability and maximize profit are the only efforts
that a corporation should seek to undertake, it is undeniable that
maximizing profits and minimizing liabilities is the corporation's
natural predisposition. These fundamental differences explain why lex
mercatoria norms developed from within the mercantile community and
why binding CSR norms will only come as the result of outside
pressure. Because of these foundational differences with respect to cost
of goods sold, price, and exposure to liability universally binding CSR
norms will only result from outside pressure, making them nothing like
the lex mercatoria.
VI. LESSONS TO DRAW FROM THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CSR AND THE LEX
MERCATORIA
The argument advanced above is not necessarily a defeatist one,
and resigning oneself to the position that corporations are profit-
maximizing entities does not automatically suggest that they are
incapable of benefitting non-shareholders. Quite to the contrary, the
vast majority of the daily actions of world's corporations do not even
touch on issues of corporate social responsibility, and every example of
enforced adherence to voluntary CSR norms shows that companies are
more than willing to behave responsibly when they see such behavior as
being in their self-interest.
Nonetheless, because multinational corporations operating in
developing countries, especially those providing discount goods and
serving commodity markets, are prone to corporate abuses, the need
remains for binding CSR norms. Ongoing efforts, both public and
private, have certainly shrunk the universe of corporate abusers, but
they have not eliminated it altogether. While Professor Steinhardt is
entirely correct in noting that the source of binding CSR norms does not
lie in international human rights law or corporate law, he is wrong to
argue that it lies in the corporations themselves. Instead, binding CSR
norms are most likely to take the form of clauses in bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) or in the practice of law enforcement and
regulatory bodies in host countries. These changes will likely result
from macroeconomic and political developments giving host countries
increased bargaining power relative to multinational corporations.
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They will not emerge out of new customary legal norms emanating from
multinational corporations.
Currently, bilateral investment treaties are drafted in favor of
developed countries.17 6  This is because developing nations see
themselves in competition with each other to attract foreign
investment. As a result, developing nations tend to sacrifice their own
interests in improved labor standards or environmental quality in the
hopes that they will attract enough additional investment to make up
for those sacrifices. 177 This has led to a race to the bottom, leaving all
developing countries worse off and creating the assumption that host
governments are not likely to play a positive role in the realm of
corporate social responsibility. 178 However, there is evidence to suggest
that, at least over the medium or long term, several factors will combine
to improve the relative bargaining power of host countries to a point
where they will insert CSR provisions into bilateral investment treaties
thereby creating CSR norms that are both binding and enforceable.
Additionally, the local laws of host countries will be enforced in a way
that holds corporations accountable for their labor and environmental
practices. Both of these phenomena would essentially be the result of
increased host country bargaining power. The major factors potentially
leading to this potential increase are summarized below.
A. Increasing Demand for Comnmodities
The first factor leading to increased host country bargaining power
is the rapidly increasing demand for commodities. As evidence of this
demand increase, in 2010, cotton prices rose 92 percent, 79 coffee prices
rose 65 percent,180 and copper prices rose 30 percent.181 This increasing
demand comes in part from futures trading and global drought and
176. See Stiglitz, supra note 43, at 490; Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes
of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 435, 437 (2009) ("These concerns
about the integrity of investment treaty arbitration are worthy of consideration. Unfair
treatment of respondent states on the basis of whether they are part of the developed or
developing world raises tangible issues about the legitimacy and long-term viability of
arbitration. Similarly, if participants believe that a dispute's outcome depends in some
part upon whether an arbitrator comes from the developing or developed world, they may
question the procedural integrity of arbitration.").
177. Stiglitz, supra note 43, at 490.
178. Darren M. Springer, Reimagining the WTO: Application of the New Deal as
Means of Remedying Emerging Global Issues, 29 VT. L. REV. 1067, 1083 (2005).
179. Liam Pleven & Matt Wirz, Companies Stock Up as Commodity Prices Rise, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 3, 2011, http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB10001424052748704
775604576120533736097682.html.
180. Why Are Commodity Prices Rising? Let Me Count the Ways, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan.
17, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/246895-why-are-commodity-prices-rising-let-
me-count-the-ways.
181. Id.
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flooding, 182 but the primary driver of this global phenomenon comes
from a growing middle class in developing countries such as Brazil,
India, and China.183 This trend is only accelerating. According to
numbers compiled by the United Nations and Goldman Sachs, by 2030
China will have 1.4 billion middle class consumers and India will have
1.07 billion. 184 During the same time period, the middle classes of the
United States and Western Europe will be 365 million and 414 million,
respectively. 185
This demographic and macroeconomic shift benefits developing
countries because "[h]igher commodity prices act like a consumption
tax, transferring income from households and companies which use the
resources to companies and countries that produce them."1 6 The
majority of commodities are produced in developing countries. For
example, 58.5 percent of the world's refined copper, 51.2 percent of the
world's aluminum, and 58.4 percent of the world's grains are produced
in the developing world. 187
Thus, both the fact of rising commodity prices and its cause - a
growing middle class in developing countries - suggest that developing
nations will have increased bargaining power at the negotiating table.
The argument that a multinational corporation who does not feel that it
is getting favorable enough terms can simply move to another
developing country and secure these terms is becoming a much less
tenable one. Over time, developing countries will come to appreciate
182. Id.
183. See Nick Trevethan, Analysis: World Commodity Prices Poised to Gain on Rising
Yuan, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/13/us-china-
commodities-yuan-idUSTRE70COU220110113 (noting that "[tihe volume of unwrought
copper was about the same in the two years, but the value of those imports rose 44
percent in 2010," and that "China consumed over 7.5 million tonnes of copper in 2010,
according to Reuters calculations, almost 40 percent of the world's refined output"); Paul
Krugman, Commodities: This Time is Different, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/commodities-this-time-is-different/ ("[It's
clear from news coverage that Chinese demand is driving the markets. As I and others
have been pointing out, we've got a bifurcated world right now, with advanced economies
still depressed but emerging economies in an inflationary boom; commodity prices are
reflecting the boom part of the picture.").
184. Kenneth Rapoza, Within A Generation, China Middle Class Four Times Larger
Than America's, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kenrapoza/2011/09/05/within-a-generation-china-middle-class-four-times-larger-
than-americas/.
185. Id.
186. Back With a Vengeance: Rising Commodity Prices Both Reflect and Threaten the
World's Economic Recovery, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/17969925.
187. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEv., PRODUCTION AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF COMMODITIES 75 (2004), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs
/gdscsir2004lc5-en.pdf.
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this trend and use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with home
countries and MNCs themselves.
B. The Persistence of the "Obsolescing Bargain"
The second factor leading host countries to a greater voice in CSR
compliance applies equally to the resource extraction and
manufacturing context and can be found in "the obsolescing bargain,"
an idea developed by Raymond Vernon in the early 1970's.188 The
obsolescing bargain says that, although MNCs have an initial
bargaining advantage over their host country, over time, the former's
bargaining power weakens vis-A-vis the latter.s 9  This change in
relative bargaining power is the result of several shifts that take place
as a MNC's foreign direct investment matures.
Initially, a high level of uncertainty characterizes an MNC's
relationship with a host country. Then, as the MNC begins to enjoy
success in the newly exploited market, the perception that the MNC's
high returns are justified by the risk weakens substantially, and the
host country will be less willing to offer the MNC such favorable terms
as the relationship progresses.190 As the MNC constructs immovable
assets in the host country, the MNC's ability to cease operations there
diminishes significantly due to the "sunk costs" represented by plants,
offices, and the development of human capital. 191 Over time, changes
within the host country itself lead to a shift in the relative bargaining
positions of the MNC and the host government. Essentially, the
economic development that results from foreign direct investment leads
to increasing demands for social services.192 Under the initial contract
between the MNC and the host government, the corporation is able to
keep the bulk of its profits, leading to rapidly expanding corporate
coffers coupled with only a modest increase in government revenue. 193
This situation leads to dramatically increased pressure on the host
government to secure more favorable terms vis-A-vis the MNC in the
future.
To support this theory, an empirical, longitudinal study found that
the MNC's proportion of foreign ownership fell over time, regardless of
the existence of a colonial relationship between the host and home
188. See generally RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971).
189. Robin F. Hansen, Multinational Enterprise Pursuit of Minimized Liability: Law,
International Business Theory and the Prestige Oil Spill, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 410, 447
(2008).
190. Barbara Jenkins, Reexamining the "Obsolescing Bargain" A Study of Canada's
National Energy Program, 40 INT'L ORG. 139, 141 (1986).
191. See Hansen, supra note 189, at 447.
192. Jenkins, supra note 190, at 141.
193. See id.
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countries or the identity of the home country.194 However, this study
found that the size of the firm was negatively correlated with foreign
ownership - the larger the firm, the more control the home country
retained over the venture.19 5 This suggests that a larger size results in
an increase in leverage over the host government that outweighs the
pressures of sunk costs upon the MNC. On balance though, time is
evidently on the side of the host country when it comes to relative
bargaining power.
C. Self-Determination in the Developing World
Lastly, the Arab Spring has the potential to lead to the
establishment of governments in the developing world that are less
willing to acquiesce to the demands of developed nations and more
responsive to the people. This final factor is more aspirational and less
economically inevitable than the first two but nonetheless has the
potential to play a major role in the proliferation of effectively binding
CSR norms. At their fullest potential, the democratic uprisings in the
Middle East and North Africa represent a new era in the developing
world - one in which the popular will of the people overcomes the self-
interested decisions of despots like Hosni Mubarak and Muammar
Ghaddafi. 196 When dealing with governments who respond to the needs
of its citizens, MNCs likely will be forced to account for the host country
conditions that norms of corporate social responsibility are meant to
address. In countries where these uprisings lead to stable institutions,
the Arab Spring may successfully pressure host governments to secure
more favorable terms for their citizens and pass and enforce laws and
regulations passed domestically.
Increased demand for commodities (including labor), the steady
long term effect of the obsolescing bargain, and the new emergence of
popular governance in the developing world will all lead to greater
bargaining power on the part of host government vis-A-vis MNCs and
their home governments. Taken together these three factors may lead
to an insistence on the part of host governments that their citizens are
protected to a degree never before seen. These phenomena would allow
for the regulation of multinational corporations without a need to
derogate from the state primacy model of international human rights
law or the shareholder primacy model of corporate law.
194. Sushil Vachani, Enhancing the Obsolescing Bargain Theory: A Longitudinal
Study of Foreign Ownership of U.S. and European Multinationals, 26 J. INT'L Bus. STUD.
159, 174 (1995).
195. Id. at 175.
196. See generally Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFF., no. 3, May-June 2011,
at 2, 2-6.
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This development, if it is to occur at all, is likely to be a gradual
one. Renegotiation of bilateral investment treaties is not an every day
occurrence, and the transformation of a society towards democratic
governance is even rarer. Such a tectonic shift will undoubtedly take
time. When one considers the severe doctrinal barriers to creating non-
contractual binding legal norms, however, the relative efficacy and
efficiency of the introduction of contractually based or domestically
enforced norms begin to seem both more appealing and more realistic.
While the already-tried mechanisms for ensuring corporate
compliance with widely-accepted CSR norms have done an outstanding
job shaping corporate behavior around the edges, the most serious
violators will almost certainly respond only to coercive, binding, and
enforceable measures. Over the medium and long term, these coercive
measures are much more likely to come in the form of BIT clauses or
domestic regulation driven by macroeconomic and political factors than
through the emergence of new, independently binding legal norms,
especially those devised and implemented by MNCs themselves and
then adopted by governmentally-sanctioned courts.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principle of equity lies at the heart of the lex mercatoria norms.
Even if lex mercatoria norms did not create independently binding legal
norms in a traditional court, the principles emerged organically as a
direct result of the fact that the mercantile community saw each other
as equals and treated each other accordingly. They saw equity as a goal
to be sought in and of itself throughout the mercantile community.
Today, a different economic paradigm prevails in which parties seek
only achieve the best result possible for themselves. That result is
deemed equitable, regardless of the actual contents or broader
consequences of the agreement, because it was created as the result of a
bargain in the free market, which is viewed as a sort of natural state.
This creates a community that looks nothing like the mercantile
community in which lex mercatoria norms developed; if medieval
merchants dealt with one another then the way that many
multinational corporations deal with developing nations today, lex
mercatoria norms may not have developed at all.
In the end, medieval merchants developed lex mercatoria norms
because it helped their bottom line and minimized potential liability.
They allowed themselves to be bound by the norms because they saw
each other as relative equals. Because neither of these conditions exist
with regards to developing nations and the worst corporate abusers,
enforceable norms of corporate social responsibility will ultimately
develop outside of the corporate suite and be implemented
independently of the corporation itself. To argue otherwise is to
romanticize the corporation and to ignore the need for outside pressure
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in order for meaningful norms to develop. A more realistic approach
must prevail.
MICROFINANCE - IS THERE A SOLUTION?
A SURVEY ON THE USE OF MFIS TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY IN INDIA
Jesse Fishman*
ABSTRACT
Microfinance has a long history of success in providing financial
access to the world's poor through small loans. It has been lauded as
aiding the Millennium Development Goals, reducing poverty,
empowering women, and supporting numerous other social benefits.
Recently, however, public figures have questioned microfinance. One
politician went so far as to say that microfinance is "sucking blood from
the poor." However, recent setbacks in microfinance do not indicate that
microfinance as an institution is extinct. Despite the recent problems,
microfinance still serves a crucial role in international development.
This paper explores some of the reasons that microfinance is currently
struggling and provides potential suggestions for addressing them.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Summary of Paper
Microfinance has a long history of providing financial access to the
world's poor through small loans. It has shown numerous successes
throughout history, most famously through the Grameen Bank. It has
been lauded as aiding the Millennium Development Goals, reducing
poverty, empowering women, and supporting numerous other social
benefits. Recently, however, public figures have begun to question
microfinance. In fact, Bangladesh's Prime Minister went so far as to
say that microfinance is "sucking blood from the poor."' A string of
suicides in Andhra Pradesh (AP) was linked to the pressures of
repaying microloans, further muddying microfinance's reputation.
Microfinance, as it stands, is simply not working.
* 2012 Graduate, Sturm College of Law at the University of Denver. I would like to thank
Jason Lantagne, Malliga Och, and John Crone for their invaluable contributions
throughout the editing process. In addition, many thanks to Stu and Sue Fishman for
their insight on India, and to Y.S. Lee for his pioneering work on microtrade.
1. Indian Microlenders Facing Crisis, Warns Industry, FINANcIAL EXPRESS (Dec. 12,
2010) [hereinafter Indian Microlenders Facing Crisis], http://www.thefinancialexpress-
bd.com/more.php?newsjid=119980.
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Despite microfinance's recent problems, it serves a crucial role in
international development, in providing financial access to the poor,
and in alleviating poverty. This paper explores some of the reasons
that microfinance is currently struggling, and provides potential
suggestions for addressing them. Section I explores the foundations of
microfinance, explains why microfinance matters, and addresses
programs Grameen Bank utilized to aid development. Section II
addresses how microfinance affects international human rights,
including many of the concepts scholars deem as successful, in part, due
to microfinance. Section III analyzes the current state of microfinance
institutions, explaining their prevalence and the recent suicides in AP.
Section IV explores some of the difficulties microfinance institutions
have had in alleviating poverty and the reasons that scholars say
microfinance is floundering. Section V provides recommendations for
improving microfinance and how to effectively use it to alleviate poverty
and spur development. Finally, Section VI concludes that, though
flawed, microfinance can still be effectively used to help reduce poverty
and stimulate development.
B. Why Microfinance Matters
Exchanging hair for capital is not a novel concept; 2 however, the
rural women building these businesses add a new face to the old idea.
Sivamma, a 35-year-old woman from AP, took out her first $45 loan to
build a business based on human hair. 3 She hired 250 women to collect
human hair from villagers in exchange for items such as toys. 4 Then,
"[t]he hair is collected and sold to a leading Indian hair exporter in
Madras, from where it eventually finds its way to the United States and
other Western countries to be used for wigs and hairpieces."5 Now,
Sivamma enjoys her earnings. She is proud of "the $3,000 home she
built from the profits, the $700 motorbike she bought for her husband
and her $1,000 savings."6
Jane found similar success in microfinance. Jane grew up in a
Kenyan slum, dropped out of school after eighth grade, and became a
38-year-old single mother.7 When her husband took a second wife, Jane
was pushed out of the house. She was alone, homeless, broke, and
2. Saritha Rai, Tiny Loans Have Big Impact on Poor, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04112/business/tiny-loans-have-big-impact-on-poor.html.
3. Id.
4. Id. ("When the women travel to the nearby villages with the small toys that she
buys for them, small children greet them and exchange handfuls of hair for the toys.").
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Nicholas D. Kristof, Sewing Her Way Out of Poverty, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/opinion[kristof-sewing-her-way-out-of-poverty.html.
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trying to support her small children.8 In order to survive, Jane sold all
that she had left - her body.9 After five years of prostitution, Jane
joined an antipoverty organization utilizing microfinance and
microsavings.' 0 She left prostitution, learned to sew, and used what
she saved plus a small loan to buy a sewing machine. When her sewing
business flourished, Jane bought a "small home in a safe suburb" and
focused on keeping her children in school." Jane's children are equally
a success story: her daughter was the first child in Jane's family to
graduate from high school, and her son ranked first in his class. 12
When the New York Times author spoke to Jane's son, he said "that
when he gets his first paycheck, he's going to buy something beautiful
for his mom - and his eyes glistened as he spoke." 13 Jane literally
sewed her way out of poverty. Because of the opportunities provided by
microfinance, the image of a woman in an impoverished village having
financial access and the opportunity to create a successful business is
now commonplace.
C. Definitions
"Microcredit is the extension of small loans and other financial
services . . . to the . . . poor." 14 The term is used nearly interchangeably
with "microfinance."15 Microcredit allows the very poor to become
entrepreneurs and generate income, thus providing an ongoing source
of income for borrowers and their families.16 The microloans go to those
who traditionally could not have access to normal banking because they
lack collateral, steady employment, and a credit history.17 Historically,
the rural poor only had access to capital through usurious
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (noting that Jane's son is also "a star soccer player even though he has no
soccer shoes.").
13. Id.
14. What is Microcredit, THE MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, http://www.micro
creditsummit.org/about/whatismicrocredit/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter
MICROCREDIT SUMMIT].
15. The Microfinance Alliance defines "microfinance" as "financial services targeting
and catering to clients who are excluded from the traditional financial system on account
of their lower economic status." B. Seth McNew, Regulation and Supervision of
Microfinance Institutions: A Proposal for a Balanced Approach, 15 L. & BUS. REV. AMS.
287, 290 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. MICROCREDIT SUMMIT, supra note 14.
17. Micro Credit Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, INC., http://definitions.us
legal.com/m/micro-creditl (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
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moneylenders, the equivalent of modern day loan sharks.' 8 Microloans
were initially meant to "provide a kinder, cheaper alternative."1 9
Modern microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not have a uniform makeup
- they can be nonprofit organizations, "credit unions, cooperatives,
private commercial banks, and even non-bank financial institutions." 20
Since "microcredit" institutions have grown to include numerous types
of financial access, 21 this paper will primarily use the term "MFI" to
refer to microfinance and microcredit programs.
As microfinance borrowers are typically impoverished, they cannot
offer banking institutions typical types of collateral. 22 Therefore, many
MFIs loan money to groups of people in a community, so that borrowers
"are jointly responsible if anyone defaults on a loan."23 This "social
collateral" among borrowers pressures them not to default, and has
proved to be successful in urging repayment. 24 As the World Bank
explained regarding a microfinance project in AP: "[k]ey to the
management of risk for banks was the social collateral provided by poor
women in self-help groups who guarantee each other's loans."25 The
situations where the social collateral method is used are often called
"self-help groups."2 6  Unfortunately, while the "social collateral"
approach is successful in aiding loan repayment, the shame it causes
borrowers is often difficult for them to deal with.27 "Both proponents
and critics acknowledge that the peer-pressure exerted by the group on
the borrowers is often shame-based. The combined pressure from peers
and loan officers can be intense, and studies have documented some
early tragedies, including one woman who killed herself as a result of
18. See Eric Bellman & Arlene Chang, India's Major Crisis in Microlending, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023043164045
75580663294846100.html.
19. Id.
20. McNew, supra note 15, at 290-91.
21. Rebecca Farrer, Exploring the Human Rights Implications of Microfinance
Initiatives, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 447, 448 n. 1 (2008).
22. See id. at 453.
23. Id. at 455; see also Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the Mechanics of Solidarity
Lending: Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract Structure, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 198; Yoko Miyashita, Lessons from Indonesia's Village
Banking System, 10 PAc. RIM. L. & POL'Y 147, 198 (Dec. 2000).
24. See Farrer, supra note 21, at 455-56.
25. Widespread Community Impact in Andhra Pradesh, THE WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/O,,contentMDK:2233
1408-menuPK:3266877-pagePK:51236175-piPK:437394-theSitePK:73154,00.html (last
updated Sept. 2009).
26. See id.
27. See Farrer, supra note 21, at 456; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant
Mirror: Why the West Has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 217, 263 (2005).
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this pressure."28 In the past few years, suicides attributed to the
pressure of repaying microloans have increased. 29 The difficulties with
this shame-based social collateral system are further addressed in the
section on AP.
D. History of Microfinance
The idea of microcredit has a long and tumultuous history.
Informal banking institutions have existed for centuries, including such
industries as 'susus' of Ghana, 'chit funds' in India, [and] 'tandas' in
Mexico."30 As early as the 18th century, in Europe, charities and credit
cooperatives have been extending small loans to budding
entrepreneurs.3 1 For example, 18th century author Jonathan Swift
donated part of his wealth to be lent to poor tradesmen, in small sums,
to be repaid weekly and without interest. 32  Similarly, the Irish
Reproductive Loan Fund Institution was founded post-famine in 1822
to give loans under ten pounds to people in rural areas for the "relief of
the distressed Irish."33 Group microlending was documented as early as
the nineteenth century in Germany. 34 Like the programs that Yunus'
infamous Grameen Bank35 would utilize in the future, the early
cooperatives relied upon close groups of people that knew one another
well, in communities where individuals were willing to be held liable for
the debts of other borrowers in their groups. 38 Starting in the 1970s
with the popularization of Grameen Bank, microcredit became an
important tool in advancing development.
28. Farrer, supra note 21, at 456; see also Dyal-Chand, supra note 27, at 263
(describing "a defaulting female borrower who was locked by bank workers inside a bank
building as punishment . . . because the woman faced shame, social ostracism, and
violence, she hanged herself inside the bank building.").
29. See Soutik Biswas, India's Micro-finance Suicide Epidemic, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia- 11997571.
30. The History of Microfinance, GLOBALENVISION.ORG (Apr. 14, 2006),
http://www.globalenvision.org/library/4/1051/.
31. Laura Brandt et al., Lending Methodoloy Module, 53 THE RUSSIA MICROFINANCE
PROJECT 1, 1, 4 (utilizing their module, invented from structure and content borrowed
from chapter 6 of C. WATERFIELD & A. DUVAL, CARE SAVINGS AND CREDIT SOURCEBOOK
(1996)).
32. THOMAS SHERIDAN, THE LIFE OF THE REV. DR. JONATHAN SwiFT 234 (2d ed. 1787).
33. Aidan Hollis & Arthur Sweetman, The Life-cycle of a Microfinance Institution:
The Irish Loan Funds, 46 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 291, 296 (2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
34. Edward S. Prescott, Group Lending and Financial Intermediation: An Example,
83 EcoN. Q. 23, 29 (1997).
35. See infra pp. 594-96 and note 37.
36. Prescott, supra note 34, at 23.
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E. The Evolution of Grameen Bank
In 1974, Muhammad Yunus was a Professor and Head of the Rural
Economics Program at the University of Chittagong. 37 He traveled
through many rural areas of Bangladesh and was appalled by the
poverty that villagers were suffering. 38 As he explains it:
The starving people did not chant any slogans. They did
not demand anything from us well-fed city folk. They simply
lay down very quietly on our doorsteps and waited to die.
There are many ways for people to die, but somehow dying of
starvation is the most unacceptable of all. It happens in slow
motion. Second by second, the distance between life and death
becomes smaller and smaller, until the two are in such close
proximity that one can hardly tell the difference. Like sleep,
death by starvation happens so quietly, so inexorably, one
does not even sense it happening. And all for lack of a handful
of rice at each meal. 39
Shocked at the poverty and looking for a way to help the starving
villagers, Yunus used his background in economics to pioneer modern
day microfinance. In 1983, Yunus established Grameen Bank to
provide small loans to people for starting or growing their businesses.40
Grameen began as an organization "with the belief that credit should be
accepted as a human right," where a person "who does not possess
anything gets the highest priority in getting a loan." 4 1 With this ideal
in mind, the bank had modest beginnings - its first loan was for only
twenty-seven dollars to aid forty-two stool makers. 42
Grameen Bank grew quickly, and Yunus soon realized that he
needed to implement programs to aid with "income shocks," specifically,
to compensate borrowers for natural disasters. 43  Initially, if a
borrower's entire business was ruined from a hurricane or other natural
disaster, Grameen had no system to help the borrower rebuild. To
resolve this, Yunus started programs where group borrowers gave a set
amount of money per month to the group's emergency fund, which could
37. A Short History of Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN BANK: BANK FOR THE POOR,
http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=1
14 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
38. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE
AGAINST WORLD POVERTY vii (PublicAffairs 2007) (1997).
39. Id. at vii-viii.
40. A Short History of Grameen Bank, supra note 37.
41. Is Grameen Bank Different from Conventional Banks?, GRAMEEN BANK: BANK FOR
THE POOR (Oct., 2011), http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task
=view&id=27&Itemid=l76.
42. McNew, supra note 15, at 293.
43. For example, "[i]n 1987, devastating floods hit Bangladesh and caused" them
"serious losses." YUNUS, supra note 38, at 218.
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be emptied by any group member if a similar "income shock" occurred. 44
After success in battling "income shocks," Yunus began implementing
social programs and trainings to help borrowers become more
successful. 45 For example, Yunus noticed that villagers had poor health
care, so he started a health insurance program. 46 Grameen's programs
changed to address the needs of borrowers.
Grameen has shown incredible growth since it was founded. When
Grameen started in 1983, it cumulatively loaned $194.95 (in million
USD), and by 2009, that number grew to $8741.86 (also in million
USD).4 7 The number of groups taking out loans in 1983 was 11,667, and
by 2009, the groups grew to 1,253,160.48 The number of villages covered
by Grameen grew from 1,249 in 1983 to 83,458 in 2009.49 Grameen
includes more than 5.5 million members, and has distributed more than
$5.2 billion in loans.50 Most shockingly, the profit/loss amount per year
went from -0.0059 in 1983 to 5.38 in 2009 (both in million USD).5 1
Grameen went from an organization aiding the poor to a company
making $5.38 million a year. 52  The Bank reported a 98 percent
repayment rate on its loans, 5 3 attributing and majority of its success to
the "group lending" concept it popularized. 54 Yunus and Grameen Bank
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for "pioneering the system."5 5
44. This protection against income shocks would have been useful in the recent
ruined crop in Bangladesh - "after the total destruction of their crops," villagers are
unable to repay their loans, "[y]et the microfinance organizations continue to collect the
installments." James Melik, Microcredit 'Death Trap' for Bangladesh's Poor, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11664632 (last updated Nov. 2, 2010).
45. YUNUS, supra note 38, at 229.
46. Id. at 228-29.
47. Historical Data Series in USD, GRAMEEN BANK: BANK FOR THE POOR,
http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=177&Itemid=
144 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Rajdeep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon, The Microfinance Revolution: An
Overview, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LouIs REV. 9, 9 (2008) [hereinafter The Microfinance
Revolution].
51. Historical Data Series in USD, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. Michelle Nichols, "Banker to the Poor" Gives New York Women a Boost, GRAMEEN
BANK: BANK FOR THE POOR (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.grameen.comlindex.php?option=
comcontent&task=view&id=589&Itemid=l99.
54. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 50, at 11.
55. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18; The Nobel Peace Prize 2006, GRAMEEN BANK:
BANK FOR THE POOR (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com-
content&task=view&id=197&Itemid=197.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF MICROFINANCE
A. Introduction & Early Popularity
Microfinance was early lauded as the solution to poverty. It
"became the darling of the development world, hailed as the long
elusive formula to propel even the most destitute into better lives."5 6
The concept has become "hotly recognized,"5 7 and even earned celebrity
support.58 Unfortunately, microfinance has recently suffered
monumental media hits.5 9 Still, scholars agree that microfinance has
had an enormous impact on human rights, and that it has potential for
further changing the international landscape.6 0  One commentator
suggests that: "[i]f you asked poverty experts to name the single most
significant new concept in the field in the last few decades, chances are
they would say microcredit." 61  Microfinance has had numerous
successes in India and evidence shows that it enables the poor "to better
withstand shocks, build assets, and link into the wider economy as
fuller economic citizens."62 However, the crucial question remains: has
microcredit helped to alleviate poverty and spur development on a
broader scale?
56. Neil MacFarquhar, Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/14microfinance.html?pagewanted
=all.
57. "Microlending abroad has become a hotly recognized and discussed topic in recent
years, mainly through the successes of Nobel Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus and his
international Grameen Bank." Olivia L. Walker, The Future of Microlending in the
United States: A Shift from Charity to Profits?, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J.
383, 384 (2011).
58. "Natalie Portman and Michael Douglas lent their boldface names to the cause."
MacFarquhar, supra note 56. President Clinton championed microfinance in 1997. Vikas
Bajaj, Microlenders, Honored with Nobel, Are Struggling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/business/global/06micro.html?pagewanted=all.
59. David Bornstein, Microfinance Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21,
2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/microfinance-under-fire/; see infra
note 107; Biswas, supra note 29; Soutik Biswas, Crisis Hits India's Small Loans Industry,
BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12035909 (last updated Dec. 21,
2010).
60. "Clearly, microfinance programs have an impact on human rights . . . .
Microfinance has great potential to empower people economically and engage women in
developing nations in the global economy in ways they have never been involved before."
Farrer, supra note 21, at 480.
61. Tina Rosenberg, When Microcredit Won't Do, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 31,
2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/when-microcredit-wont-do/.
62. Mark Pickens et al., Banking the Poor via G2P Payments, 58 CGAP 1, 1 (2009),
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41174/FN58.pdf (citing Fred M. Ssewamala et al., A
Novel Economic Intervention to Reduce HIV Risks Among School-Going AIDS Orphans in
Rural Uganda, 42 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 102 (2008); MARTHA A. CHEN & DONALD
SNODGRASS, MANAGING RESOURCES, ACTIVITIES, AND RISK IN URBAN INDIA: THE IMPACT
OF SEWA BANK (2001), pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs[PNACN571.pdf; MICHAEL W. SHERRADEN,
ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY (1991)).
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B. Millennium Goals & International Law
At the international level, microfinance supports the international
community's development goals and commitments. The 15th Global
Microcredit Summit recently stated that microcredit "will ensure the
attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) target of
halving absolute poverty."63 The United Nations (UN) constructed the
MDGs as an international framework for making the "planet more
livable for all people."64 The MDGs call for responsible international
action to address such issues as poverty and gender inequity.65
Importantly, because the MDGs have been endorsed by the UN's
member states, they qualify as official commitments; thus, they form
part of the international legal framework for human rights
protections.66 The MDGs embody and reinforce rights that many states
already committed to protecting.67 Significantly, several conventions
provide a legal foundation obligating states to pursue the MDGs.68
Microfinance can be a crucial international tool in supporting the
MDGs.69 One development advocate explains:
The success of a project can be measured by the changes it
makes in the lives of individuals, families, and communities
using local knowledge and practice. Key factors contributing
to the success of such projects, especially ones designed with
women in mind, include savings in time, realistic
opportunities for learning, increased income levels, the
empowerment of women, and project sustainability. Each of
these factors simultaneously contributes to project success and
63. Obinna Chima, Africa: Experts Harp on Microcredit for Poverty Eradication,
ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 26, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201112260222.html.
64. Deborah K. Dunn & Gary Chartier, Pursuing the Millennium Goals at the
Grassroots: Selecting Development Projects Serving Rural Women in Sub-Saharan Africa,
15 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 71 (2006); see U.N. Millennium Development Goals,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
65. Dunn & Chartier, supra note 64, at 71-72; see U.N. Millennium Development
Goals, supra note 64.
66. Dunn & Chartier, supra note 64, at 71-72 n. 5; see U.N. Millennium Development
Goals, supra note 64.
67. Dunn & Chartier, supra note 64, at 71-72.
68. "[S]tates' pre-existing treaty obligations commit them, in many cases, to
implementing the MDGs as a matter of international law." Dunn & Chartier, supra note
64, at 72-73. ("These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).").
69. Farrer, supra note 21, at 451 ("The United Nations declared 2005 the
International Year of Microcredit.").
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embodies human rights protections mandated by the
conventions that support the MDGs.70
As scholars have shown, and this article enumerates, microfinance
can be used to successfully support each of the above factors, thereby
greatly supporting the MDGs.
C. Poverty Reduction
Microfinance is widely recognized for its monumental potential as a
means of reducing poverty.7 1 The World Bank defines "poverty" as
living on less than $1.25 per day, and in 2005, approximately 1.5 billion
people were living in poverty. 72 In the same report, the World Bank
stated that microfinance has helped the world's poor by increasing their
incomes using self-employment and empowerment.73 Grameen Bank
embodies these notions in its long-term goals: reducing "poverty, family
size, and under and unemployment."74 In the past, microfinance was so
widely-embraced and successful that the United Nations deemed 2005
the "International Year of Microcredit." 76 The UN Secretary General at
the time, Kofi Annan, added that microfinance "helps alleviate poverty
by generating income, creating jobs, allowing children to go to school,
enabling families to obtain health care, and empowering people to make
choices that best serve their needs."76
D. Social Benefits
Supporters defend microfinance as providing broad social benefits
such as improved health, greater gender equality, and increased
educational participation.7 7 Microfinance proponents argue that the
"industry was the first to reach out to those that make less than $1 a
day" and was "so successful that it has spawned efforts to bring
70. Dunn & Chartier, supra note 64, at 82; Helen Hambly, Grassroots Indicators for
Sustainable Development, 23 IDRC REP. (1997), http://archive.idrc.calbooks/reports
IV231/susdev.html.
71. Farrer, supra note 21, at 451.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id., at 457; Rachel Errett Figura, An End to Poverty Through Microlending: An
Examination of the Need for Credit by Poor, Rural Women and the Success of
Microlending Programs, 8 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 157, 172 (2002).
75. Farrer, supra note 21, at 451; Lisa Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of
Conflict: Rebuilding the Lives and Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12
GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 205, 224 (2005).
76. Farrer, supra note 21, at 451; Jay Lee, Note: Equity and Innovation: Using
Traditional Islamic Banking Models to Reinvigorate Microlending in Urban America, 16
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 523, 524 (2006).
77. Ashley Hubka & Rida Zaidi, Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance:
Improving the Investment Climate for Growth and Poverty Reduction 4, 4-5 (2005) (paper
prepared for the World Development Report), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWDR2005/Resources[HubkaZaidiImpact of Government_Regulation.pdf.
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everything from insurance to cell phones to solar lights to groceries to
the poor."78 Studies have shown that microfinance spurs a vast social
impact. For example, "[a] number of studies have concluded that, as a
result of the Bank's involvement, borrowers have been more likely than
the general population to use birth control, to be more articulate, and at
least be aware of the positive effects of the directives."79 In Brazil, for
example, the government's welfare program has linked monetary aid to
vaccination and schooling, thus using microfinance to support public
health and education.80 The government provides financial aid to 12
million families "on the condition that their children attend school and
are vaccinated." 81 Microfinance has also been lauded as helping with
dispute resolution. 82 MFIs have been touted as providing vast social
benefits.83
E. Enhance Gender Equality and Empower Women
MFIs often focus their efforts on women. Microfinance is of
particular import for women 84 because, worldwide, the borrowers are
78. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
79. Farrer, supra note 21, at 458 (citing Dyal-Chanda, supra note 27, at 258).
80. See Charles Kenny, Big is Beautiful: Financial Access is Key to Helping the
World's Poor - and Tech-Savvy Big Banks, not Microcreditors, are our Best Hope for
Providing it, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan 18, 2011, at 2, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/01/18/big-is-beautiful?page=O, 1.
81. Id.
82. CS Reddy & Sandeep Manak, Self-Help Groups: A Keystone of Microfinance in
India - Women Empowerment & Social Security, APMAS: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE SELF-
HELP MOVEMENT IN INDIA 13 (2005), available at http://www.aptsource.in/
admin/resources/1273818040_SHGs-keystone-paper.pdf; A project in Andhra Pradesh
used SHGs to improve the community through such means as exposing corruption,
managing group activities, and fostering community leadership. U.N. Econ. & Social
Commission for Asia and the Pac., Bulletin on Asia-Pacific Perspectives: Empowering
Women Through Self-Help Microcredit Programmes vi (2003/03) [hereinafter
Empowering Women Through Self-Help], http://www.unescap.org/pdd/publications/
bulletin2002/ch6.pdf.
83. Grameen Bank takes a holistic approach to alleviating poverty through
development; Grameen uses a portion of its profit for infrastructure, development, and
charity. A portion of the profits go to social benefits, such as "student loans for the client's
children, go to a beggar's program for the ultra-poor, and go to dividends to its owners, the
poor women who borrow from it." Kenny, supra note 80; Philip Willner, Can the Profit
Motive Improve Microfinance?, ASIA SOCIETY (Oct. 25, 2010), http://asiasociety.org/
business-economics/development/can-profit-motive-improve-microfinance (describing the
actions of the Grameen bank as a holistic approach to alleviating poverty through
development; Grameen uses a portion of its profit for infrastructure, development, and
charity. A portion of the profits go to social benefits, such as "student loans for the client's
children, go to a beggars program for the ultra-poor, and go to dividends to its owners, the
poor women who borrow from it.").
84. See Farrer, supra note 21, at 450.
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predominantly women.85 In 2010, one study estimates that 82.3
percent of poor clients reached were women.86 "Women earn only ten
percent of the entire world's income despite making up over fifty
percent of the world's population, and they own less than 10 percent of
the world's property."87 Despite these abysmal figures, women often
hold critical roles as providers. In the developing world, women
frequently provide for their families.8 8 Because of this, "MFIs have
specifically focused on women, and the majority of those receiving
microfinance loans are female."8 9
Gender equality and women's empowerment is one of the MDGs.90
The three indicators to monitor this are: education, employment, and
political representation.9 1 Overall, it is clear that microfinance can
improve gender equality. Access to paid work, even work done in the
home, "has the potential to shift the balance of power within the
family."92  For example, "[s]tudies of the impact of microcredit in
societies where women have traditionally been excluded from the cash
economy have found that women's access to credit led to a number of
positive changes in women's own perceptions of themselves, and their
role in household decision making."9 3 This access also helped to reduce
domestic violence and increase women's assets.9 4 A study on MFIs in
India showed that microfinance improved: political participation and
self-confidence in politics, access to government programs, practical
skills, and knowledge of the wider society.95
Microfinance projects have concluded that women's self-image and
self-confidence was enhanced when they received training on women's
rights and social and political issues.96 While financial access is crucial
85. Id. at 475; "Grameen Bank estimates that 97% of their borrowers are female but
the same difficulties in calculating the number of microfinance loans present in
ascertaining specific numbers." Id. at 475, n. 137 (citing GRAMEEN BANK,
http://www.grameen-info.org).
86. Jan P. Maes & Larry R. Reed, State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report
2012, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN 36 (2012) ("Of the 137.5 million poorest clients
reached at the end of 2010, 82.3 percent (113.1 million) are women.").
87. Farrer, supra note 21, at 452; Figura, supra note 74, at 159.
88. Farrer, supra note 21, at 452 ("It is common is several parts of the developing
world for women to be responsible for providing food and water for their families.").
89. Id.
90. Naila Kabeer, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: A Critical Analysis
of the third Millennium Development Goal, GENDER & DEV. 13, Mar. 2005, at 13,
http://pages.uoregon.edulaweiss/intl421_521/Sweetman%2013-24.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Empowering Women Through Self-Help, supra note 82.
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in providing for families and empowering women,9 7 it has also been
heralded as an opportunity to "involve women in the global economy."9 8
Numerous studies note that women are being empowered through
microfinance,9 9 and their empowerment is evident in their civic
engagement: 100
One of the key benefits of SHGs [a type of microfinance
institution] is women's empowerment and this can be seen
with the number of women involved in public affairs. While
the number of women actually involved in politics is still
very low, research has indicated that of those women that
stand for election, over 70% had won their seat. And, the
female contribution to civil issues ranges from issue of
ration cards, laying of pucca roads, building of school,
ensuring appointments in vacant positions in schools and
health centres, recovery of river bank lands from
encroachers and laying of drinking water pipes. 101
Women's empowerment in developing countries also spurs a
plethora of social benefits. 102 Empowering women, and providing them
with capital to create income-generating businesses, helps to reduce
trafficking103 and to rebuild livelihoods post-war.104 Women in post-war
areas often want to participate in microfinance. "Women and children
are particularly affected by war. And yet even in the most dire
situations where women are living in extreme conditions in refugee
camps, there are still women who seek assistance to start a
business."10 5 Because of this, "[m]icrocredit programs in war-torn areas
have direct application to addressing women's human rights. It is often
women who are left to support their households after wars. . . . The
more self-reliant a woman can be, the safer she and her children will
be."106 Providing financial assistance for women in war torn areas to
97. Lee, supra note 76 (quoting the founder of the Women's World Banking stating,
"Credit for women is our right and we must fight for it.").
98. Farrer, supra note 21, at 452-53 ("Microfinance has also been advanced as an
excellent way to involve women in the global economy, with a particular focus in women
in developing countries who have traditionally been limited in their access to and
participation in economic markets.").
99. See discussion supra Part II.C-D; see discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
100. Reddy & Manak, supra note 82, at 12.
101. Id.
102. Reddy & Manak, supra note 82.
103. Katherine Driscoll, Comment, Microcredit: Not Yet a Panacea to End Trafficking
in Women, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 275, 297 (2010).
104. Farrer, supra note 21, at 479-80; Avery supra note 75, at 224.
105. Farrer, supra note 21, at 479.
106. Id. at 480.
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create businesses can spur economic growth, and help to rebuild
women's livelihoods.
III. CURRENT STATE OF MFIs
A. Introduction
From the world's excitement over Grameen's success came an
abundance of MFIs. "After a decade of extraordinarily rapid growth,
there were only about 154 million microfinance clients worldwide at the
end of 2008 - around 130 million future customers were born that same
year alone." 107 MFIs have spread through Asia, Africa, and South
America.10 8 Unfortunately, recent scandals in India and Bangladesh10 9
contributed to tarnishing the industry's reputation, likely decreasing
individual trust and interest in MFIs.110 Now, it is estimated that 2.5
billion adults have no access to formal financial services.111 In 2009,
microfinance's growth rates slowed for the first time in years 112 and
many MFIs suffered stagnant or rising costs - in some cases, they even
faced a slow rise in credit risk. 113
B. Current State of MFIs in India
With an enormous population, and many people living in poverty,
India is a crucial part of the microfinance industry. 114 "India continues
to be a driving force" among South Asian MFIs. 115 Remarkably, even in
the difficult economy, Indian MFIs keep growing.1 16 Overall, 30 million
107. Kenny, supra note 80.
108. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
109. Bangladesh ordered Muhammad Yunus to be removed from serving as managing
director of Grameen Bank. Bornstein, supra note 59.
110. Kenny, supra note 80.
111. Id.
112. More specifically, "[alfter years of steady global growth rates of 25 percent, MFIs
from every region saw their borrower base expand more slowly in 2008 in all but a
handful of markets." Nigerian MFI Among Top Global 100 MFIs, MICROFINANCE AFRICA
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://microfinanceafrica.net/tag/self-reliance-economic-advancement-
programme/ (MIX's 2009 ranking "surveyed 955 institutions from nearly 100 countries.").
113. Anita Bhoir, 10 Indian MFIs in Global Top 100 Ranking, LIVEMINT.COM & WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.livemint.com/2008/12/26224810/10-Indian-MFIs-in-
global-top-1.html.
114. "[W]ith its giant population and hundreds of millions of people living in poverty,"
it "is one of the most important markets." Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
115. Top 100 Microfinance Institutions in the World, INDIA MICROFINANCE (Aug. 23,
2010), http://indiamicrofinance.com/top-100-mfi-world.html (explaining that an ideal MFI
would be "a financially sound institution" that expands "outreach to clients at the lowest
possible cost," and does so "in the public arena so that others may learn from the
experience." MIX's ranking methodology incorporates "strong growth without
compromising credit risk, improving efficiency without compromising portfolio quality,
and expanding access while still offering an array of services.").
116. Id. at 5.
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households have taken micro-credit in India.117 More than a third of
those households live in the region of AP, and the majority of borrowers
are women.118 For-profit companies hold nearly 90 percent of the total
outstanding borrowings.119 In addition, India's microfinance industry
has received both internal and international support. 120
C. Current State of MFIs in Andhra Pradesh
The AP region accounts for nearly half of the loans in India,12 1 and
only four companies have doled out 80 percent of the region's loans.122
Self-help groups in the region include over 12 million women, and have
distributed more than $2.5 billion in loans. 123 The families that have
borrowed "have an average debt of $660, and an average annual income
of $1,060. This means that more than 60 percent of their fragile,
uncertain income is being spent paying off loans."124 Interest rates on
these loans can vary greatly. Some sources say that annual interest
rates are near 24-30 percent. 125 According to others, interest rates
begin around 15 percent but can rise to as much as 40-100 percent. 126
Repayment collection varies greatly as well; however, repayments are
generally due starting one week after they are taken out.127 Many
borrowers have suffered in attempts to pay back their loans: "[v]illagers
are sending their children to work to help them make the repayments,"
debt collectors are insisting that borrowers "sell their cattle chickens
and other household items." 128 Even "[s]elling agricultural land is . . .
considered as a last desperate option." 129 As a political leader
illustrated, "I have seen them sell their wedding jewelry to pay the
installments." 30 Worse yet, the rural villagers have complained "of
117. Biswas, supra note 29.
118. Id.
119. Financial Performance of Indian MFIs in 2010 - Sa Dhan Report, INDIAN
MICROFINANCE (Oct. 25, 2010), http://indiamicrofinance.com/financial-performance-of-
indian-mfis.html.
120. "Mainstream Indian and international banks have backed the microlending
industry in India with more than $4 billion of loans this year, with private-equity funds
pouring more than $250 million into the industry in India last year alone." Bellman &
Chang, supra note 18.
121. Biswas, supra note 59 (MFIs have given away over $7bn in loans to borrowers in
India, and accounts for "nearly half of the loans.").
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Biswas, supra note 29.
125. "[A]nnual interest rates vary from 24-30% compared with the 36-120% charged by
usurious money lenders." Id.
126. Melik, supra note 44.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
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harassment from the debt collectors and there have been allegations of
physical assaults."13 1
D. Suicide Epidemic in Andhra Pradesh
In the last few months of 2010, more than 80 people in the AP
region of India committed suicide after defaulting on micro-loans. 132
This, in turn, "triggered the worst ever crisis in India's booming micro-
finance industry."1 33
In another example, a loan taken to save a life ended up taking a
life. 134 At only 45 years old, Mylaram Kallava hung "herself from the
ceiling of her mud hut in the neighbouring village of Ghanapur after
she defaulted on four micro-loans amounting to $840."135 She had
borrowed money to pay for medical expenses for her two daughters: one
for appendicitis, and the other for a pregnancy that ended in
miscarriage.136 Mrs. Kallava lived more than 45 miles from the closest
government hospitals, so she was forced to go to a private hospital,
which was far beyond her budget.137 With a sick and barely working
husband, two months of defaults on her loans, and the recently ended
job program in the village, Mrs. Kallava could not ignore the
employment shortage in the area. 38 Her co-guarantors, from her local
self-help group, went to the house to ask why she was defaulting and
Mrs. Kallava was ashamed.139 The last straw for Mrs. Kallava,
perhaps, was the impending visit of the loan recovery agents. They
were expected to arrive by the end of the week, but Mrs. Kallava did not
wait for the agents.14 0 The "very social fabric" that was formed through
self-help groups, that of co-guarantors holding one another accountable
as guarantors for one another's loans, "has been disrupted with
members blaming each other for private loan defaults."141 In Mrs.
Kallava's suicide, her co-guarantors checking in on her could have been
a contributing factor - her daughter says that the co-guarantors
questioning her mother made her feel ashamed.142
As if the suicide epidemic was not tragic enough, some analysts
worry that AP's floundering microfinance will infect other regions.143
131. Melik, supra note 44.
132. Biswas, supra note 29.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Biswas, supra note 29.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Biswas, supra note 59.
142. Biswas, supra note 29.
143. Biswas, supra note 59.
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Vijay Mahajan suspects that "if repayments dry up in Andhra Pradesh,
the contagion will spread to other states - and the entire micro-loan
industry will be in peril."144 He thinks the repayment problems could
spread so far as to destroy microfinance in India, saying "[t]he biggest
tragedy will be that the 30 million poor households, who got access to
bank credit for the first time through micro-finance companies, will
have to go back to moneylenders."l 45 As the Wall Street Journal
concurs: "what happens [in AP] is frequently a bellwether for
microlending in India, and programs around the world." 4 6 Mahajan
further extrapolates that the industry "could fold up in Andhra Pradesh
and you could see a domino effect across the country."147 This would
likely drive people "back to the humiliation of moneylenders," who
exploit borrowers with "interest rates as high as 100 per cent."148
IV. DIFFICULTIES IN MICROFINANCE
A. Introduction
Despite all of microfinance's success stories, some are skeptical
about whether microfinance has helped to alleviate poverty.149 There
are many reasons for this doubt, as there are substantial problems with
microfinance as it stands. Some say that the industry has not helped
eradicate poverty because it has not touched enough people. 5 0
Bangladesh's Prime Minister said that microfinance is "sucking blood
from the poor."15 1 Others argue that a focus on profit has caused
companies to ignore such development indicators as education.152 Yet
other camps explain that politicians have stunted the proliferation of
microfinance.153 According to one organization, the primary challenge
for MFIs is: "[d]ecreasing costs to clients through streamlined
operations, low credit risk and, eventually, lower profit margins." 154
This daunting issue is compounded by the economic climate of the past
few years, rising problems with loan repayment, and the costs of
diverting further resources to loan collection.15 5 Some scholars blame
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
147. Indian Microlenders Facing Crisis, supra note 1.
148. Id.
149. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
150. Willner, supra note 83.
151. Indian Microlenders Facing Crisis, supra note 1.
152. See Willner, supra note 83.
153. See id.
154. MICROFINANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE, 2009 MIX GLOBAL 100: RANKING OF
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS, INC. 3 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.the
mix.org/sites/default/files/2009%20MIX%20Global%20100%2oComposite.pdf.
155. Id. at 3-4.
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greed, even comparing India's situation with that of the recent
mortgage meltdown in the United States. 156
As one economic analyst says, "[e]verybody is at fault here."15 7 He
clarifies:
The banks are at fault for failing to provide inclusive
finance. State government has failed to create dynamic
economies that reduce poverty fast and make people credit-
worthy. Self-help groups started well, yet failed to meet
credit needs and are suffering loan defaults. Micro-finance
companies provided enough finance, but it became too
much! They engaged in gross over lending in a sad rush for
profits.158
While experts disagree as to a single cause of the problems with
microfinance, it is clear that the flaws of microfinance are complex.
B. Loans for Non Income-Producing Items & "Income Shocks"
MFIs now give microloans for items that are not income-producing,
and often fail to plan for income shocks. When microloans were first
popularized in the Grameen era, they were "given out to help small
traders sell vegetables or buy livestock, or for basic farming needs." 159
They were given for specific income-producing items, as capital to start
businesses or to help budding entrepreneurs increase their trade. 16 0 In
recent years, however, the loans have changed: "[i]n recent years those
farming commercial crops (cotton, groundnut, vegetables) or larger
livestock (high-yielding buffaloes and cows) received micro-credit." 161
Loans have also been given to "build homes, repay old debts, buy
consumer durables like TV sets and pay for family marriages."162 While
loans were previously given for "productive purposes," the bulk of
current micro-loans are given for "consumption-related expenses." 163
Since MFIs are now lending for larger, higher-yielding endeavors,
modern borrowers need to be more adept at handling the assets they
buy with the microloan. 164 For example, if a borrower buys larger
156. Unfortunately, "the difference in India is that the borrowers are even poorer, with
zero social security." "India's micro-finance crisis mirrors the 2008 subprime mortgage
meltdown in the US, where finance companies threw cheap and easy loans at homebuyers
until prices crashed and borrowers were unable to sell their homes or pay their debts."
Biswas, supra note 59.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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livestock like buffalo, the animal requires "sophisticated veterinary care
and insurance." 165 Additionally, rural farmers are often unprepared to
handle the "income shocks" from a difficult crop season or a change in
the market leading to lowered prices.16 6 While Grameen utilized an
emergency fund program to prepare borrowers for natural disasters,
many current programs do not provide similar opportunities. MFIs are
not preparing borrowers for income shocks, nor ensuring that the
borrowers they loan to are investing in income-producing items.
C. Lack of Capacity
Many people suggest that microfinance has not adequately helped
alleviate poverty because it has not affected enough people and does not
have strong enough financial backing. The founder of SKS
Microfinance, India's largest microfinance institution, argues that the
microfinance industry has made a fatal mistake because it "hasn't
scaled large numbers." 67 He extrapolates that while three billion
people survive on less than two dollars a day, "only twenty percent of
the [world's] poor households" have reaped the benefits of
microfinance.168 He explains that this failure to affect as many people
as possible is because non-profit banking institutions do not have access
to enough capital. 169
D. Greed & Measuring Success by Profit
Yunus chastised, "[w]e created microcredit to fight the loan sharks;
we didn't create microcredit to encourage new loan sharks . . .
Microcredit should be seen as an opportunity to help people get out of
poverty in a business way, but not as an opportunity to make money out
of poor people."170 Many agree that greed led to microfinance's current
struggle.' 7 ' For-profit companies are making huge profits - "way above
those of most banks, public and private."172 Experts are concerned that
the profit-motive encourages the poor "to take on more debt than they
can bear."173  Likewise, some suggest that for-profit microfinance
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Willner, supra note 83.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. MacFarquhar, supra note 56.
171. "At the root of it, many say, is the increasing greed of the private microfinance
industry in India." Biswas, supra note 59. Some camps say that MFI interest rates are
often as high as money-lenders, which defeats "the supposed purpose of micro-credit, with
all its talk about improving the lives of the poor." Biswas, supra note 29.
172. Biswas, supra note 59. SKS Microfinance, for example, "raised more than $350m
on the stock market [in August 2010]." Between 2007-2008, "private equity players
pumped $100m into India's private micro-credit companies." Id.
173. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
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institutions have erred by measuring success in profit, thereby
disregarding the purpose of microfinance institutions.174 The president
of the Grameen Foundation worries that for-profit companies use profit
as their "main metric of success." 75 Judging success based on profit
means that these companies often ignore crucial development
indicators,176 and ignore such common-sense necessities such as
measuring a borrower's capacity to repay.
Many organizations simply do not ensure that borrowers will have
the eventual capacity to repay their debts - "[c]ritics say avarice and
rash business practices have led to India's micro-credit meltdown."177
While banks are often cautious and check that the loans will be used for
buying productive assets, private MFIs have "exploited the existing self-
help group network and snared their members with easier and faster
loans."s7 8 In AP, companies "lend up to $450 to a borrower with few
questions asked about what she or he proposes to do with the loan and
without sufficiently examining their capacity to repay." 79  Some
analysts say that for-profit MFIs, "[1]ike other high-profit industries"
needed "to aim for high growth" and therefore lent recklessly. 8 0 Many
of the companies lend repeatedly to the same borrowers, who then
cannot repay.181 As Vijay Mahan, chairman of a network of private
MFIs, explains: "[m]ultiple lending, over-indebtedness, coercive
recovery practices and unseemly enrichment by promoters and senior
executives [of microcredit companies] has led to this situation."182 He
blames "reckless lending and feckless borrowing by micro-credit
companies and villagers respectively."183
E. Banks Stopped Lending to MFIs
Due to bad lending practices in some regions, such as in AP, banks
stopped lending to MFIs, in fear that they will not recover $4 billion in
loans. 8 4 As one SKS Microfinance recovery agent declares, "it's not
business as usual."185 SKS used to have crowded weekly meetings
174. Willner, supra note 83.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Biswas, supra note 59.
178. Id. Quoting Reddy Subramanyam, Andhra Pradesh's most senior rural
development official.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. Biswas, supra note 29.
183. Biswas, supra note 59.
184. Biswas, supra note 29.
185. Vishwanath Pilla, Six Months on, Loan Defaults Mount, LIvEMINT.coM & WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.livemint.com/2011/04/25223809/Six-months-on-loan-
defaults-m.html.
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giving out new loans; now, few customers attend.18 6 The company still
goes out to meet with clients on a regular basis and attempts to
persuade borrowers to repay their loans.1 87 Unfortunately, only a few
members are repaying, and "most of them refuse even to talk to us and
attend our calls."188 In one particular group, the SKS agent arrived and
the self-help group wanted to repay its loans. However, the women
explained that the group had been forbidden to repay by a local
politician and their husbands. 189 The area's political leader arrived and
"told the SKS agents not to harass his neighbors."190 Recovery in AP
has been called "dismal" 191 and is around 10-20 percent. 192 Because of
AP's "mass default" in loan repayment, commercial banks and investors
are nervous about loaning, which is hurting the overall operations of
MFIs. 1 93
F. Political Rhetoric Has Exacerbated Problems
Political rhetoric has aggravated problems with microfinance in AP.
Politicians opposed to microfinance "have already and could again stall
loans to the poor, reversing the progress microfinance institutions have
made in India."194 In AP, repayment has dropped drastically because
politicians have asked borrowers to stop repaying.19 5 People in the
government "would say the micro-finance meltdown serves as a lesson
for an industry distorted by 'perverse' profit making and villagers who
have borrowed imprudently."1 9 6 Urged by government officials and
campaigning politicians, thousands of borrowers have stopped repaying,
even when they have the money.197 Politicians "have blamed dozens of
suicides on microlenders" and have urged "borrowers not to pay back
what they owe."19 8  For example, former Chief Minister N.
Chandrababu Naidu instructed borrowers not to repay their loans - he
"asked women to stop repaying loans until the government formed a
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
190. Id.
191. Pilla, supra note 185.
192. Id.
193. When MFIs borrow from banks, and are then unable to repay the banks, the
MFIs become the defaulters, and banks become more reluctant to lend to them. Indian
Microlenders Facing Crisis, supra note 1.
194. Willner, supra note 83.
195. Biswas, supra note 59.
196. Id.
197. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
198. Id.
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regulator agency to oversee MFIs and interest rates were lowered from
as high as 30 percent."199
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF MICROFINANCE
A. Introduction
Clearly, there are numerous problems with microfinance as it
currently stands. However, as Sivamma and Jane demonstrate,
microfinance has drastically changed women's lives. 200 Microfinance
has had huge successes - it simply needs a change from the current
system. The proffered solutions for strengthening microfinance are as
diverse the plethora of reasons microfinance has been flailing. The
debate on what solutions would help strengthen microfinance is
controversial, with strong advocates on every side. The causes are
multi-faceted and diverse; therefore, they require more than one simple
solution.
B. Act as a "For-profit" to Aid More Borrowers
Some groups suggest privatizing microfinance. 201  This
controversial question of solutions was recently epitomized when the
founder of SKS Microfinance 202 and the president of Grameen
Foundation debated what role profit should have in microfinance. 203
After the debate, the audience was polled on whether SKS's switch to
for-profit represents the "ideal model" for microfinance. 204  Not
surprisingly, "the room was split, with many in the audience remaining
undecided." 205 The debate between for-profit and non-profit MFIs is
ongoing. 206 The private MFIs appear "to be an oligopoly with a handful
of companies dominating the market." 207 However, some people believe
that stronger for-profit microfinance institutions could spread the
benefits of microfinance to more people, therefore alleviating more
poverty.208 The founder of India's largest microfinance institution,
199. Pilla, supra note 185.
200. Kristof, supra note 7; Rai, supra note 2.
201. See, e.g., Willner, supra note 83; Walker, supra note 57, at 393 ("In order to move
forward, microfinance must transform into an industry.").
202. SKS Microfinance is one of "two major microlending organizations [that] have
transitioned from traditional non-profits to for-profit corporations being traded on the
public market." Walker, supra note 57, at 384-85; Bruce Einhorn, A Microfinance IPO in
India, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 6, 2010), http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/10_20/b4178016201790.htm.
203. Willner, supra note 83.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Biswas, supra note 59. This battle is particularly important in India, where
"some 50 of the country's 1,000-odd micro-finance institutions are privately owned." Id.
207. Id.
208. Willner, supra note 83.
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Vikram Akula, explains that when non-profit banking institutions
become for-profit businesses, then they can have access to more
capital. 209 His company, SKS Microfinance, switched from non-profit to
for-profit in the past few years. 210 As he explains, "In twelve years,
we've reached 7.5 million clients," and most of them came since the
change to a for-profit company. 211 Grameen Bank, on the other hand,
"today reaches 8 million clients, but it took the Grameen Bank thirty-
five years to do that."212 The proponents of for-profit microfinance
institutions also suggest that the profit motive gives them more
opportunities for innovation. 213 For example, "SKS has adopted a
couple of innovative models that create mutually beneficial effects, such
as using advertising revenue from the pamphlets SKS distributes to its
customers in order to reduce interest rates." 214
C. Create Buoyant Markets
One of the difficulties in microfinance is that borrowers need access
to "buoyant markets,"215 those with "plenty of trading activity," and
where "prices are rising, rather than falling."216 If a borrower is given a
small sum of money to start a business but has no buyers to sell his
products to, then the borrower's business is bound to fail. 217 Therefore,
academics and entrepreneurs alike have been taking novel approaches
to creating markets for borrowers. 218 The entrepreneurial proponents
of this ideology support "capitalism as a force that can benefit the
poor."219 For example, William Bissell, the "ethnicool entrepreneur," 220
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Biswas, supra note 59; Farrer, supra note 21 ("Another way to support women
who have started businesses is by helping them gain greater access to global markets.").
216. Definition of Buoyant Market, QFINANCE, http://www.qfinance.com/dictionary/
buoyant-market (last visited May 4, 2012).
217. As Professor Lee explains in the context of microtrade, "[a]ll trade, including
microtrade, can take place only when there is a demand for goods to be supplied in trade."
Yong-Shik Lee, Theoretical Basis and Regulatory Framework for Microtrade: Combining
Volunteerism with International Trade Towards Poverty Elimination, THE LAW & DEV.
INST. (Oct. 2010), http://www.lawanddevelopment.netlyslee-microtradeoctober20lO.pdf
[hereinafter Framework for Microtrade].
218. Naazneen Karmali, Fabindia, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/
global/2009/0216/024a.html; Terry M. Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, Linking Gender
Equity to Peaceful Societies, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 406 n.78 (2007) (citing Keiko Morris,
Macy's Sells Rwandan "Peace Baskets," KNIGHT RIDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2006),
at 1); Framework for Microtrade, supra note 217, at 8 n.33.
219. Karmali, supra note 218.
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runs a business and provides trade support in India, with the mission of
"[cireating a link between those far-flung craftspeople and urban
markets."221 Bissell manages Fabindia, a self-proclaimed "profitable
business which conducts itself responsibly in the social context."222
Bissell thought that he could help India's poor by expanding the
domestic retail market rather than by focusing on exports. 223 The
company sells over 90 percent of its goods in India, but also has stores
abroad in such places as Rome, Italy; Guangzhou, China; and Dubai,
UAE. 224 Bissell's method of using for-profit companies to increase
access to trade could be controversial, but in this instance, it can add
revenue to an India-based company, provide work, and create more
buoyant markets for India's craftsmen. 225
Numerous other organizations, both for-profit 226 and non-profit, 227
have provided borrowers with access to markets.228 Through the
concept of "microtrade,"229 academia has taken a similar approach 230 to
220. Seema Chowdhry, William N. Bissell: The Ethnicool Entrepreneur, LIVEMINT.COM
& WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.livemint.com/2008/03/01004930/William-N-
Bissell--The-ethni.html.
221. Karmali, supra note 218.
222. Chowdhry, supra note 220.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Bissell's "successive sales targets" from 2002-2007 were reached, and his 2007
goal is "attaining revenues of $192 million a year." Karmali, supra note 218.
226. Farrer, supra note 21, at 485 (Macy's sells products that are handmade by
Rwandan women. "For the Rwandan artisans and entrepreneurs, access to Macy's
customer base greatly expands the market for their products . . . .") (citing Dworkin &
Schipani, supra note 218, at 391 n.78 and Keiko Morris, Macy's Sells Rwandan "Peace
Baskets," KNIGHT RIDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 15, 2006, at 1); About Us, GLOBAL
GIRLFRIEND, http://www.globalgirlfriend.com/store/ggf/support/aboutus?1 (Global
Girlfriend is a "fair-trade boutique [that] offers a line of trend-setting, women-made, fair-
trade products including stylish apparel, accessories and gifts with one purpose - helping
women in need help themselves').
227. See, e.g., KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/ (last visited May 4, 2012).
228. Additionally, social enterprise approaches show enormous potential for providing
greater access to markets. "Social enterprise describes any non-profit, for-profit or hybrid
corporate form that utilizes market-based strategies to advance a social mission." Farrer,
supra note 21, at 487; see SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, http://www.se-alliance.org/ (last
visited May 2, 2012).
229. "The theory of microtrade was first developed in 2008 by Professor Y.S. Lee with
support from the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law." Origins of Microtrade Theory,
THE LAW & DEV. INST., http://www.lawanddevelopment.net/microtrade.php (last visited
May 3, 2012).
230. "Elements of microtrade have also been discussed and put into practice by others.
For example, some non-profit organizations, such as Oxfam, have been selling products
from developing countries at their stores in developed countries." Id. "A score of
individual stores in developed countries, such as those of Oxfam, sell hand-made goods
from developing countries and return profits to the developing country producers. The
microtrade scheme proposes to organize and systemize these efforts on a global scale with
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helping borrowers reach buoyant markets. Professor Lee defines
"microtrade" as "international trade of small quantities of locally-
produced products (LPPs) produced on a small scale."231 Essentially,
microtrade would provide an online database where merchants, many
borrowing from MFIs, could sell their products to buoyant markets. It
would enable the residents of least-developed countries (LDCs) to
export their local products to more affluent markets in developed
countries.232 This theory would provide a market to borrowers in
developing countries, while offering other logistical support. 233  A
microtrade organization would coordinate the "managing the online
database for microtrade, monitoring microtrade activities, and assisting
parties to microtrade by creating a favorable regulatory and economic
environment for microtrade in cooperation with sovereign states,
relevant international organizations such as the WTO, NGOs, and
private corporations." 234 This logistical support would make access to
buoyant markets much more feasible for borrowers in developing
countries.235
D. Increase Group Borrowing
Grameen Bank attributed much of its repayment success to group
lending, 236 proving through its success that MFIs should implement
"social capital" more frequently. 237 Group lending is easy to execute;
borrowers simply form groups and then co-borrow. 238 If an individual in
the group defaults on a loan, the rest of the group is held liable and is
unable to receive future credit. 239 This takes the credit risk from the
bank and gives it to the borrowers, who can then hold co-borrowers
accountable. 240 History proves that "by utilizing this unique group
lending approach in conjunction with a formalized regulatory and
supervisory framework . . . the creation of self sufficient, sustainable,
the assistance of an open online database and financial devices such as microfinance. . .
Framework for Microtrade, supra note 217, at n.33.
231. Framework for Microtrade, supra note 217.
232. See Id. at n.33.
233. As Professor Lee explains, "[m]any of the problems facing microtrade such as lack
of market information and difficulties with shipping and transportation may indeed be
found in trade from developing countries in general." Id. at n.34.
234. Id. at 15.
235. Microtrade utilizes microfinance and could help to alleviate numerous difficulties
associated with microfinance. While further analysis of microtrade is outside of the scope
of this paper, more information is available. See Framework for Microtrade, supra note
217.
236. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 50.
237. McNew, supra note 15, at 294; see generally Reddy & Manak, supra note 82; see
The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 50, at 12.
238. See The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 50, at 12.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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MFIs is completely within the realm of possibility."241 Many scholars
propose that instituting more self-help groups (SHGs) 242 and group
borrowing would improve the microfinance system. 24 3
The Maharashtra Rural Credit Project (MRCP), for example, found
that its most successful work was in SHGs because it made credit
delivery to the rural poor more sustainable and empowered women, by
allowing for more women to borrow. 244 Creating SHGs among village
neighbors and friends based on affinity and trust gave borrowers the
opportunity to practice group money management. 245 SHGs "provided a
channel for pooling tiny savings which would otherwise have not even
been noticed or used less productively." 24 6 The organization concluded
that their most successful work in microfinance was that of developing
SHGs and strengthening their links to banks because this made rural
credit delivery a sustainable endeavor and allowed for more
empowerment of women. 247 A project in AP had similarly successful
results utilizing social capital. 248 Like MRCP, the AP project concluded
that SHGs were crucial in creating a sustainable method for microcredit
and in promoting women's empowerment.249
241. McNew, supra note 15, at 294.
242. SHGs are "small groups of rural and urban people banding together to form a
savings and credit organization," a practice that "is well established in India." Reddy &
Manak, supra note 82, at 6.
243. See Shana Hofstetter, Note, The Interaction of Customary Law and Microfinance:
Women's Entry into the World Economy, 14 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 337, 348-51
(2008); see also Farrer, supra note 21, at 474 (noting that "Hofstetter sees the Grameen
Bank as utilizing women's customary group norms in the use of social capital in a positive
way. She notes that the peer group approach utilizes women's traditional emphasis on
social networks; noting that women in Kenya responded to the group pressure aspect of
social collateral more than men did; and that a study in Zimbabwe showed that women
were more willing to sanction other members, and that female sanctions in groups were
more effective than male sanctions in groups."); Reddy & Manak, supra note 82, at 6
(according to one research group utilizing SHGs provides stronger political and advocacy
capabilities, more shared knowledge and experiences, and access to greater capital).
244. Raghav Gaiha, Microcredit and the Rural Poor: A Review of the Maharashtra
Rural Credit Project, 3 J. MICROFINANCE 125, 129-30 (2001).
245. Kurien Thomas, Andhra Pradesh Community Self Help Model 1 (Ctr. for Good
Governance, Working Paper, 2003), http://www.cgg.gov.in/pdfs/WP-77-92.pdf.
246. Project Completion Review Rep. of India Maharashtra Rural Credit Project (IFAD
Loan 325-IN), Asia & the Pac. Div. Programme Mgmt. Dep't, 9 U.N. Report No. 1395-IN
(May 2003).
247. Id. at 28.
248. IFAD also loaned money to help improve microfinance and development in the
Andhra Pradesh region. The Andhra Pradesh Participatory Tribal Development Project
took place from 1994-2002, costing a total of USD $50.3 million, and was co-financed by
the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Int'l Fund for Agric. Dev. (IFAD), External Review of
the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations: Country Note on India 1, U.N. Doc. 271387
(July 10, 2002) (by Govind Kelkar & Lothar Caviezel).
249. SHGs have several positive benefits: cost effective credit delivery system,
collective learning, democratic culture, imbibe norms of behavior, stable base for dialogue,
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E. Change the MFI Model
Experts suggest that MFIs have no choice but to "review and recast
their business model" in AP.250 This does not apply solely to AP; the
MFI model must be updated in other places where microfinance is
flailing. 251  Specifically, they need to "work more on product
diversification," and in the future, "micro-lenders will have to adopt a
different model."2 52 Some MFIs have already begun this process. 253
One option for changing the model is to incorporate "microsavings."254
Some scholars suggest that microsavings are "just as important to the
sustainability of MFIs" as microloans. 255 Microsavings are defined as
small accounts for deposits "to lower income families or individuals as
an incentive to store funds for future use."256 While the concept often
takes the backseat to microloans and many MFIs do not currently
incorporate microsavings services, experts project that "if given the
opportunity, microfinance clients would utilize these services." 257
Experts purport that "mobilizing these small savings funds may be the
key to creating self-sufficient, sustainable MFIs that can function
without the help of NGOs or foreign donors."258
F. Restructure Loan Repayment
One suggestion than many seem to agree on, and MFIs suggest, is
that restructuring the loan repayments could improve the relationship
between borrowers and the industry. Vijay Mahajan, head of a group of
for-profit MFIs, recommends loan restructuring - "he recommends that
loans of 20 percent of the worst-affected borrowers be restructured and
the payment periods stretched."259 Other MFIs have embraced this
concept as well. 260 "The biggest lenders who account for the majority of
management capacity, economic empowerment, and increased awareness levels about the
society and community. Thomas, supra note 245, at 13-14.
250. Pilla, supra note 185.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. "Spandana, for instance has already started giving loans with gold as collateral."
Similarly, SKS is "exploring possibilities of offering customized alternative products" to
their target population - they are starting pilot programs "in housing finance and gold
finance." Id.
254. McNew, supra note 15, at 291.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. McNew, supra note 15, at 291-92; see Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP), Savings Mobilization Strategies: Lessons from Four Experiences, CGAP Focus
No. 13 (Aug. 1998) [hereinafter CGAP], http://www.cgap.org/does/FocusNote-13.pdf.
258. McNew, supra note 15, at 291; see CGAP, supra note 257.
259. Biswas, supra note 59.
260. For example, Grameen Bank restructured its loan-repayment program in 2002.
The new program "allows the borrower to slow down loan payments during difficult times
so that instead of being 'in default' of payments, the borrower can opt to pay a higher
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borrowing say they will cap their rates at around 24 percent and form a
fund to help troubled borrowers reschedule their loan payments." 261
Restructuring loan repayments could also be government-mandated; if
the government regulated loan repayment, MFIs would likely work
towards compliance. 262
G. Utilize Technology for Social & Educational Benefits
Numerous projects have shown that utilizing technology can
provide greater financial access to people in developing countries, 263
and it can also provide numerous other educational and social benefits
for borrowers. For example, Grameen Bank 264 created a nonprofit
Internet provider to "make the Internet available to educational and
research institutions."265 Through this program, borrowers had the
opportunity to benefit from the latest innovations in their fields,
without unnecessarily wasting time and money trying earlier products
and methods in their businesses. 266 The idea allowed for "rapid social
change" in rural areas because it linked isolated women, that otherwise
would have had difficulty sharing ideas. 267 Additionally, it prevents
villagers from wasting effort "getting messages to dispersed family
members" because they could communicate through the Internet. 268
Lastly, it helped to quickly address "income shocks," like natural
disasters, because it allowed for villagers to deal quickly with
emergencies.269
interest rate for a short period of time, in order to stay in the program and still meet her
obligations. This allows the Bank to ease the pressure it exerts on the borrower." Farrer,
supra note 21, at 456; see MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY:
SocIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 60-66 (2007).
261. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
262. MFIs "say they are ready to comply with more government restrictions as long as
they are given time to meet new requirements." Bellman & Chang, supra note 18.
263. Greater access is achieved due to expanding markets through e-commerce,
promotion of self-employment, and by bringing education, knowledge and skill training to
the poor. YUNUS, supra note 260, at 189-90,
264. Grameen's founder, Yunus, agrees that technology is crucial, but he is wary of
who may control it. "Technology is an essential prerequisite for raising productivity, but
it must be directed so that the increased production does not simply end up in the hands
of the wealthy." YUNUS, supra note 38, at 221.
265. Id. at 227.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 227-28.
268. Id.
269. Id.
2012 615
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
H. Utilize Technology & Government to Increase Financial Access
Financial access is crucial for borrowers; however, they often have
difficulty accessing their banks. 270 Banking technology that allows
"banking without the need for a bank branch" could solve this
dilemma. 271 Numerous companies now use cell phones to provide
banking services. 272 To provide greater financial access, Kenya's M-
Pesa used cell phones for banking and "has turned 16,900 phone
vendors into banking agents."273 Even though Kenya is "a country with
fewer than 1,500 physical bank branches," M-Pesa now has 11.9 million
customers, which comprises around 54 percent of Kenya's adult
population. 274 Using phone vendors as banking agents greatly
decreases costs, 275 so banks "can operate in locales with far fewer
users." 276 This idea of utilizing mobile communication for banking is
picking up international steam. 277 In 2008, "[tlhere were 4 billion
mobile subscribers worldwide," while "[t]he global population over age
15 is only 4.9 billion," suggesting that "it is now plausible to imagine
universal access to basic financial services." 278 Government support
has proved to be a critical tool in the proliferation of wireless
banking. 279 Governments can act as alternative banks for borrowers. 280
"Governments [already] make regular payments to at least 170 million
poor people worldwide - far more than the 99 million or so who have
active microloans." 281  Government-to-person payments "have the
270. Kenny, supra note 80 ("In India, four people in five who signed up for basic
traditional bank accounts aimed especially at the poor said they would need to spend half
a day's wages and an entire day just to reach the nearest bank branch and make a
transaction").
271. Kenny, supra note 80.
272. Id.; see also Pickens, supra note 62, at 13 (asserting that Brazil has used the bank
outsourcing system very effectively. "In 2001-2005 banks in Brazil used agents to expand
across the country, with a service point in all of the country's 5,567 municipalities," and
they were able to accomplish this feat with few agents).
273. Kenny, supra note 80.
274. Id.
275. Id. ((noting that when banks like M-Pesa outsource services "to street vendors,
their costs drop dramatically.") (citing Pickens, supra note 62, at 13 ("In Pakistan, Tameer
Bank discovered that the capital and operating costs for an agent are 76 times less than
for its microfinance branches in the first year, and 89 times cheaper over five years.")).
276. Pickens, supra note 62, at 13.
277. Id. ("According to the GSM Association (the trade association for the global
communications industry), more than 80 percent of the world's population is now within
mobile coverage," and "[flinancial institutions increasingly make use of wireless networks
to connect their infrastructure.").
278. Kenny, supra note 80.
279. Id. (noting that, in the past, governments have been a crucial player in
implementing "branchless banking" because banks need "cheap and effective ways to
deliver cash transfers to their citizens.").
280. Pickens, supra note 62, at 1.
281. Id.
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potential to become a vehicle for extending financial inclusion and
improving the welfare of poor people." 282
I. Increased Regulation & Government Support
Increased government support and regulation is also crucial in
other contexts. 283 Many scholars argue that increased regulation is the
answer, 284 and even governments agree that microlending needs
government support. 285 However, opponents of increased regulation
believe restricting freedom for MFIs is damaging to the MFIs.286 As
USAID has said, the goal of MFI reform or regulatory framework
"should be to create an environment that supports the expansion of
financial services to the poor, thereby increasing access." 287 Many MFIs
purport that "regulation is essential for MFIs looking to fund
themselves," some think "regulation will promote their business and
improve their operations," while others believe "regulation is key in
speeding the emergence of sustainable MFIs."288 Local governments
often also support a stronger regulatory framework, as they "are
sometimes troubled by the weakness of many MFIs, and unimpressed
with the coordination and supervision being exercised by the donors
who fund them." 289 Therefore, they would like "someone to step in and
282. Id.
283. Walker, supra note 57, at 393 (noting that proponents of privatization claim
government regulation is "inevitable" for the conversion of microfinancing into a for-profit
industry).
284. Id. at 389 (citing David Bornstein, who "believes that the government can and
should play a role in the microfinance industry . . . He believes that the government's role
should be to subsidize the costs of institutional development, but that this subsidy should
not be infinite."); see also Muhammad Yunus, How Legal Steps Can Help Pave the Way to
Ending Poverty, 35 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. No. 1, 23 (Winter 2008) ("The best option would be
to create new law exclusively for establishing microfinance banks for low-income people
and people on welfare" and "lawyers [should] form groups in each country to develop and
revise laws that ultimately help the poor to help themselves.").
285. Bellman & Chang, supra note 18 (noting that politicians and regulators have
grown concerned "that unfettered expansion was leading to poor lending practices" and
"multiple loans to the same borrowers.").
286. McNew, supra note 15, at 288 ("[MIore regulation of MFIs is needed, but too much
regulation may make it impossible for MFIs, which by their nature require flexibility, to
survive."); see also, Alexandra O'Rourke, Public-Private Partnerships: The Key to
Sustainable Microfinancing, 12 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 179, 179 (2006) (discussing "legal
barriers to the sustainability" of MFIs).
287. USAID, Model Scope of Work: Legal & Regulatory Reform for Access to Finance
Policy & Programming Toolkit (2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf
docs/PNADF663.pdf.
288. McNew, supra note 15, at 295.
289. McNew, supra note 15, at 295; see also Robert Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The
Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks for Microfinance, CGAP Occasional Paper No. 4, 1
(Apr. 2000), available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2699/OP4.pdf.
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clean up a situation that they think is hurting the development of
microfinance in their country." 290
J. Andhra Pradesh Utilized a Regulatory Framework
AP recently approved microfinance regulations, in an attempt to
improve microlending. Politicians and critics have accused MFIs of
"using coercive practices to recover loans from overleveraged
customers," and claimed MFIs were "held responsible for suicides by
debt-burdened borrowers."291 In response to this onslaught of criticism
and the suicide epidemic, "the panicky state government has pushed
through a tough new law that seeks to regulate the industry, much to
the latter's consternation."292  In October of 2010, AP "passed an
ordinance - which later became law - tightening regulation of
microfinance companies that lend to the unbanked poor" after MFIs
were "accused of exploiting by charging high interest rates." 293 "The
regulations require that all microfinance institutions register with the
government, restrict the total interest payments charged from
exceeding the amount of the loan, ban the taking of security for loans
and impose penalties of jail time and hefty fines for coercing borrowers
with strong-handed techniques." 294 The law has changed collection
practices, prohibiting "companies from accepting weekly repayments"
and demanding "clearance from local authorities to extend a second
loan to a borrower."295 It put loan applications "under government
scrutiny," asked lenders to stop "doorstop lending," and switched "from
a weekly to a monthly loan recovery system." 296 India has followed suit
in regulating microfinance companies. 297
K Conclusion on Recommendations
It is clear that a multi-faceted approach will be required to fully
address all the difficulties with microlending. There is no one simple
solution for addressing the problem. Multiple approaches are required
to adequately aid microfinance institutions. Luckily, in AP, MFIs and
borrowers alike have agreed that change needs to occur and they have
agreed to participate. While it is too soon to tell how the new
290. Christen & Rosenberg, supra note 289.
291. Pilla, supra note 185.
292. Biswas, supra note 59.
293. Pilla, supra note 185.
294. Walker, supra note 57, at 391-92.
295. Biswas, supra note 59.
296. Pilla, supra note 185.
297. Walker, supra note 57, at 391 ("As of early 2011, the Indian federal government
and the Reserve Bank of India were working together on new federal regulations to
oversee microlending."); see Maes & Reed, supra note 86, for more information on Andrah
Pradesh post-epidemic regulatory actions.
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regulations in AP will influence the industry, it is clear that the
government is making a concerted effort to address all the difficulties.
With the continued support of NGOs and government institutions, a
continued influx of capital, and global interest, there is no doubt that
there is hope for the microfinance industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Microfinance, as it currently stands, is clearly facing adversity.
The suicide epidemic of borrowers in AP indicates that microfinance is
flawed as it stands, but this does not mean that microfinance as an
institution is dead. As Grameen Bank's beginnings demonstrate,
microfinance has the ability to greatly aid the world's poor and to
stimulate development. As Sivamma, Jane, and the millions of other
women supported and empowered through microfinance demonstrate,
microfinance is still thriving. In spite of microfinance's flaws, if
microfinance institutions, governments, and non-profit organizations
implement some of the recommendations, microfinance will continue to
be used to achieve the MDGs and help women like Jane sew their way
out of poverty.
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SCIENCE FICTION NO MORE: CYBER WARFARE AND THE UNITED STATES
Cassandra M Kirsch*
ABSTRACT
Faced with the increased propensity for cyber tools to damage state
computer networks and power grids with the click of a mouse,
politicians and academics from around the world have called for the
creation of a Geneva Convention equivalent in cyberspace. Yet,
members of United Nations Security Council continue to disagree as to
what cyber activities might rise to the level of an armed attack under
the existing Law of Armed Conflict. Activities once limited to cyber
espionage, and outside the reach of international law, are now the very
same tools utilized in cyber operations to disable state communications
and wreak havoc on state infrastructure. Wars, traditionally waged
between nations and clearly defined groups, can now be fought behind
the veil of anonymity inherent of the Internet. While acts of war have
yet to happen openly on the Internet, accusations have already been
made against Russia for the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia and against
Israel for the Stuxnet worm unleashed on Iran's nuclear reactors. Just
as aerial bombing and nuclear arms revolutionized the battlefield, cyber
attacks, and the mechanisms behind them, stand poised as the next
evolution in weapons of war and any multilateral treaty must take
these facts into consideration.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, technology has revolutionized the manner in
which wars are fought. In the eighteenth century, gunpowder brought
an end to the days of castles and knights, ushering in a period of
battalions and infantrymen. Two hundred years later, the invention of
the aircraft gave rise to the Hague Rules of Air Warfare after the
widespread destruction caused by strategic bombing campaigns during
the First World War. The atrocities wrought by the atom bomb at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki still burn in the memories of many and is
responsible for the proliferation of espionage and intelligence gathering
continuing to this day in our international community. Now, at the
dawn of the twenty-first century, information technology stands to once
again change the landscape of war. While the Internet transformed
society in the nineties by allowing computer users to access information
across the globe with the click of a mouse, the spread of information
technology comes at a cost. The more people become dependent on the
620
CYBER WARFARE AND THE UNITED STATES
Internet, and the more data we move from paper to digital format, then
the more vulnerable our society becomes to a cyber attack.
Formerly the substance of science fiction, cyber warfare is one of
the most serious national security threats in recent years. Cyber
warfare covers the doctrine regarding the tactics, techniques, and
procedures of Computer Network Operations (CNO) including attacks,
defense, and exploitation, plus the new aspect of social engineering.'
While the technology used in cyber warfare has been traditionally
characteristic of espionage activities in the last twenty years, this same
technology is capable of creating real damage to a nation-state. In 2007,
Estonia suffered the first ever reported state-wide incident of cyber
assault when Estonia's banks, online newspapers, and government
communications were shut down for two weeks by a group of Russian
hackers who were believed to be tied to the Kremlin. 2 One of the most
wired societies in the world, the people of Estonia quickly turned to the
streets in riot, leaving at least one person dead and 150 people injured. 3
Similar attacks predated the weeks leading up to the 2008 Georgian
bombings by Russia, but it was not until the United States Department
of Defense ("DoD") suffered a massive compromise of military defense
networks that the United States issued a Cyberspace Policy Review and
established the United States Cyber Command ("USCYBERCOM") to
protect DoD networks. 4
* J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2013); B.A., The University of Texas
(2008). Cassandra M. Kirsch is a 2013 Juris Doctorate candidate at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law pursuing studies in the areas of information privacy law
and Internet law. The author would like to extend special thanks to Professor John T.
Soma, the Executive Director of the University of Denver Privacy Foundation, for his
encouragement, mentorship, and support of her research on the implications of cyber
warfare and cyber crime on international law.
1. STEPHEN NORTHCUTT, Foreword to CYBER WARFARE: TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND
TOOLS FOR SECURITY PRACTITIONERS xx (JASON ANDRESS & STEVE WINTERFELD, 2011).
2. See War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 25, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792; Noah Shachtman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched
the Estonian Cyber War, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.wired.com/danger
room/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro. A Pro-Kremlin youth group took responsibility for the
attacks on Estonia in 2007. However, the group has a track record of conducting
operations on behalf of the government.
3. Estonia Hit by "Moscow Cyber War," BBC NEWS, http://news.bb.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6665145.stm (last updated May 17, 2007).
4. See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyber
Strategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2010, at 97, available at www.foreignaffairs.com
articles.66552/william-j-lynn-iiildefending-a-new-domain; US Needs 'Digital Warfare
Force," BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiltechnology /8033440.stm (last updated May
5, 2009). In what was the most significant United States military computer data breach to
date, an infected flash drive was inserted into a United States military laptop at a base in
the Middle East and the code on the flash drive uploaded itself onto a network run by U.S.
Central Command and transferred data to servers controlled by foreign intelligence
agencies. The code resulted in "Operation Buckshot Yankee," a 14-month effort to remove
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Despite various initial steps to deter a massive cyber attack on DoD
networks, the United States is largely unprepared to respond to an act
of cyber warfare. In fact, the United States military does not even have
a definition for cyber warfare nor does the legal community understand
how it applies to legal norms, specifically the Law of Armed Conflict.5
The lack of a definition of cyber warfare is especially problematic as the
President, in responding to a cyber attack must first determine whether
such an attack rises to the level of an "armed attack," and thus justifies
self-defense. However, much of what transpires in the cyber realm does
not resemble traditional military threats. Whether it is appropriate to
characterize cyber attacks as "weapons, means or methods of warfare"
and subject them to legal review is an issue because the legal
architecture for the Law of Armed Conflict is founded on the concept of
traditional military threats.
This paper focuses not only on the current state of the law
regarding cyber warfare, but also what cyber warfare could and should
be. Part I looks at the nature and history of cyber attacks to provide an
understanding of their capabilities as weapons of war as compared to
espionage. Part II examines the applicability of the Law of Armed
Conflict to cyber attacks, including how the elements of proportionality,
attribution, and necessity apply to the most common forms of cyber
attacks. Part III discusses how cyber warfare is currently being
addressed by the United States, the recent proposals for an
international treaty on cyber warfare, and the obstacles to establishing
a multilateral international treaty. Finally, Part IV looks ahead to the
future of American civil liberties post-normalization of cyber warfare.
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF CYBER ATTACKS: WEAPONS OF WAR OR
ESPIONAGE?
In the last decade, the rate of cyber attacks increased
exponentially, along with their propensity for actual harms. Faced with
the growing reality of cyber attacks from foreign state actors, talk of a
Geneva Convention equivalent for cyber space made headlines in the
news and at academic conferences in 2010 and 2011.6 Politicians and
the code from all networks. See also Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm that Ate the
Pentagon, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/worm-
pentagon/#more-66316.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE, 2-4 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf.
While the Pentagon has concluded that computer sabotage may constitute an act of war in
its first formal cyber strategy report, the report does not detail what kind of cyber attacks
justify the use of force.
6. See, e.g., KARL FREDERICK RAUSCHER & ANDREY KOROTKOv, EASTWEST INST.,
WORKING TOWARDS RULES FOR GOVERNING CYBER CONFLICT: RENDERING THE GENEVA
AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS IN CYBERSPACE 6-14 (2011), available at http://www.isn
.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications[Detaill/ots591=0c54e3b3-le9c-bele-2c24a6a8c70
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academics alike agree that a treaty would lessen the chance of a real
cyber war, arguing the world is now in the early stages of a Cyber Arms
Race.7 In evaluating how domestic and international law might be used
by the United States in response to cyber attacks, the international
legal community must first discern the nature, purpose, and scope of
cyber attacks. While the use of terms like "war" and "attacks" espouse
an offensive military nature, threats to our national computer systems
frequently fall under the category of espionage due to their data
gathering nature.8 Espionage, while punishable under domestic laws, is
not listed as a crime by the International Court of Justice. Rather, the
International Court of Justice reserves the term crime against
international law for acts of aggressive war, serious war crimes or
crimes against humanity, all of which presume harm to citizens to a
nation-state. 9 The establishment of any sort of international regime,
consequently, turns on delineating cyber activities that are used as
weapons versus those limited to state espionage.
Although cyber tools used for espionage activities are often the
same tools used to attack a nation's computer networks, acts of cyber
warfare deviate from their espionage counterparts by going beyond
compromising a computer network.10 Rather than passively monitor
state activities on a computer network or copy data,11 a cyber attack
actively "penetrates another nation's computer systems or networks for
the purposes of causing damage or disruption."1 2 While the United
States military has yet to settle on official definitions for both cyber
60233&lng-en&id=127333; Bruce Schneier, It Will Soon Be Too Late to Stop the
Cyberwars, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at 9, available at
http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/f863fb4c-fe53-1ldf-abac-00144feab49a.html; Maggie Shiels,
Cyber War Threat Exaggerated Claims Security Expert, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co
.uk/news/technology-12473809 (last updated Feb. 16, 2011). Cyber warfare and its
relation to the Geneva Convention was a popular topic at the 2011 RSA Security
Conference in San Francisco and the East West Institute has conducted a joint report
between Russian and American scholars to define rules of cyber warfare based on the
Geneva Convention. Although he has argued in the past that the threat of cyber war is
exaggerated, IT Security Expert Bruce Schneier says that the Geneva Conventions need
to be updated to manage the current reality of cyber war and cyber attacks.
7. Hamish Barwick, Global Cyber War Treaties Urgently Needed: Bruce Schneier,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/406751/global
cyber wartreaties.urgently-needed-bruceschneier.
8. See JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, Espionage, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO MILITARY
HISTORY 156-57 (Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker eds., 1996).
9. See LAWRENCE MALKIN, Genocide, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO MILITARY
HISTORY 181 (Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker eds., 1996).
10. See JEFFREY CARR & LEWIS SHEPHERD, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE
CYBER UNDERWORLD 1-5 (2009); RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR
228-32 (2010); RICHARD STIENNON, SURVIVING CYBERWAR 20 (2010).
11. STIENNON, supra note 10, at 20-22.
12. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 10, at 6.
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attacks and cyber warfare, 13 the DoD recently adopted an effects-based
approach, or consequence-based model, for determining when a cyber
activity becomes a cyber attack. 14 Under the current approach by the
DoD, the damage caused by the activity to computer networks and
infrastructure is compared with the consequences of traditional armed
attacks. 15 In other words, when the effect of a cyber attack is analogous
to those that would invoke U.N. Charter terms of "armed attack," then
the cyber operation rises to the level of an armed attack. For example, if
a cyber attack takes critical state infrastructure, such as an electricity
grid offline or a dam, offline and collateral damage spills over into the
civilian realm, then the cyber attack would likely count as an armed
attack. 16 On the other hand, a cyber operation that interferes with
intelligence activities shares more similarities with espionage activities
than the kinetic effects of armed attacks. Recently, NATO also adopted
the effects-approach, concluding in an expert report led by Madeline
Albright that a cyber attack on the critical infrastructure of a NATO
country may equate to an armed attack and justifies retaliation.' 7
Despite support of this approach by the United States and NATO,
Russia and China have both rejected the effects-approach in favor of a
broad definition of cyber warfare that encompasses any use of a
computer technology to wage an attack on another country, including
online acts to undermine the political and social harmony of the state.' 8
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 2-4.
14. See id. at 3-4. The Department of Defense refers to cyber attacks as cyber threats,
stating adversaries may seek to "exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the networks and
systems that DoD depends on." Also, cyber threats include "destructive action[s]" that
threaten to destroy or degrade networks, as well as attacks on both military targets and
critical civilian infrastructure. See also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW
AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBER ATTACK CAPABILITIES
(WILLIAM A. OWENS, et al. eds., 2009); U.S ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, THE
UNITED STATES ARMY CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS CONCEPT CAPABILITY PLAN 2016-2028, at
67 (2010), available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-7-8.pdf.
15. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attacks and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
885, 913-14 (1999). This approach appears to draw on the kinetic-effect approach coined
by Michael Schmitt. In an attempt to resolve the definitional problem of armed attack,
Schmitt removes economic and political coercion by focusing on the kinetic effects of the
cyber attacks on the actual nation-state.
16. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 196 (4th ed. 2005).
International Legal Scholar Yoram Dinstein agrees with the effects-approach. Dinstein
argues that what counts in determining whether an electronic computer network attack
rises to the level of an armed attack under the U.N. Charter is the consequence of the
assault. In his opinion, shutting down computers that control dams and causing wide-
scale flooding that results in casualties is the equivalent of an armed attack.
17. N. Atlantic Treaty Org., NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement 6-7
(May 17, 2010), available at http://www.nato.int/natostatic/assets/pdflpdf_2010_05/
20100517 100517_expertsreport.pdf.
18. Declaration of the Heads of the SCO Member States on International Information
Security, June 15, 2006, unofficial translation available at http://www.fidh.
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Although Russia, China and the United States began official talks
nearly two years ago, 19 state representatives have yet to reach a
consensus as to when a cyber attack rises to the level of an armed
attack and, in turn, when a cyber attack violates international law. 20
Just as the definitions of cyber attacks vary among nations, the
variety of hostile activities capable of being carried out over computer
networks is equally vast, ranging from malicious defacement of
websites to large-scale destruction of SCADA21 infrastructures that
civilians depend upon. The most common cyber tools employed by
private and state hackers are Structured Query Language ("SQL") code
injection, Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS"), and Worms. While
many of these cyber tools characterize recent developments in cyber
espionage and the use of each tool alone does not result in damage,
their objective and combined use can quickly breed an atmosphere of
war. Keeping the United States effects-based approach in mind, the
following descriptions illustrate the wide-range and scope of recent
org/IMG/articlePDF/article-all315.pdf. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an
intergovernmental mutual-security organization founded in 2001 by Russia and China,
appears to have adopted an expansive vision of cyber-attacks to include the use of cyber-
technology to undermine political stability. The organization has "express[ed] concern
about the threats posed by possible use of [new information and communication]
technologies and means for the purposes [sic] incompatible with ensuring international
security and stability in both civil and military spheres." See CARR, supra note 10, at 1-10.
19. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia on Internet
Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/13/science/13cyber.html; Claudine Beaumont, US and Russia in "Secret"
Cyber Warfare Talks, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/technology/news/6808883/US-and-Russia-in-secret-cyber-warfare-talks.html; Cheng
Guangjin, US Official Rules Out Chance of "Cyber War" with China, CHINA DAILY (Oct.
20, 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-10/20/content_13938436.htm. In 2009, the
United States began talks with Russia and a United Nations arms control committee
about limiting the militarization of cyberspace. The United States has also been holding
discussions with China over the last two years as well.
20. Diane Bartz & Paul Eckert, U.S. and China Face Vast Divide on Cyber Issues,
REUTERS (July 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-usa-china-cyber-
idUSTRE76D3KO20110714; Guangjin, supra note 19; John Markoff, Step Taken to End
Impasse Over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A7, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/17cyber.html. A group of cyber security
specialists and diplomats representing fifteen countries agreed on a set of
recommendations to the United Nations Secretary General for negotiations on an
international computer security treaty, but was subsequently rejected by the United
States for censorship concerns. Two years later at the 2011 annual cabinet-level U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the conference included cyber security for the
first time, but produced no breakthroughs. Bilateral discussions between the United
States, China, and Russia are ongoing.
21. SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) generally refers to industrial
control systems (ICS): computer systems that monitor and control industrial,
infrastructure, or facility-based processes. See Donald B. Ashton & Daniel W Nagala,
SCADA, PIPELINE AND GAS TECHNOLOGY, Nov.[Dec. 2004, at 26-27; Graham Nasby &
Matthew Phillips, SCADA Standardization, INTECH, May/June 2011, at 18.
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attacks, emphasizing that their objective use transforms them beyond
tools for espionage and into weapons of war.
SQL Code Injection
Long used as an essential part of any hacking activity, the dangers
of SQL code injection became known to the public in 2011 when online
group Lulzsec shutdown the Sony Playstation Network for over a
month. 22 SQL code, an international programming language designed
for managing data in relational database management systems
("RDBMS"),23 serves as the current industry-standard for website
database language. 24 However, such standardization of web sites makes
it easy for hackers to gain access to multiple databases as the Achilles'
heel of one website is often the same as another. SQL injections alter
the predefined logical expressions within a predefined query by
injecting operations which always result in true or false statements. 25
In turn, hackers can run random SQL queries and extract sensitive
user information from applications or bypass security mechanisms and
compromise the backend of server or network.26 Hackers utilizing SQL
injection techniques may gain legitimate username and password
information to sensitive government databases and aid in intelligence
gathering or espionage activities. However, passive cyber activities that
merely observe or gather data, as previously mentioned, are not
weapons or acts of war. Rather, SQL injection enters the realm of cyber
warfare by operating as a stepping-stone for further cyber attacks: Once
a computer network is infiltrated, a hacker can execute a variety of
attacks, including planting logic bombs or other malicious coding to
damage the computer network.
22. Adam Clark Estes, The Hacks that Mattered in the Year of the Hack, ATLANTIC
WIRE (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/12/hacks-
mattered-year-hack/46731.
23. Christine McGeever, Structured Query Language, COMPUTERWORLD, May 15,
2000, at 70. Structured Query Language (SQL) is a programming language designed to
get information out of and put it into a relational database. Queries are constructed from
a command that lets you select, insert, update, and locate data.
24. See, e.g., KEVIN KLINE ET AL., TRANSACT-SQL PROGRAMMING 52 (1999); Orest
Halustchak, Proposed Spatial Data Handling Extensions to SQL, in TOWARDS SQL
DATABASE LANGUAGE EXTENSIONS: FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 69 (VINCENT
B. ROBINSON & HENRY TOM eds.,1993); DEJAN SARKA, ITZIK BEN-GAN, LuBOR KOLLAR &
STEVE KASS, INSIDE MICROSOFT@ SQL SERVER@ 2008: T-SQL QUERYING 273 (2009).
25. Theodoros Tzouramanis, SQL Code Poisoning: The Most Prevalent Technique for
Attacking Web Powered Databases, in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 161 (Lech
J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).
26. CHRIS ANLEY, NEXT GENERATION SEC. SOFTWARE RESEARCH, ADVANCED SQL
INJECTION IN SQL SERVER APPLICATIONS 3-4 (2002), available at http://www.cgi
security.com/lib/advanced-sqLinjection.pdf.
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Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
DDoS attacks have been the most prevalent form of cyber attack in
recent yearS27 and predated both the 2007 attacks on Estonia and the
2008 Georgian bombings. DDoS attacks use an unknown number of
servers to deny access to a specific site by overloading the network with
data packets, thus preventing it from processing legitimate requests. 28
Using a DDoS attack disguises the attack as a legitimate attempt to
access the server or web site through controlling a collective of
computers at different locations called "zombies." Although current
software can detect basic DDoS attacks, prevention remains extremely
difficult as intrusion software cannot distinguish whether the data
request is an attack or real connection attempt. 29
Although damages from a DDoS attack against a web site range
from user inconvenience from lack of site reliability to the complete
shut down of the server and delay, 30 a strong enough DDoS attack may
effectively serve as the equivalent of a military blockade. Just like the
blockade of East Germany during World War II, the DDoS attacks on
Estonia might also be analogized to a military blockade. For example,
the 2007 DDoS attacks on the government of Estonia were so severe
that the attacks effectively shut down government communications for
weeks, knocking out the emergency lines for hours. 31 Georgia fell under
a similar fate in 2008, when a DDoS attack prevented it from
communicating with the outside world.32 Though inconvenience and
delay in communications are often not considered acts of war, these
scenarios are analogous to a missile being used to take out a
government's communication center: such a DDoS attack would
constitute an act of war.
Worms
Worms have come to light in recent years with the advent of wide-
scale disabling network attacks, such as the Conficker worm and the
Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear reactors. Another threat to cyber
security and military networks across the globe, worms are self-
27. George Disterer et al., Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks: Prevention, Intrusion
Detection, and Mitigation, in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 262-63 (Lech
Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).
28. John Worthy & Martin Fannin, Denial-of-Service: Plugging the Legal Loopholes,
COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REPORT 194-98 (2007).
29. Disterer et al., supra note 27, at 263.
30. Id.
31. Cyberwarfare: Newly Nasty, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/nodel9228757.
32. Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: the Need for
Individual Accountability on Tomorrow's Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 3-6
(2010).
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replicating malware computer programs, which use a computer network
to send copies of itself to computers on a network, sometimes without
any user intervention.33 Due to the security shortcomings on the target
computer, the worm begins replicating and sending out hundreds or
thousands of copies of itself. Unlike DDoS attacks, the presence of a
worm almost always results in damage to the computer network. 34
Although worms wreak havoc on computer networks, the nature of
worms is rooted in espionage and data gathering through electronic
eavesdropping.35 Worms function primarily by hiding on a computer
and through their presence granting access to the device. While the
presence is not generally enough to cause a problem, worms more often
than not multiply at an unprecedented rate, consuming large amounts
of bandwidth and corrupting computer network performance36
Over the last half decade, worms have become major tools in
toppling entire computer networks. In the summer of 2010, a computer
worm coined "Stuxnet" had the world's leading cyber security experts
up in arms as the self-replicating computer worm made its way through
computers the world over. The goal of the Stuxnet worm was to
physically, not figuratively, destroy a military target. 37 Believed to be
distantly related to the Conficker3 8 worm, Stuxnet targeted Siemens
industrial software and equipment, specifically the computer systems
that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities, by activating when
33. Kevin Curran et al., Hacking and Eavesdropping, in CYBER WARFARE AND
TERRORISM 308 (Lech Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).
34. See 0. Toutonji & S. Yoo, An Approach against a Computer Worm Attack, 1.2
INT'L J. COMM. NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SEC. 47, 53 (2009); R.D. VINES, WIRELESS
SECURITY ESSENTIALS, DEFENDING MOBILE SYSTEMS FROM DATA PIRACY 200 (2002).
35. Curran et al., supra note 33.
36. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991). The Morris worm on
November 2, 1988, was one of the first computer worms distributed via the Internet.
According to its creator, the Morris worm was not written to cause damage, but to gauge
the size of the Internet. A supposedly unintended consequence of the code, however,
caused it to be more damaging: a computer could be infected multiple times and each
additional process would slow the machine down, eventually to the point of being
unusable.
37. William J. Broad, et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all.
38. Protect Yourself from the Conficker Worm, MICROSOFT (Apr. 4, 2009),
http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/conficker.aspx; John Markoff, Worm Infects
Millions of Computers Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/technology/internet/23worm.html; John Markoff,
Defying Experts, Rogue Computer Code Still Lurks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/technology/27compute.html. Conficker
uses flaws in Windows software to co-opt machines and link them into a virtual computer
that can be commanded remotely by its authors. With more than five million of these
zombies now under its control - government, business and home computers in more than
200 countries.
628 VOL. 40:4
CYBER WARFARE AND THE UNITED STATES
the worm detected the presence of a specific configuration of Siemens
controller that appear to exist only in a centrifuge plant.39 Creators of
Stuxnet designed the computer worm to remain inert long periods
before accelerating the spinning rotors in the centrifuges beyond the
burst frequency, resulting in both the bearings and tubes of the rotors
breaking. 40 Stuxnet also included a man-in-the-middle code that sent
out false industrial process control signals, rendering the aberrant
behavior undetectable to diagnostic systems. 41 In turn, the man-in-the-
middle code prevented the safety system from engaging, which would
shut down the centrifuge plant before self-destruction.
As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, cyber tools, like
Stuxnet and the wide-scale DDoS attacks on Estonia, have the potential
to inflict massive amounts of damage on a state computer network, or
even a nuclear reactor. On their own, these tools of the hacker trade
may look like espionage activities, but used in conjunction and with the
right intent, may bring about effects similar or equivalent to those of an
armed attack. Recognizing that cyber tools can rise to the level of armed
attacks, the next issue facing the United States and the international
community is how to regulate and limit the use of this technology in the
fifth domain of battle, cyberspace.
In the last fifty years, the control of the production and use of
certain weapons has taken on increasing urgency as technological
progress during the Cold War opened doors for the development of far
more devastating weapons than any means of prior conventional
warfare. 42 In the post-WWII environment, arms control treaties have
burgeoned, prohibiting or regulating under the Law of Armed Conflict
the use of new weaponry developments ranging from chemical and
biological, to nuclear arms. 43 As little to no difference exists between
benevolent and malevolent coding44 and the use of coding is available to
anyone with a computer, completely banning these cyber weapons
remains highly unlikely and equally ineffective. Cyber weapons, with
their increasing propensity for harms to state infrastructure and
computer networks, stand posed as the next evolution of warfare and in
turn, weapons governed or prohibited by the Law of Armed Conflict.
39. Broad, et al., supra note 37.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 304-05 (1983); WILLIAM BOOTHBY,
WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 357 (2009); MICHAEL E. O'HANLON &
MICHAEL A. LEVI, THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 1-12 (2004).
43. O'HANLON & LEVI, supra note 42, at 62, 159.
44. J. Morales et al., Symptoms-Based Detection of Bot Processes, Proceedings of the
Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security
Conference (Sept. 7-10, 2010).
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II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND CYBER WARFARE
The Law of Armed Conflict is the legal corpus comprised of the
Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent
treaties, case law, and customary international law. 45 The Law of
Armed Conflict "arises from a desire among civilized nations to prevent
unnecessary suffering and destruction while not impeding the effective
waging of war."4 6 A part of public international law, the Law of Armed
Conflict regulates armed hostilities and applies to military operations
and related activities conducted during an international armed
conflict.47 In the case of cyber attacks, the form and degree of network
attacks are a major factor in determining whether a nation may
respond by force in self-defense. The language used to develop these
rules does not easily translate into cyberspace so there is no common
understanding on how they will apply to this new war-fighting domain.
Not only must Internet activity rise to the level of an armed attack
under the Law of Armed Conflict, but must also meet the required
elements of necessity, proportionality, and attribution.
Serving as the pillar of the right to self-defense within the Law of
Armed Conflict, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for the right of
countries to engage in military action in self-defense, including
collective self-defense, if they come under an "armed attack" from
another state.48 If the attack is real or the threat has proceeded beyond
the point of no return, the victim state of a cyber attack, without any
alternative means, may use self-defense to justify reasonable,
necessary, and proportional measures to maintain the security of the
state under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 49 In turn, the armed attack
requires a precondition that the use of force produces or is liable to
produce serious consequences. When no such results materialize,
Article 51 does not come into play. However, many nations, particularly
members of the U.N. Security Council, have yet to arrive at a consensus
45. GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 7-10 (2010); What is International
Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1 (July 2004),
http://www.icrc.orgenglassets/files/other/what-is ihl.pdf.
46. Solis, supra note 45; Leslie Green, What is--Why is there- the Law of War?, in 71
INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
141, 161 (Schmitt & Green eds., 1998); Thomas W. Pittman & Linda S. Murnane, The
Law of Armed Conflict in Modern Warfare, 42 JUDGES' J. 18, 18 (2003).
47. SOLIS, supra note 45, at 23; ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 65 (2008); William Taft, The Law of
Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 319 (2003).
48. U.N. Charter art. 51.
49. JEFFREY CARR & LEWIS SHEPHERD, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE CYBER
UNDERWORLD 56 (2009).
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on what the right to self-defense means in the event of an attack on a
country's computer networks.50
In determining whether a cyber attack constitutes an armed attack
warranting self-defense, any examination under Article 51 must also
consider Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 lists measures "not involving the
use of armed force," including "complete or partial interruption . . . of
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication."5 1 Since Article
41 describes actions not involving the use of force, a cyber attack
initially does not appear to fall into the category of armed attack.
However, this ignores the vast propensity described in Part I of this
paper for a cyber attack to wreck wide-spread damage and harm on
vital civilian and military networks, resulting in equally or more
devastating harm than that brought about by more traditional modes of
warfare.
If a cyber attack is determined to have risen to the level of an
armed attack, the response of the state must be necessary, proportional,
and attributive.52 In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice stated,
"the submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary
international law" and "this dual condition applies equally to Article 51
of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed."53 Necessity
entails that the state invoking self-defense establish that a genuine
armed attack, not an accident or mistake, was launched by a particular
country and that the immediacy of the danger provides no reasonable
alternative means for responding. 54 However, the condition of necessity
is inherent in responding to any state-sponsored cyber attack; all cyber
attacks call for immediate self-defense if there is any chance for the
extremely destructive potential of cyber tools to be stopped from
spreading into the civilian realm or wreck wide-spread damage.
Under the Law of Armed Conflict, the proportionality doctrine
forbids the use of any kind or degree of force that exceeds that required
to fulfill the military objective.55 Article 51(5)(b) of the U.N. Charter
codifies proportionality and directs that attacks on a specific military
objective are impermissible if they "may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
50. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of
Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 426-27 (2011).
51. U.N. Charter art. 41.
52. CARR, supra note 18, at 56.
53. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 245 (July 8).
54. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 198 (1984).
55. Id. at 198-200.
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combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."5 6 A responsible
state actor intent on a particular target must then first determine if it
is a military objective, and then whether the collateral damage from
destruction of the target is proportionate to the military advantage of
destroying it.57 These articles do not entirely prohibit civilian casualties
under international law, but rather attempt to minimize the number of
civilian casualties as much as possible and ensure that any injury is
sufficiently justified.5 8 In preparation for an attack, Article 57 requires
planners to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."5 9 In other words, if a weapon cannot
discriminate between military and civilian objects, the use of such
weapon is illegitimate.60
Due to the high level of interconnectivity between civilian and
military networks, cyber warfare operations risk producing collateral
damage in the civilian realm that is far beyond the intended effects of
the attack.6 1 Regardless of whether cyber attacks result in damage
beyond the target computer program or data, the estimated amount of
damage done would need to come from the victim state as the effects on
civilian networks or infrastructure are often not immediately visible. 62
For example, 95 percent of the United States military information
transfers, and 90 percent of major corporation information transfers,
take place or depend on civilian networks.68 Should a state interfere
56. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
57. Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56
A.F. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005).
58. See Protocol I, supra note 56 (stating an indiscriminate attack is one that an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated); Thomas & Murnane, supra
note 46; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond, 87 INT'L L.
STUD. 463, 470 (2011).
59. Protocol I, supra note 56, art. 57.
60. Id. art. 51(4) (stating that indiscriminate attacks are prohibited and include
attacks that indiscriminate attacks are not directed at a specific military objective,
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be
limited).
61. JASON ANDRESS & STEVE WINTERFIELD, CYBER WARFARE: TECHNIQUES, TACTICS
AND TOOLS FOR SECURITY PRACTITIONERS 233 (2011).
62. Id.
63. Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations:
Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV 132, 132-33 (2005).
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with a military information transfer, the attack could easily spillover
into civilian communications by sheer virtue of occurring on the same
computer network.
While the effects of a proposed cyber attack may be difficult to
estimate, ascertaining or gauging the extent of damage to civilians is
not impossible. In fact, cyber attacks generally target a specific
database or network through code design. Although criticized for
allowing a specifically targeted attack to enter into public networks
around the globe, 64 the creators of Stuxnet could feasibly have refined
the coding so as not to spread outside the intended network.65 In
addition to code design, deleting military files, or even disabling
military computer networks, would limit damages to a proper military
target. Combining these aforementioned activities with proper
intelligence gathering and operational planning, the state hacker could
restrict their activities to military networks and avoid networks
dedicated solely to medical or other public facilities. Otherwise, the
cyber attacks will likely be indiscriminate and spillover into the civilian
realm.
Even if a response meets the requirements of proportionality and
necessity, an attack must be attributable to a state because the laws
governing an action of self-defense depend upon whether the attacker is
a nation-state or a non-state actor.66 Generally, the international law of
self-defense prohibits the use of force by a victim state, unless the act of
aggression can be conclusively attributed to a state or an agent
thereof.6 7 As the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force applies only
64. Michael Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104; Gregg Keizer, Secrets
of the Stuxnet Worm's Travels, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.pc
world.comlarticle/206822/secretsofthestuxnet_worms travels.html?tk=hpnew
(explaining that Stuxnet was aimed at a specific target list, but spread to thousands of
PCs outside Iran, in countries including China, Germany, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia);
John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, NY TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?partner-r
ss&emc=rss; Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevell
2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/l.
65. Gregg Keizer, supra note 64; Unraveling Stuxnet, KASPERSKY LABS (Jan. 16,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5YpwNBTdOl8. Senior Antivirus Expert at
Kaspersky Lab Roel Schouwenberg believes that because an initial infected-USB based
attack failed, the creators of Stuxnet took the risk of it spreading by adding more
functionality to the worm. Liam 0 Murchu, operations manager with Symantec's security
response, agrees with Schouwenberg.
66. Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right
of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 451 (2009).
67. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, BATTLING TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE USE OF FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR 169 (2005); Michael Glennon, The Fog of
Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (2002); Levi Grosswald, Cyberattack Attribution Matters
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to states and not to individuals, attribution to a state actor is
inescapable.68 However, knowledge of the state of origin of a cyber
attack, alone, does not identify the individual, or country, that initiated
the attack.
An experienced hacker can easily hide their tracks by routing
through zombie computers that are hacked or compromised without the
knowledge of the owner, as seen in the attacks on Estonia.69 More
recently, a detailed study by the Information Warfare Monitor
uncovered "Ghostnet," a cyber espionage plot based in China that
compromised more than a thousand sensitive government and
commercial computer systems from around the world. 70 The plot
managed to infiltrate computer systems belonging to embassies, foreign
ministries and other government offices in India, London, and New
York City.71 However, the report could not conclude whether the
Chinese government or private hackers working in their own political
interest controlled the plot. At the same time, the report could neither
reject the possibility that a state other than China was behind the plot,
routing through zombie computers in China to "deliberately mislead
observers as to the true operator and purpose of the Ghostnet system." 72
Even with today's highly advanced trace-back and forensic technologies,
the attribution of a cyber attack remains exceedingly difficult.73
Consequently, states acting on the legal requirement of attribution
continue to handle transnational cyber attacks as any other criminal
matter on the Internet, resorting to traditional public sector cyber
security measures and leaving investigation and prosecution to the
originating state. However, even the best cyber security framework is
not invincible and countries are often unwilling to investigate.
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1155 (2011). Article 51
U.N. Charter requires that the attack be carried out as an "act of a state," which means
that it must be attributable to a state.
68. Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use
ofForce Invoking the Right of Self Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 232-35 (2002).
69. Ryan Singel, Zombie Computers Decried as Imminent National Threat, WIRED
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/zombie-computer.
70. John Markoff, Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/
29spy.html?pagewanted=all.
71. Id.
72. Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC (June 7, 2010),
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/75262/the-new-vulnerability?page=0,2.
73. Andre Arnes, Identification and Localization of Digital Addresses on the Internet,
in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 368-69 (Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M.
Colarik eds., 2008).
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Duties Between States and The Doctrine of Imputability
Given the difficulties raised by the attribution requirement of the
Law of Armed Conflict and increasing fear of another attack similar to
Stuxnet, the international community has seen considerable activity by
various state actors over the last half decade in the pursuit of feasible
options to conclusive attribution. Prior to 1972, state responsibility only
extended to those acts committed through state "agents."74
International law, nevertheless, started to shift towards a doctrine of
indirect responsibility with the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia's seminal opinion on state responsibility in the Tadic case.75
In Tadic, the court found that even though the state may not have
directed a particular act, the state still exercised "overall control" for
the actions of combatants.76 Although overall control denotes a manner
of direct state control, the Tadic ruling signals a shift in international
law towards holding states responsible for the acts of persons within
their borders.
This shift continued through the last decade with the events of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Now, a large
amount of the international community generally accepts that non-state
actors who have committed armed attacks against other states can
impute responsibility onto the state they are operating within.77 This
doctrine of state imputability rests upon the premise of a positive
obligation of states to prevent their territories from being used as safe
havens for not only terrorist attacks, but any attack that would inflict
harm on a foreign state.78 Consequently, U.N. declarations have
increasingly concerned cyber attacks, with the U.N. General Assembly
calling upon states to institute domestic criminal charges for persons
engaging in malicious cyber activity and to take proactive measures to
prevent becoming safe havens for such criminals.79
74. The Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24).
75. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995). See also Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A Concerto for Court,
Council and Committee, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 63 (2008).
76. Tadic 1 70. The court distinguished between state responsibility for individual
actors and responsibility for operations of "organized and hierarchical structured groups,"
such as military units where effective control may not be necessary to carry out state
objectives. The court also drew on the substantial political, military, and financial aid
provided to the combatants. The court found that atrocities only need to be committed in
part with the state resources and that the state have knowledge of the circumstances by
an organ of the state to be responsible.
77. CARR, supra note 18, at 53.
78. TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2006).
79. G.A. Res. 55/63, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/63 (Dec. 4, 2000).
2012 635
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The doctrine of state imputability turns upon the requirement of
due diligence, a long held principle of international law.80 Under
international law, a state must "use due diligence to prevent the
commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another
nation or its people."8' Following on this principle, the U.N. General
Assembly maintains that a state has an obligation to prevent and
punish these injurious acts. 2 When the actions of a state do not
conform to this international obligation, that obligation is breached. As
such, a breach of an international obligation is an international wrong
and that state is then responsible to other states for the injury inflicted
as a result of that wrongful act.83 In order to effectively impute
responsibility onto a nation-state for a breach of due diligence, the
victim state must at "minimum examine a sanctuary state's criminal
law dealing with cyber attacks, its enforcement of the law, and its
demonstrated record of cooperation with the victim states' own
investigations and prosecutions of cyber offenders who have acted
across borders."84 This became a recent political reality when
responsibility for the September 11 attacks by al Qaeda was extended
to the Taliban Government of Afghanistan after evidence revealed that
the Taliban Government following the September 11attacks continued
to provide safe harbor to al Qaeda after multiple warnings to stop.85
Adhering to this rationale, a sanctuary state's indifference to cyber
attacks launched from within its borders and its failure to cooperate
with investigation efforts may very well result in charges of imputed
responsibility.
Admittedly, placing the responsibility on states for cyber attacks
committed within their borders potentially unleashes a Pandora's box of
80. See Robert Perry Barnidge Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International
Law, 8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 81 (2006); Jan Hessbruege, Historical Development of
the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L.
& POLY 265 (2004).
81. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7). See also Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949, I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9). The post-Charter court ruled that every
state has an obligation to not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other states.
82. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). See also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Any state
acquiescing to terrorist activities will be held in violation of Article 2(4).
83. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 82, art. 31, para. 1.
84. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L & POL'Y
87, 94 (2010).
85. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists.: Should States Be Strictly Liable for
Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615, 619-20 (2005). See
also S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). Security Council Resolution
1368 includes the harboring of those perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of terrorist
acts as imputing state responsibility. The term "those" is sufficiently broad to include non-
state actors.
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problems, particularly in determining whether the state initiated
adequate control measures over the hackers. Regardless, the current
status quo is unacceptable; in several recent cases of cyber attacks on
states, countries from which the attacks originated refused to accept
responsibility and even refused to cooperate with investigations. 86
Furthermore, many countries have yet to enact any sort of cyber crime
laws or the existing laws are rendered ineffective through gaps in the
statutory language.8 7 In light of these considerations, the international
community must continue to advocate for greater recognition of each
state's positive duty under international law to actively prevent the use
of its territory for acts harmful to another state and the international
community.
III. THE FUTURE OF U.S. CYBER WAR STRATEGY: BILATERAL TREATIES
Expanding the doctrine of state imputability to attacks waged in
cyberspace requires codification, similar to an arms control treaty,8 8
recognizing the role of computer technology and the Internet to conduct
attacks on other nations within the Geneva Convention and the Law of
Armed Conflict. Much as arms control treaties are used to limit the
damage done in warfare by restricting the usage of new innovative
86. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009).
87. Jonah Fisher, Efforts to steer young Nigerians away from cybercrime, BBC (Dec.
15, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16192839; John Leyden, Nigeria Fails
to Enact Cyber Crime Laws, REGISTER (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk
/2011/04/01/nigeriacybercrimelawfail; Brazilian justice minister urges inclusion of
cyber crime into criminal code, XINHUA NEWS (June 30, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english20lO/world/2011-06/30/c_13957924.htm. Both Brazil and Nigeria continually
rank high for cyber crime, but neither country has a set of cyber crime laws.
88. Paul Wagenseil, Cyberweapons Treaties Might Help Prevent Cyberwar, SECURITY
NEWS DAILY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/cyberweapons-treaties-
cyberwar-1276/. At the 2011 Hacker Halter cyber security conference, BT chief cyber
security officer, Bruce Schneier, proposed establishing a cyber weapons treaty, crediting
former presidential adviser Richard Clarke for the idea from his 2010 book "Cyber War:
The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It." Schneier claims that just
as there are mechanisms for enforcing nuclear arms and chemical weapons treaties, the
same could be developed for cyber weapons. He recommends a no first use policy,
outlawing unaimed weapons, and mandating weapons that self-destruct at the end of
hostilities. See also Hamish Barwick, Global cyber war treaties urgently needed: Bruce
Schneier, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com.aularticle/
406751/global cyber-wartreaties_ urgently-needeLbruce-schneier; Barbara Honegger,
Former Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke Calls for New National Cyber Defense
Policy to Prevent a Cyber 9/11, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCH. NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.nps.edulAbout/News/Former-Counterterrorism-Czar-Richard-Clarke-Calls-for
-New-National-Cyber-Defense-Policy-to-Prevent-a-Cyber-9/11-.html; Bruce Schneier, It
Will Soon be Too Late to Stop the Cyberwars, LONDON FIN. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f863fb4c-fe53-1idf-abac.
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weaponry,89 states have a similar interest in limiting the use of cyber
tools in armed conflicts to minimize, or altogether prevent, collateral
damage to civilian populations and damage of both critical
governmental and civil infrastructure.90 Unfortunately, the United
States and several Security Council members vary widely as to what
activity by a state on the Internet arises to the level of an act of
aggression or armed attack in the digital world. For example, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which members include China
and Russia, asserts cyber war includes the dissemination of information
"harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states."9'
Russia maintains that anytime a government promotes ideas on the
Internet with the goal of subverting another country's government that
it has committed an illegal act of aggression under the U.N. Charter. 92
In contrast, the United States would rather not include political acts
that may result in censorship and freedom of speech issues, and instead
focuses on the physical and economic damage and injury caused by
cyber attacks. 93 The United States also remains skeptical of Russian
ideas of an international agreement, since a multilateral treaty could
provide cover for totalitarian regimes to censor the Internet in the
fashion of Egypt and Libya prior to the Arab Spring. 94 This difference in
opinion has led to reluctance by the United States to pursue
multilateral international cyber arms control agreements with both
Russia and China.
Following recent international treaty trends, the United States is
pursuing bilateral treaty agreements to fit the DoD effects-based
89. GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION
22 (2001). Arms control agreements refer to all agreements between two or more states to
limit or reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations to diminish tensions
and the possibility of conflict.
90. Id. at 1. The international community benefits more from limited warfare than a
peaceful situation in which a state is allowed to pose a serious threat to international
peace. See also Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J. (June 4,
2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284964
215965730.html Markoff, supra note 19, at Al; Andrew Nagorski, Cyberwar Is Hell,
NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.comlnewsweek/
2010/07/28/cyberwar-is-hell.html. After years of talks that went nowhere, the United
States, Russia, China, India, and several others have agreed to begin cyber war limitation
talks at the United Nations due to the increase in cyber attacks and their transnational
nature.
91. Tom Gielten, Seeing the Internet as an "Information Weapon," NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701.
92. Sergei Korotkov, Legal Aspects of Informational Operations, U.N. INSTITUTE FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.unidir.org/audio/20081
InformationSecurity/08-Korotkov.m3u (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
93. See Grosswald, supra note 67, at 1158 n. 39.
94. John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html?pagewanted=all.
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approach to cyber warfare.95 Through the course of the last five
decades, the international economic legal regime transformed from one
of multilateralism to that of a bilateral regime, in large part, due to
conflicting national interests, global imbalances and lack of effective
global governance. Presumably, nation-states are rational actors, acting
out of a cost-benefit mindset of absolute and relative gains.96 As
rational actors, nation-states ratify treaties when the anticipated net-
transaction benefits are positive for all ratifying parties at the time of
signing.97 However, treaties generally involve transaction costs for
administration, communications, enforcement, and monitoring; all of
which can hamper treaty formation and adherence. Monitoring can be
extremely difficult and costly in larger treaties as each party must
monitor the other in order to guard against treaty violations.9 8 Even
after detecting a violation, the cost of enforcement is generally high and
often uncertain.9 9 If countries anticipate a net gain from adhering to
treaty stipulations, despite changing circumstances, the treaty becomes
self-enforcing. 0 0 While the treaty must be incentive compatible, signing
parties must also perceive a net gain over the threshold transaction
95. White House, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY,
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/international-strategy-forscyberspace.pdf.
96. Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, 85
AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1303, 1316 (1991). Both contemporary competing theories of Structural
Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism focus on the states balancing gains and losses,
however they differ on whether the focus is primarily on absolute or relative gains. Powell
resolves the two systems by arguing that states initially look at absolute gains, but then
consider the future relative losses that affect the gains.
97. Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and
the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 551, 583 (2004).
98. U.S. Costs of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties,
Congressional Budget Office, xi-xii (1990), available at http://www.cbo.gov
/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7775/90-CBO-043.pdf. Costs of treaties can be illustrated by the 1990
CBO report on the cost of pending arms treaties. For the five accords together, the total
one-time costs of compliance and on-site inspection would range from $0.6 billion to $3.0
billion in 1990 dollars. Recurring costs, beginning with the first year of implementation
and continuing indefinitely, are estimated to range from $0.2 billion to$0.7 billion per
year for the five accords. More recently, the estimated cost of ratifying the Additional
Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was estimated at $20 -$30 million in one
time fees, and then a recurring $10-$15 million per year. An estimated $160 million would
go to the salaries of 230 inspectors and 200 administrative personnel. See also The Cost of
Implementing the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Congressional Budget Office (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index
=5160&type=O.
99. George Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 104 (2002); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International
Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 579, 590 (2005).
100. Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV 155, 157
(2008); Scott Barrett, Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements, 46 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 878 (1994).
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costs. Consequently, nonparticipating nations to a multilateral treaty
risk altogether negating the net gains of the treaty.
Nonparticipating states are considered sine qua non'0 1 states by
some academics as the absence of their participation gives the law no
realistic meaning.102 These states are pertinent to achieving the
objectives of the treaty for without them, there is no restriction or
change regarding the cause of the problem. 0 3 Support for the necessity
of sine qua non states can be found in recent political and legal reality.
For example, in recent years, nations have attempted to create regional
agreements to fight terrorism by agreeing not to provide their
territories as safe havens for such activities.104 A single nation,
however, offering sanctuary to terrorists can undermine much of the
gains for states who deny safe havens by allowing such activities to
persist unchecked.105 Other examples of this are found in the area of
environmental law, such as the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (IARPOL) requires the treaty only
enters into force after participation by states that represent over 85
percent of the world's gross merchant tonnage. 0 6 While signatories to
the treaty totaled less than half of the globe, the signatories
represented over 85 percent of the world's major shipping states and in
turn ensured gains by limiting the activities of the biggest polluters.107
101. Latin for "without which not." An indispensable condition or thing; something on
which something else necessarily depends. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
102. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 71, 87 (1997). See also Review
of the Multilateral Treaty-making Process, U.N. Doc. ST LEG SER.B 21, U.N. Sales No. E
F.83.V.8 (1985) (stating that a treaty cannot be effective if not ratified by states whose
participation is crucial for implementation of the provision); Andrew Michie, Provisional
Application of Arms Control Treaties, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 349 (2005). Several major
arms treaties, including the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty, require that their entry into force is conditional upon the adherence of
those states that are militarily or technologically the most significant as the subject
matter of the treaty. Arms control treaties that fail to attract adherence of states actually
possessing weapons have little practical value.
103. Scott & Carr, supra note 102, at 87.
104. See Eric Rosand et a]., The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional
and Subregional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership, CENTER ON GLOBAL
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION (2008), available at http://www.globalct.org/
images/content/pdf/reports/strengthening_a_criticalpartnership.pdf.
105. Todd Sandler, Collective Versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism, 124 PUB.
CHOICE 75, 85-87 (2005). See also Michie, supra note 102 (explaining that the failure of
pertinent states to ratify can compromise the security of those states that become party to
the agreement because it allows the non-signatory parties to pursue a strategic
advantage).
106. Marine Pollution: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
107. List of Contracting Parties to MARPOL Convention, available at
https://imo.amsa.gov.aulpublic/parties/marpol78.html.
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The area of cyber crime further reflects this reality as many countries
have been hesitant to sign the Convention on Cyber Crime following
Russia and China's refusals to sign. 08 As China and Russia serve as
the two main hubs for international cyber crime and activity, their
absence from the treaty arguably negates the gains in failing to manage
the source of the problem. 109 NATO has recommended pushing
"notable" non-participants Russia and China to sign onto the
Convention on Cyber Crime as a recommended cyber defense
initiative.1 0 In sum, no net gains exist if the cause of the problem is not
part of the agreement and bound by restrictions.
With China, Russia, and the United States unable to reach a
consensus, a multilateral international treaty on cyber war currently
seems implausible. However, their absence does not mean that states
have no options to build a regulatory regime for cyber warfare. While
establishing accepted international norms for behavior on the Internet
requires time, bilateral treaties provide an alternative to allowing the
global community to act arbitrarily as to their own views of cyber
warfare. Bilateral treaties not only codify existing customary
international law, but also "begin an evolution that creates it."111 As it
currently stands, the United States has committed itself to working
"with like-minded states to establish an environment of expectations or
norms of behavior, that ground foreign and defense polices and guide
international partnerships."112 The United States viewpoint is that only
after governments widely come to a general consensus will analysts be
able to develop coordinated policy recommendations and will countries
be able to act multilaterally to create a sufficient treaty. In turn, the
United States has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India
on Cyber Attacks and added an extension to the Australia, New
Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS or ANZUS Treaty)
that extension allows the United States and Australia to use technology
108. Markoff & Kramer, supra note 94.
109. Lolita C. Baldor, U.S. Report Blasts China, Russia For Cyber Crime, USA TODAY
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/story/2011-11-03/
Cyber-attacks/51058852/1. The United States has known for years, but finally publicly
announced that China and Russia are responsible for harboring cyber crimes and stealing
sensitive United States technology data in an attempt to highlight the risks of cyber
attacks in a growing high-tech society.
110. Sverre Myrli, 173 DSCFC 09 E bis - NATO and Cyber Defense - 2009 Annual
Session, 1 64, available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1782.
111. M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND
BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 127 (2008).
112. White House, supra note 95, at 9. The United States is currently prepared to
build bilateral and multilateral partnerships, to work with regional organizations, and to
collaborate with the private sector.
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to cooperate in the event of a large-scale cyber attack. 113 The United
States has chosen to first pursue bilateral arms-control and defense
treaties since multilateral treaties are inherently harder to monitor and
figure out which states follow their obligations, rather than hiding
behind the guise of proxies. 114 In turn, the United States posits itself to
quickly determine which countries will be not only accept their
definition of cyber warfare, but also adhere to the guidelines being
established.
While the turning point for Russia and China is the dissemination
of information harmful to "political, economic, and social systems" as
well as "spiritual, moral and cultural," 115 parties to a multilateral treaty
could feasibly tackle these discrepancies in the future by treaty
reservations or reaching a compromise. However, such resolutions of
divergent views on cyber attacks cannot be resolved for a country
housing one of the largest cyber commands: Iran. The Iranian
government blames the United States and Israel for the release of the
debilitating Stuxnet work into its nuclear reactor computer networks.11 6
Exactly who created Stuxnet remains unproven, but many experts now
acknowledge the high likelihood that Israel was behind the attack,
possibly aided by the United States. 117 As a result, Iran believes that
the United States and Israel initiated the first stages of cyber war,
setting the stage for Iran to create their own cyber command to respond
to a future Stuxnet.11 s Part of the mission of Iran's new cyber command
is the implementation of "retaliatory measures" against a host of
nations the Iranian government deems hostile, including the United
States and Israel. 119 In fact, Iranian engineers claim the recent drone
"crash" in Iran is the beginning of cyber attacks by the Iranian cyber
113. See Press Release, United States and India Sign Cybersecurity Agreement, DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 19, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20110719-us-
india-cybersecurity-agreement.shtm.
114. Clarke, supra note 10, at 235, 237. See also Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism,
Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 351-
57 (2008).
115. Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an "Information Weapon," NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130052701.
116. Broad, supra note 37; Stuxnet Worm Hits Iran Nuclear Plant Staff Computers,
BBC (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11414483. Following
Stuxnet, Mahmoud Liayi, head of the information technology council at the ministry of
industries announced to the press that "an electronic war has been launched against
Iran." See also Gross, supra note 64.
117. Broad, supra note 37.
118. Atul Aneja, Under Cyber-attack, Says Iran, HINDU (Sept. 26, 2010),
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internationallarticle797363.ece.
119. Ilan Berman, Iranian Cyberwar: U.S. Must Prepare for Possible Confrontation,
DEFENSENEWs (Sept. 11, 2011), http://mobile.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650158.
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command to hijack and redirect the drones. 120 Following the drone
crash, Iran removed 90 percent of all websites to a local server to
protect against anticipated cyber attacks. 121 These factors combined
with the fact that the United States has not had formal diplomatic
relations with Iran in over three decades,122 contribute to the
unlikelihood that Iran will participate in any multilateral treaty or
bilateral treaty involving the United States.
Due to their contribution and potential to wage cyber attacks, Iran
is a net loss for any international multilateral cyber warfare treaty.
Rather than view Iran's absence from the treaty as destroying its
effectiveness, the United States can mitigate the loss with net gains
through collective defense and creating international intolerance for
certain conduct when engaging in cyber warfare. As Iran now houses
one of the largest cyber commands in the world and have stated their
intent to implement "retaliatory measures" against hostile nations, it is
even more imperative that widespread international norms and
guidelines are established before the United States or any other nation
is put in the position of another Estonia.
120. Rick Gladstone, Iran Complains to Security Council About Spy Drone, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/world/middleeast/
iran-complains-to-security-council-about-spy-drone.html?ref-iran; Adam Rawnsley, Iran's
Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but Possible, WIRED (Dec. 14, 2011), www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps. Iran claims to have managed to jam the drone's
communication links to American operators by forcing it to shift into autopilot mode. With
its communications down, the drone allegedly kicked into autopilot mode, relying on GPS
to fly back to base in Afghanistan. With the GPS autopilot on, the engineer claims Iran
spoofed the drone's GPS system with false coordinates, fooling it into thinking it was close
to home and landing into Iran's clutches.
121. Ramin Mostafavi, Iran Moves Websites to Guard Against Cyber Attacks, REUTERS
(Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/us-iran-internet-
idUSTRE7BJ1VB20111220; Iran Hosts Local Websites to Avoid Cyber Attacks, XINHUA
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/scil2011-12/21/c_131319
917.htm. Iran's deputy minister for communications and information technology said that
the Islamic republic transferred the locations more than 30,000 Iranian websites from
foreign-based hosting agencies to new computer facilities inside the country to avert
potential cyber attacks.
122. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Iran, U.S DEP'T OF STATE (Feb.
1, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/5314.htm; Lionel Beehner, Timeline: U.S.-Iran
Contacts, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/iran/
timeline-us-iran-contacts/pl2806. Following the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979, on April
7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and on April 24, 1981, the
Swiss Government assumed representation of United States interests in Tehran. Due to
poor relations between the two countries, instead of exchanging
ambassadors Iran maintains an interests section at the Pakistani embassy in
Washington, D.C., while the United States, since 1980, has maintained an interests
section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran.
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IV. POST NORMALIZATION OF CYBER WARFARE: U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPACTS
While the creation of norms for the realm of cyber warfare is
imperative, conflating cyber conflicts with the language of war poses
dangers for the future of the Internet and how Americans everywhere
use it. Following the passing of the Patriot Act, government agencies
have expanded their ability to control the Internet and monitor
computer use under the guise of the War on Terror. 123 Should the
United States government officially announce the onset of a "Cyber
War," the American public could quickly witness the militarization of
the Internet, where traditional notions of freedom of information are
displaced by national security concerns. 124
Although there is no direct reference or declaration on rights to
privacy in the United States Constitution, the American people have
come to expect at the very least the right "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure." 125
The framers of the Constitution intended the Fourth Amendment as a
prohibition on law enforcement from gathering more information than
is required, but unfortunately, the phrase "unreasonable" was never
well defined, and its definition has become increasingly blurred by the
normative idea of what level of privacy a person should expect with the
technological advances of the last century.126 For example, the Supreme
Court ruled in United States Telecommunications Association v. FCC
that the Fourth Amendment protects digits that convey context,' 27
however Title II of the Patriot Act (Enhanced Surveillance Procedures)
was passed in part to allow for the FBI to run packet-sniffing software
to intercept email sent by a suspect. 128 The software can be configured
123. See Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA Patriot Act and Telecommunications: Privacy
Under Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 373-78 (2003); Sunya Kashan,
The USA Patriot Act: Impact on Freedoms and Civil Liberties, 7 ESSAI 87, 88 (2010).
124. See William J. Lynn III, The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, One Year Later, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68305/william-j-lynn-
iiilthe-pentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later?page=show (referencing William J. Lynn
III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
(July 14, 2011), available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593).
Ninety percent of United States military voice and Internet communications travel over
the same private networks that service private homes and businesses.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 933, 1020 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (2010).
127. United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
128. Stefanie Olsen, Patriot Act Draws Privacy Concerns, CNET (Oct. 26, 2001),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-275026.html. See also Tom Cohen, Obama Approves
Extension of Expiring Patriot Act Provisions, CNN (May 27, 2011), http://articles
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either to record the email content, which are arguable digits that
convey a plethora of personal context. 129 Beyond allowing the FBI to
intercept emails, Title II of the Patriot Act covers all aspects of the
surveillance of suspected terrorists, those suspected of engaging in
computer fraud or abuse, and agents of a foreign power who are
engaged in clandestine activities.iso Specifically, Title II authorizes
government agencies to gather "foreign intelligence information" from
both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens. 3 1 As Title II of the Patriot Act is still
in effect and allows for a government agency to at-will monitor a
person's e-mails, Congress could very well create another extension or
strengthen the U.S Patriot Act that provide for heightened surveillance
of electronic transmissions from personal computers.
Considering that hundreds of American computers were used
unsuspectingly to wage the DDoS attacks that shut Estonia's
government down for weeks, 132 the FBI and other agencies could
feasibly argue that the risk of infected zombie computers within our
nation's borders should grant the federal government access to monitor
electronic transmissions in order to protect national security
interests. 133 The domino effect this sort of precedent could cause is
.cnn.com/2011-05-27/politics/congress.patriot.act 1_lone-wolf-provision-patriot-act-
provisions-fisa-court?_s=PM:POLITICS; David Kravets, Patriot Act Turns 10, With No
Signs of Retirement, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel
/2011/10/patriot-act-turns-ten/. Section 505 of the Patriot Act gives the government
powers to acquire phone, banking, and other records via the power of a so-called "national
security letter," which does not require a court warrant. National security letters, perhaps
the most invasive facet of the law, are written demands from the FBI that compel
Internet service providers, financial institutions, and others to hand over confidential
records about their customers, such as subscriber information, phone numbers, and e-
mail addresses, and arguably websites you have visited. They require no probable cause
or judicial oversight and also contain a gag order, preventing the recipient of the letter
from disclosing that the letter was ever issued. In addition, the "lone wolf' measure under
Section 207 of the Patriot Act allows FISA court warrants for e-monitoring of non-U.S
citizens, even without showing that the suspect is an agent of a foreign power or a
terrorist. It has never been invoked, but the authority is retained. The provision has been
extended through June 1, 2015.
129. Olsen, supra note 128.
130. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
131. Id.
132. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29
estonia.html?pagewanted=all. Estonian officials reported that over a million computers
were used during the 2007 DDoS attacks, including American computers. See also James
Sterngold, U.S. on Guard Against Computer Attacks, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June
24, 2007, at A4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/cla/2007/06/24/
MNGCDQKS241.DTL&ao=all.
133. Singel, supra note 69. Department of Homeland Security representative Jordana
Siegel said botnets were imminent threats to national security. See also Ryan Singel, NSA
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frightening: any American computer could be logged into and monitored
for suspicion of being a zombie computer for a future DDoS attack. With
that in mind, cyber warfare tactics and policy need to recognize that
much of the American public, despite the ease millions place private
information onto Facebook, still expect a level of privacy in the home
and at work in this post-September 11 society. In respecting and
honoring the rights of the American people, any resulting domestic
cyber warfare policy needs to take privacy concerns into
consideration.134
CONCLUSION
When the Law of Armed Conflict was first codified into the Geneva
Convention, the Internet may as well have been the subject of a science
fiction novel. Now the United States and the international community
are faced with questions of how to apply nearly a century-old charter to
a technology that allows the aggressor to hide behind a veil of
anonymity. Despite this obstacle to enforcing the current Law of Armed
Conflict, cyber warfare remains a serious threat that can no longer be
swept under the proverbial rug. At the onset of the decade, cyber
attacks, with their inherent anonymity and propensity to cause real
transnational harms, pose one of the most serious and evasive
asymmetric threats to the United States and all other members of the
international community, along with terrorism and nuclear
proliferation.135 Under the current environment, international peace is
threatened, unless the United States and other nations have the ability
to respond in self-defense to cyber attacks without being restrained by
outdated interpretations of international law governing the right to
Must Examine All Internet Traffic to Prevent Cyber Nine-Eleven, Top Spy Says, WIRED
(Jan. 15, 2008), www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/feds-must-exami; Lawrence Wright,
The Spymaster: Can Mike McConnell Fix America's Intelligence Community?, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa
fact-wright. Though he later retracted his statement, one of the lead United States spies
initially argued for monitoring all Internet traffic after the attacks on Estonia.
134. Compare IBOPE Zogby International, What is Privacy? Poll Exposes Generational
Divide on Expectations of Privacy, According to Zogby/Congressional Internet Caucus
Advisory Committee Survey, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.zogby.com/news/2007/01/31/what-
is-privacy-poll-exposes-generational-divide-on-expectations-of-privacy-according-to-
zogbycongre/ (explaining in 2007, IBOPE Zogby found that over 80 percent of Americans
polled were concerned about the security and privacy of their personal information on the
Internet.) with Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Reputation Management and Social Media,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 2010), http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/
Reputation-Management/Summary-of-Findings.aspx. IBOPE Zogby's number is
comparable with the 2010 Pew Research Center poll that found nearly 44 percent of
adults 18-29 actively take steps to limit the amount of their personal information that is
available online, while 71 percent of social network users actively changed their privacy
settings to limit what is shared.
135. Symposium, Cyber Threats to National Security, CACI INTERNATIONAL (2010).
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respond in self-defense with force. The global and open architecture of
the Internet, while an environment necessary to encourage innovation,
makes defending against cyber attacks an exceedingly onerous task for
state actors; effective international cooperation and trust building are
critical to successfully protecting both state and non-state actors on the
Internet in the years to come.
Although state practice in the aftermath of cyber attacks suggests
widespread condemnation, cyber warfare remains a legal gray zone.
Recently, policy debates on the subject have yielded little consensus in
the way of an agreement on how to address a cyber attack, or even at
what level a cyber attack becomes an armed attack. In the absence of
custom, bilateral treaty regimes may provide a basis for the regulation
of cyber attacks in international law. The regional and bilateral treaty
regimes pursued by the United States not only offer some form of
recourse in the absence of a comprehensive multilateral treaty, but also
begin setting the early stages of precedent, based on their effectiveness,
for a future treaty regime. However, while establishing accepted
international norms through bilateral treaties is useful, doing so does
not provide governments a codified definition of cyber attack or written
guidelines on how states should respond in the event of a foreign-state
taking aggression against them over the Internet. Cyber attacks are by
their very nature transnational; cyber weapons are often designed by
authors in multiple countries to run through computer networks
without respect of state borders in hopes of undermining a computer
system on the other side of the globe. In turn, this global threat can
only be effectively met by increased diplomatic relations between the
United States and the international legal community working together
to solidarize a new treaty regime for cyber attacks.
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A CONFLICT OF DIAMONDS:
THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND ZIMBABWE'S MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS
Julie Elizabeth Nichols*
ABSTRACT
In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme ("KPCS")
entered into force as a novel approach to regulate the diamond industry
and combat associated atrocities regarding "conflict diamonds." Fueled
by the recent history of bloody civil wars, and graphically publicized
slaughters and amputations by rebel groups funded by African
diamonds, diamond-producing nations, the diamond industry's leaders
and human rights groups created a process whereby "conflict diamonds"
are identified and systematically excluded from the legitimate trade.
However, the KPCS definition of "conflict diamond" has proved
unacceptably restrictive. Diamonds from Zimbabwe's Marange fields
are mined using systematic relocation, mass murdering campaigns and,
recently discovered, torture camps. Yet, because Zimbabwe's
"legitimate" government, not a rebel group, controls the Marange
mines, the KPCS has certified these diamonds as conflict-free, fit for
international trade. To stop this unacceptable situation, in which
perpetrators of systematic and violent human rights abuses benefit
from their crimes, the KPCS's definition of "conflict diamonds" must
change. The diamond industry must support such a change by refusing
to allow trade of any diamond mined through such systematic abuse. If
these changes are not adopted, the United States must use all
additional means, including legislative boycotts and civil suits, to stop
the atrocities occurring today in Zimbabwe's Marange diamond fields.
Over the past few years, the world became quite familiar with the
term "blood diamonds." Recent commercials proclaim diamond retailers
who exclude the middleman offer better quality, less expensive stones
that come with guarantees about their safe, blood-free origin.' When
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University. I would like to thank my parents, Jill and Robert Nichols, for their never-
ending support. Additional thanks to Professors Ved Nanda, Eli Wald, Rebecca Aviel,
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Valentine's Day comes around, sparkling stones with "Conflict-Free"
certificates receive attention from the more conscientious consumers.
Hollywood informed audiences about the atrocities of Sierra Leone's
diamond-fueled civil war through Leonardo DiCaprio's 2006 movie
Blood Diamond. 2 The movie ends with a conference of concerned
parties seeking an end to the problem of blood diamonds. The film's
conference is a reference to an actual meeting, which eventually led to
the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme - and the
"Conflict-Free" certificates that received so much positive attention.3
The world knows now about blood diamonds and how countries have
eliminated them from their stores - or so it appears on the surface.
Blood Diamond's final scenes depict the first meeting of what
became the Kimberley Process ("KP"), the watchdog organization
designed to prevent the sale of "conflict diamonds." The KP is a tri-
branch organization, consisting of participating states ("Participants"),
which make all official decisions, and representatives of both the
diamond industry and of civil society -NGOs and activist groups - who
serve as official observers.4 The KP regulates aspects of the diamond
industry through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
("KPCS"),5 which is intended to eliminate conflict diamonds from the
market while preserving the legitimate diamond trade.6 The KPCS
identifies and certifies rough diamonds that can legitimately enter the
market.7 It prohibits Participants from importing or exporting "conflict
diamonds," which it very specifically defines, 8 and from trading any
rough diamonds with non-participating states. 9 As more states join,
fewer markets exist for conflict diamonds and, in theory, such stones
International Law and Policy for their encouragement and assistance throughout the
process of preparing this paper.
1. See, e.g., Diamond FAQs, THE SHANE COMPANY, http://www.shaneco.com/Jewelry/
DiamondFAQ.htmx.
2. BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Bros. 2006).
3. KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/webfkimberley-
process/kp-basics [hereinafter KP websitel.
4. See id.; Liz Ford, Global Witness Quits Kimberley Process in Protest at "Diamond
Laundering," GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/
201 1/decl05/kimberley-process-global-witness-withdraws [hereinafter Ford].
5. See Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, Nov. 2002 [hereinafter KPCS],
available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (follow "Documents" hyperlink; then follow
"Core Documents" hyperlink; then follow "KPCS Core Document" hyperlink).
6. Jolyon Ford, The Kimberley Process and Diamond Demand, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://africanarguments.org/2011/12/05/the-kimberley-process-and-dia
mond-demand-%E2%80%93-by-jolyon-ford-at-oxford-analytical.
7. KP Website, supra note 3.
8. KPCS, supra note 5, § I.
9. Id. § 111(c).
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will eventually no longer be sold at all.10 In many ways, it has been
very successful; conflict diamonds now make up less than one percent of
all diamonds on the legitimate market."x
Yet that very specific definition of conflict diamond has caused a
serious dilemma. According to the KPCS, "conflict diamonds" are
"rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments." 12 In
Zimbabwe, there are no rebel movements campaigning to overthrow the
government, therefore there can be no conflict diamonds in that
country. However, diamond miners suffer gross human rights
violations on a daily basis.
On August 8, 2011, the BBC program "Panorama" aired a
documentary disclosing torture camps run by Zimbabwean police and
military.' 3 Witnesses described one camp, known as "Diamond Base,"
where police send miners who want a larger profit share or villagers
caught mining for their families.14 Men receive severe beatings three
times a day and women are raped repeatedly.15 Former paramilitary
police officers describe handlers directing their dogs to maul prisoners
and local doctors report frequently treating such wounds.' 6 Apparently,
these camps have been operating at least since late 2008.17 Though this
BBC documentary may have shocked the public, non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") that have been monitoring Zimbabwe's diamond
mines for years were not even surprised.18 They have been reporting
similar human rights abuses since 2006.19
10. Daniel Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the
Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 835, 867 (2003).
11. See KP Website, supra note 3.
12. KPCS, supra note 5, § I (emphasis added).
13. See Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14445087; Victims Speaking of Massacre in
Zimbabwe Diamond Fields, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
panorama/hi/frontpage/newsid_9557000/9557246.stm.
14. Hilary Andersson, Marange Diamond Field: Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14377215 [hereinafter
Andersson].
15. Id.
16. Alan Cowell, Britain Urges Zimbabwe to Examine Diamond 'Torture Camp'
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/worldlafrical
09zimbabwe.html.
17. Andersson, supra note 14.
18. Chiadzwa Torture Camps Exposed, ZIMBABWEAN (Aug. 8, 2011) [hereinafter
Chiadzwa Torture Camp Exposed], http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/
51591/chiadzwa-torture-camps-exposed.html.
19. Id.; Ford, supra note 4.
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Thus, the situation in Zimbabwe brought the conflict diamond
dilemma to a head: Zimbabwe is in compliance with the KPCS2o and is
yet responsible for gross human rights violations perpetrated for the
sake of diamonds.
In response to Zimbabwe receiving official certification under the
KPCS, the KP lost one of its most valued supporters. 21 In December
2011, Global Witness, an advocacy organization that helped establish
the KPCS, left the coalition. 22 According to Annie Dunnebacke, senior
campaigner for Global Witness, Zimbabwe is "the most egregious
situation that we've seen since the Kimberley Process was launched,
where diamonds have been fueling violence and human rights
violations . . . and the Kimberley Process has really failed to deal with
that effectively." 23 A year earlier, Martin Rapaport, Chairman of the
Rapaport Group and the associated Rapaport Diamond Trading
Network ("RapNet"), which is the world's largest diamond trading
network, made similar statements. 24 He called the KP a scam and told
the public that relying on KP Certificates alone does not guarantee that
such diamonds have not been associated with human rights abuses. 25
Between them, these groups assert powerful arguments that the KP
cannot, or will not, appropriately face the new realities of conflict
diamonds.
Is it time to give up on the KPCS? Does Global Witness's exit mark
the end of a failed project? Or is abandoning the scheme altogether
appropriate in light of its other successes? Regardless of how we
answer those questions, the situation in Zimbabwe remains deeply
troubling. Are these diamonds "conflict diamonds"? If not, are they not
yet still covered in blood? Perhaps most importantly, notwithstanding
the efficacy of the KPCS, what should the international community do
with regard to these issues?
This article seeks to address these questions. The situation is
extremely complex. Part I examines the KPCS in detail. It first looks
at the historical context that led to the KPCS. Each branch of the KP -
20. Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/worldlafricalzimbabwe-official-lauds-diamond-trade-
ruling.html?ref-diamonds.
21. Andersson, supra note 14.
22. John Eligon, Global Witness Quits Group on 'Blood Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2011, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/worldlafrica/global-
witness-quits-group-on-blood-diamonds.html?ref-diamonds.
23. Id.
24. Martin Rapaport, Stop Buying and Selling Blood Diamonds: The Kimberley
Process and World Diamond Council are a Sham, DLAMONDS.NET (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.diamonds.net/News/Newsltem.aspx?ArticleID=29578.
25. Id.
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diamond-producing states, representatives of the diamond industry,
and human rights activists - wanted this regulatory scheme for
different, sometimes competing, reasons. These reasons provide insight
into the KPCS's current situation. Part I continues by examining the
original structure and requirements of the KPCS (subsection B) and the
additions and developments it has achieved since (subsection C).
Finally, subsection D illustrates some of the KP's current statistics.
Part II describes Zimbabwe and its Marange diamond fields.
Initially, subsection A provides a brief description of Zimbabwe's
complicated political history. This background is important to
understand arguments regarding the KPCS's relation to the Marange
diamonds. Part II then provides a chronology of events related to
Marange - starting with the discovery in 2006 and continuing through
the present.
Part III illustrates the interactions between Zimbabwe and the KP
since 2006. It provides a timeline of the KP's actions and decisions
through the November 3, 2011 decision to certify Marange diamonds.
Additionally, Part III describes two arguments illustrating how
Zimbabwe violated the KPCS.
Part IV presents two currently proposed "solutions": to change
elements of the KPCS so it can prohibit diamonds like those from
Marange - diamonds that do not fit the definition of "conflict
diamonds," but cause the same harms - or to abandon the KPCS
altogether and take another route to regulate the diamond industry and
prevent financial gain from blood-covered diamonds.
Finally, Part V provides a brief analysis and recommendations, and
Part VI presents a conclusion. There is no simple answer to this
complicated problem. However, abandoning a regulatory scheme that,
with all its shortcomings, has successfully prevented certain illicit
diamonds from entering the market seems irresponsible. Further, as
the 2012 Chair, the United States ("U.S.") is now in a position to take a
leading role and lead the KP in more constructive directions. The
KPCS must learn from its own mistakes, observe other industries
attempts to emulate it, and work with the diamond industry to
establish additional workable compliance regulations. The KPCS failed
to keep Marange diamonds off the market; yet that failure does not
guarantee that it will inevitably fail forever.
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PART 1: THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
In 2003, the KPCS entered into force as a unique 26 approach to
regulating the diamond industry and combating associated atrocities
regarding "conflict diamonds."27 Regulation of international industries
- particularly the diamond industry, which has been notoriously
"opaque" - is difficult and frequently unsuccessful. 28 However, at that
particular time, with those particular players, everyone agreed on a
regulatory scheme. They made compromises and though details proved
more complex than ideal, the KPCS became a functional mechanism to
regulate diamonds.
A. Historical Context
An unusual combination of factors led to unlikely partners meeting
in Kimberley, South Africa for a common purpose. 29 Diamond-
producing states, mainly African, had witnessed the devastation caused
by diamond-fueled wars and wanted to find a politically acceptable end
- an end that did not name governments as guilty partners.3 0 At the
same time, the diamond industry, dominated by De Beers, recognized
its vulnerability to bad press; if consumers associated their product
with the African wars the industry was doomed.3 1 And human rights
activists and related NGOs recognized this moment as the time to act
and address as many of the diamond-related human rights abuses as
possible. 32 These partners, therefore, each had different goals for what
became the KPCS. 33
B. African States
By 2000, the African diamond-producing countries wanted peace.
Wars ravaged the African continent during the 1990s and early 2000s.3 4
26. Ann C. Wallis, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United
Nations Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 Nw. U. J.
INT'L HuM. RTs. 388, 390 (2005).
27. Id. at 388; Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and
Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDoZO L. REV. 1717, 1721 (2010).
28. Nikos Passas & Kimberly Jones, Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on
Diamonds, 12 EUR. J. CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 1, 6 (2006).
29. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 388.
30. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1732.
31. Wallis, supra note 26, at 399-400.
32. Id. at 401.
33. See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 1, 32-33 (2003).
34. Shannon K. Murphy, Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and More
Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, the Kimberley Process Will Ultimately Fail
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Fourteen African nations were at war in 1996 and, in that year alone,
these "account[ed] for more than half of all war-related deaths
worldwide and result[ed] in more than eight million refugees, returnees
and displaced persons."36 In many countries, rebel groups opposed to
the then-current governments captured resource-rich areas and used
diamonds to fund their violent campaigns. By 2003, an estimated 3.7
million Africans had died in diamond-funded wars and 6.5 million
people were driven from their homes.36 The most widely publicized of
these wars occurred in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ("DRC").
C. Angola
From its independence in 1975 until 1989, Angola fought a bitter
civil war to determine which of two main political parties would govern
the new country.37 As with many other small nations at that time, this
political conflict provided a battleground for the world's super powers to
fight their Cold War.38 Movimiento Popular de Liberatacao de Angola
("MPLA"), backed by the Soviet Union, effectively seized control in 1975
against Uniao Nacional para la Indepencia Total de Angola ("UNITA"),
backed by the United States. 3 Although today the international
community recognizes MPLA as Angola's legitimate government and
the country is in a relative state of peace, UNITA still uses diamonds to
purchase illegal weapons. 40 In the 1990s, UNITA controlled the
diamond trade and diamond mines, which allowed the rebel group to
in Ending Conflicts Fueled by Blood Diamonds, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 207, 209
(2011).
35. U.N. Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General, 1 4, U.N.
Doc A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Causes of Conflict]; Muna Ndulo,
The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 315, 315 (2003).
36. Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond
Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 217, 231-32 (2005); see also Clean Diamond
Trade Act of 2003, 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2011) [hereinafter CDTA].
37. Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the
Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 25, 29 (2005); see also Angola, CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012).
38. Causes of Conflict, supra note 35, 10; Edward R. Fluet, Comment, Conflict
Diamonds: U.S. Responsibility and Response, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 103, 105 (2005).
39. Malamut, supra note 37, at 30; Gretchen A. Vetter, Note, The Forgotten Million:
Assessing International Human Rights Abuses in the Artisanal Diamond Mining Industry,
16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 733, 738 (2007).
40. Murphy, supra note 34, at 210.
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finance the war through an estimated $4 billion from illicit diamond
sales.41 Over the course of the war, 500,000 died, 3.5 million were
displaced, and an additional 300,000 sought asylum in other
countries. 42
D. Sierra Leone
Some of the most prosperous diamond mines in the world funded
Sierra Leone's civil war from 1991 until 2002.43 The Revolutionary
United Front ("RUF') relied on controlling most of the country's
diamond mines to pay for its efforts to overthrow the government.44
RUF's brutal atrocities - primarily amputating limbs to prevent people
from mining diamonds to support the government 45 and burning
children and other civilians alive 46 - eventually received enough
attention to bring diamond-funded wars to the attention of the
international community. 47 The United Nations Security Council
sanctioned Sierra Leone and threatened a weapons embargo. 48
Eventually, the RUF was disarmed, but only after capturing five
hundred UN peacekeepers 49 and recruiting thousands of child soldiers
to fight their war. 50 The war killed between 50,000 and 75,000,
displaced 1.5 to 2.25 million, and forced 500,000 refugees to leave Sierra
Leone. 51 Today there are more UN peacekeeping troops patrolling
Sierra Leone's diamond mines than there are in any other part of the
world. 52
41. Joseph Hummel, Comment, Diamonds Are a Smuggler's Best Friend: Regulation,
Economics and Enforcement in the Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds,
41 INT'L LAW. 1145, 1155 (2007).
42. Jamila D. Holmes, The Kimberley Process: Evidence of Change in International
Law, 3 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 213, 215 (2007).
43. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1150; Malamut, supra note 37, at 30-31.
44. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1151 ("At one time during the civil war, the RUF
controlled nine-tenths of the country's diamond mines, generating between $25 and $125
million annually in diamond sales." (internal cites omitted)).
45. Transcript of Sorious Samura, CNN Presents: Return to Freetown (CNN television
broadcast Dec. 23, 2001), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS
/0112/23/cp.00.html.
46. Fluet, supra note 38, at 106; Margo Kaplan, Comment, Carats and Sticks:
Pursuing War and Peace Though the Diamond Trade, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 571
(2003).
47. Feldman, supra note 10, at 840.
48. Malamut, supra note 37, at 31.
49. Holmes, supra note 42, at 215.
50. Fluet, supra note 38, at 106.
51. Holmes, supra note 42, at 215.
52. Causes of Conflict, supra note 35, T 29; Murphy, supra note 34, at 211.
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E. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC provides a final example, though many more exist. In
what has been coined "Africa's World War," 53 an estimated 2.5 million
people died in the DRC between 1999 and 2003 alone.5 4 Many African
countries have participated in this war, including Zimbabwe, Chad,
Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.5 5 Approximately $50
to $60 million in rough diamonds are smuggled out of the country each
year and continue to fund the conflict.56 And the war continues today.
The DRC is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural
resources, particularly diamonds.57 However, nearly eighty-five percent
of Congolese diamonds are smuggled out of the country, depriving the
country of at least $40 million in taxes at the lowest estimates. 58
Moreover, more than three million people have died since 199859 and
sixteen million people were reported starving in 2001.60
Each of these examples were all, at least mostly, civil wars, fought
between rebel groups and "legitimate" governments. This was essential
for the KPCS. Convincing countries to regulate their own natural
resources is very challenging. 61 Impoverished, undeveloped nations
with valuable natural resources have every incentive to sell to the
highest bidder. 62 During the 1990s in Africa, however, only rebels set
on revolution and overthrow benefited from the diamond wealth in
these countries. Their governments found regulating rebels' use of
diamond exports distinctively appealing.63
F. Diamond Industry
Certain characteristics of the diamond industry, as opposed to
other commodities, gave the KPSC a better chance of success than
53. Price, supra note 33, at 16.
54. Sally Hardcastle, Congo Pays the Price for War, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/1564653.stm.
55. Malamut, supra note 37, at 32.
56. Id. at 32-34 (noting that the diamonds are smuggled out of the DRC and into the
Republic of Congo ("ROC"), which has already established trade routes and low export
taxes).
57. Fishman, supra note 36, at 220; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1156.
58. Fishman, supra note 36, at 220-21; Price, supra note 33, at 26.
59. Fishman, supra note 36, at 223; Paul Orogun, "Blood Diamonds" and Africa's
Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era, 166 WORLD AFF. 151, 157 (2004), available at
http://www.gpia.info/files/ul6/OrogunBloodDiamondsAfricasArmedConflicts.pdf.
60. Congo in Dire Trouble, Say Agencies, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilworldlafrica/1477003.stm.
61. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1733-34.
62. See id. at 1723.
63. See id. at 1733.
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regulation schemes of other industries. This is initially
counterintuitive; the diamond industry is historically opaque and
difficult to regulate. 64 However, the industry was also a quasi-
monopoly controlled by De Beers; convince De Beers, and the entire
industry was on board.6 5
Diamonds are luxury items, whose value and sale depend
significantly on consumer opinion. 66 As Holly Burkhalter, then
advocacy director of Physicians for Human Rights said, the industry
knows that "diamonds have no intrinsic value, and they are not rare. If
the public learns to associate them with hacked-off limbs and the rape
of children, the notion of diamonds as a symbol of love could evaporate
forever."6 7 American consumers, just like the United Nations, noticed
those images of children with missing limbs and began associating
them with diamonds.6 8 Furthermore, human rights NGOs - Global
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada among them - threatened to
tarnish the entire diamond trade if De Beers did not participate in the
KPSC.69 Other groups, specifically People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals ("PETA"), had recently damaged the consumer fur industry
beyond repair. 70 De Beers recognized the very creditable threat.
Additionally, helping form the KPCS allowed De Beers to limit the
definition of "conflict diamond" and maintain the untarnished label of
all other diamonds. Moreover, this focus on distinguishing some
diamonds from others coincided with De Beer's new branding campaign,
which specifically identified the benefits of "De Beers Diamonds." 7 1
With the KPCS, they could add written guarantees their diamonds were
64. Id. at 1733-34 (citing Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6).
65. Wallis, supra note 26, at 400; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734; Nicholas Stein, The
De Beers Story: A New Cut on an Old Monopoly, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 186 (noting
that, while De Beers is still a major player, its hold on the industry is slipping); Erez
Yoeli, In December, Diamonds Are Forever: Empirical Evidence of Counter-Cyclical
Pricing in a Durable Goods Market 13-14 (May 12, 2003) (unpublished Honors
dissertation, Stanford University), available at http://economics.stanford.edulfiles/
Theses/Theses_2003/Yoeli.pdf.
66. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734 n.77 (citing Stefan Kanfer, The Last Empire: De
Beers, Diamonds, and the World 271 (1993) (stating that the first advertising campaign
De Beers ran attempted to convince Americans that "the Diamond Industry ... operates
fairly and in a manner that accords with American interests.")).
67. Holly Burkhalter, Deadly Diamonds, LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 18, 2000),
http://www.calbaptist.edu/dskubik/diamonds.htm.
68. Feldman, supra note 10, at 840-41.
69. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734.
70. Feldman, supra note 10, at 841; Holmes, supra note 42, at 231; Price, supra note
33, at 42.
71. Donna J. Bergenstock & James M. Maskulka, The De Beers Story: Are Diamonds
Forever?, 44 BuS. HORIZONS 37, 42 (2001); Feldman, supra note 10, at 866.
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"conflict-free."72 Without De Beer's participation, it is highly unlikely
that the KPSC could have ever come to fruition.73 De Beers controlled
virtually the entire industry and knew the risk it faced. It thus
concluded that some regulation, in this situation, was good for
business. 74
G. Activist Groups (Civil Society)
NGOs and other human rights organizations started reporting
diamond-related abuses years before they eventually convened the
meeting in Kimberley. Specifically, in 1998, Global Witness released a
report entitled A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and
Governments in the Angolan Conflict.7 5 The report specifically accused
De Beers of purchasing diamonds from Angolan rebels.76 Other NGOs
quickly joined the cause; a European NGO-led campaign, "Fatal
Transactions Campaign,"7 7 and Partnership Africa Canada's The Heart
of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security78 proved
particularly persuasive.
Together these groups effectively threatened an international
campaign to convince consumers that diamonds were the "physical
embodiment of human rights abuses." 79 PETA's recent success enabled
activists to simply note the unmistakable similarities between the two
luxury items. However, unlike the fur industry, which necessitates
killing animals, only a small percentage of the global diamond trade
involved blood diamonds. s0 People can safely mine diamonds and
overseers do not always commit abuses.8 1 Additionally, diamonds can
be a source of natural wealth for the often-impoverished nations that
mine them. 82 Therefore, the active NGOs at the time compromised with
72. Wallis, supra note 26, at 400.
73. See Holmes, supra note 40, at 216-17.
74. Wallis, supra note 26, at 399-400; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734-35.
75. GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE: THE ROLE OF COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS
IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1998) [hereinafter A ROUGH TRADE], available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ARough Trade.pdf.
76. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 392.
77. Id.
78. IAN SMILLIE ET AL, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE HEART OF THE MATTER:
SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY (2000), available at http://www.pac
web.org/Documents/diamondsKP/heart of the-matter-full-2000-Oleng.pdf.
79. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1737.
80. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating that conflict diamonds should not be allowed
to "negatively affect the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical contribution
to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and importing states,
especially developing states").
81. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1738.
82. Fluet, supra note 38, at 105-06.
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diamond-producing states and De Beers, and framed the issue of
"conflict diamonds" such that it did not incorporate all violations
committed for the stones, but took an important step in the right
direction.
This compromise was essential for the KPCS. Without limiting
"conflict diamonds" to a small percentage of all diamonds, De Beers
would have backed out; without focusing on rebel movements' use of
diamonds, the governments would not have agreed. Yet this
compromise received significant criticism over the years83 and recently
prevented the KP from banning Marange diamonds.
Against this complicated background, the KPSC came into being.
May 2000 saw strange bedfellows cooperating to resolve the "blood
diamond problem."84 In December 2000, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously voted to support the KPSC.8 Two years later,
on January 1, 2003, thirty-nine diamond-trading countries adopted and
implemented the scheme.86
H. Original KPCS Requirements
The details of the KPCS are codified in the original document. The
Preamble recognizes "the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by
trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in
affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations
that have been perpetrated in such conflicts."87 The KPCS then sets
out standards and a process by which rough diamonds produced in
member states (Participants) are evaluated and certified. 88 If a
shipment of rough diamonds contains a Kimberley Certificate, that
certificate (theoretically) provides that the country of origin has 1)
established "internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of
conflict diamonds" imported to or exported from that country, enforced
through domestic laws and penalties; 89 2) imported and exported all
rough diamonds in tamper resistant containers;90 and 3) not imported
or exported any rough diamonds to or from a non-Participant state.9 1
In theory, as more Participants join the Scheme, fewer markets will
83. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 388; see infra note 96.
84. KP Website, supra note 4.
85. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docfUNDOC/GEN/NOO/562/75/PDF/N0056275.pdfOpen
Element; Murphy, supra note 34, at 214.
86. Fishman, supra note 36, at 224-25.
87. KPCS, supra note 5, at 1.
88. Id. at 6-11.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id.
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exist for non-certified diamonds. This will decrease the value of non-
certified diamonds, while preserving the legitimate diamond trade. In
addition, Participants agree to make all decisions regarding
participation in the KPCS and resolve all disputes that may arise by
consensus. 92 The original document sets out the bare-bones framework
of a dispute resolution process, but the details and mechanisms are
vague and imprecise.93
The original KPCS was met with severe criticism at the outset.
Critics focused on the vague language, 94 the nearly impossible
requirement of complete consensus, 9 5 the gap in regulation between
mine and export, 96 the fact that virtually all "obligations" are, in fact,
voluntary,9 7 and on the complete lack of an enforcement mechanism.98
However, the greatest - and most consistent and still ongoing -
criticism regards the definition of the very thing the KPCS seeks to
eliminate: conflict diamonds.99
The KPCS's primary goal is to eliminate "conflict diamonds" from
the market, thereby cutting the link between diamonds and the warfare
they funded, while simultaneously preserving the legitimate diamond
trade. 100 According to the KPCS, conflict diamonds are "rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict
aimed at undermining legitimate governments." 101 If particular
diamonds do not meet every aspect of this definition, yet still contribute
to serious human rights abuses and crimes, they are not conflict
diamonds and the KPCS cannot regulate them.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Fluet, supra note 38, at 112; Murphy, supra note 34, at 218.
95. The Marange Diamond Fields - an Overview, THIS IS ZIMBABWE - SOKWANELE
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7074.
96. Vetter, supra note 39, at 746.
97. Fluet, supra note 38, at 116; Malamut, supra note 37, at 47-49; Murphy, supra
note 34, at 219-20.
98. Fishman, supra note 36, at 218; Holmes, supra note 42, at 226; Hummel, supra
note 41, at 1164; Wallis, supra note 26, at 403.
99. See, e.g., Tina Muscarella Gooch, Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should
the Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, 48 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 189, 190 (2008); Vetter, supra note 39, at 766; Mark Kersten, Justice and Diamonds in
Zimbabwe: Saving Kimberley from Itself, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/10/10/justice-and-diamonds-in-zimbabwe-saving-kim
berley-from-itselfl.
100. KPCS, supra note 5, at 1-2; see also infra notes 192-97.
101. KPCS, supra note 5, at 3.
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L KPCS Additions and Developments
The KPCS and its associated requirements have developed.
Notably, the original document itself does not prohibit alterations,
improvements or amendments.10 2 Certain subsequent actions indicate
the KPCS scope can expand. 103
In 2004, KP members formed a new ad hoc group on Artisanal-
Alluvial Production to address concerns about how local diggers operate
in illicit diamond trade. 104 This is now an official Working Group,
which also addresses concerns about the mine's environmental
conditions and how this affects miners' health, matters not addressed in
the original KP document. 105
In addition, the KP works with both the Diamond Development
Initiative ("DDI") and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, to examine broader issues involving the diamond industry.
The DDI aims to "address, in a comprehensive way, the political, social
and economic challenges facing the artisanal diamond mining sector in
order to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal
diamond mining to miners and their communities . . . ." 106 The
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative seeks to decrease
governmental corruption and help local populations benefit from their
own natural resources by publicizing government revenue figures. 107
102. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1736-37.
103. See, e.g., Zimbabwe Diamond Trade Under Spotlight, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 3,
2009), available at http://wwwl.voanews.comlenglish/news/a-13-2009-11-03-voa49.html
(quoting Ian Smillie, who helped design the KPCS as saying "nobody could imagine at the
beginning of this thing that human rights were going to become a problem in the
diamonds fields of the countries that are members. But it is an issue and I think this is
the beginning of a more mature Kimberley Process that can deal with some of the
fundamental issues that consumers are concerned about.").
104. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1739-40; Global Witness, Making It Work: Why the
Kimberley Process Must Do More to Stop Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS 15 (Nov.
2005), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/GWMaking-iLwork.pdf
[hereinafter Making It Work]; Global Witness & Partnership Africa Canada,
Implementing the Kimberley Process 5 (June 2005), http://www.globalwitness.org
/sites/default/files/import/Implementing%/o20the%20Kimberley%2OProcess%20-%2OJune%
202005.pdf [hereinafter Implementing the Kimberley Process].
105. KIMBERLEY PROCESS PLENARY MEETING, GABORONE, BOTS., Nov. 6-9, 2006, FINAL
COMMUNIQUt 1-3 (2006) [hereinafter GABORONE PLENARY COMMUNIQUt], available at
http://www.state.gov/documentsorganization/77110.pdf- Wexler, supra note 27, at 1739-
40.
106. Vetter, supra note 39, at 759; DDI Mission Statement, Diamond Development
Initiative, http://www.ddiglobal.org/pages/mission.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
107. What Is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
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The KP works with each of these organizations and functions as a
liaison between them. 108
The KP also works with the World Diamond Council ("WDC"),
which is one of the first two non-governmental Observers invited to
participate in the KP (Global Witness was the other).109 The WDC was
created in 2000 to represent the diamond industry's interests during
formation of the KPCS. 110 Eli Izhakoff, a veteran in the diamond
industry, was elected chairman and formed a broad coalition, bringing
important players from national and international industry
organizations, major jewelry manufacturers and retailers, mining
companies, gem labs, and bank representatives to the WDC table."' In
2000, the WDC devised and utilized a system of warrantees to
supplement the KP certificates. 112 That system requires that all
diamond traders, polishers, dealers, and manufacturers confirm "[t]he
diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources
not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations
resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are
conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees
provided by the supplier of these diamonds."ll 3 While these warrantees
really parallel the KPCS requirements, the WDC requirements are
directed more specifically at industry players and are intended to work
in conjunction with them.114
Finally, the KP further extended its own system of monitoring
compliance. Originally, the KPCS required only self-monitoring by
individual participants through reports on each country's own "relevant
laws, regulations, rules, procedures and practices." 115 Eventually,
participants agreed to peer reviews of individual states conducted by
teams including representatives from each branch of the KP.11 Now,
the KP periodically reviews the entire scheme as a whole group.117
108. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1740.
109. Feldman, supra note 10, at 850-51.
110. See History, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org
about-wdc/history (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter WDC Website].
111. Id.; Feldman, supra note 10, at 850.
112. See Fishman, supra note 36, at 227; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1160; Mission
Statement, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/aboutwdc
/mission-statement (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
113. See THE WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS 5 (2003), available at http://www.jvclegal.org/KimberleyProcess.pdf.
114. Michael Maggi, The Currency of Terrorism: An Alternative way to Combat
Terrorism and End the Trade of Conflict Diamonds, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 513, 533
(2003).
115. KPCS, supra note 5, § V(a).
116. Wexler, supra note 22, at 1745.
117. Id.
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These steps expanded the initial enforcement mechanisms and
demonstrate that, while steps may be small and slow, the KPCS is
capable of growth and development.
J. Current KPCS Statistics
Currently, forty-nine member states representing seventy-five
countries (the European Union is an individual Participant) are part of
the KPSC and subject to its requirements. 118 These Participants
produce approximately 99.8 percent of all the rough diamonds in the
world. 119 Though Africa remains the world's poorest and most
underdeveloped continent, 120 sixty-five of the world's diamonds
originate in Africa and Africa exports approximately $8.5 billion in
diamonds each year. 121 According to the official website - and there is
only limited disagreement - the KPCS has been extremely successful at
achieving its stated goal: "Diamond experts estimate that conflict
diamonds now represent a fraction of one percent of the international
trade in diamonds, compared to estimates of up to fifteen percent in the
1990s."122 Even Partnership Africa Canada, which frequently criticizes
KP Participants' behavior, acknowledges that the diamonds the KPSC
sought to eliminate are now virtually non-existent in the legitimate
diamond trade. 123 Furthermore, the market value of non-certified,
illicit diamonds has fallen. 124 It is difficult to argue with these
numbers; so far as its stated goals (and accepted definitions) are
concerned, the KPCS has been a success.
118. WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, Countries Participating in the Kimberley Process,
http://www.diamondfacts.org/pdfs/conflict/KimberleyProcessParticipants.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2012).
119. See Ford, supra note 4; KP Website, supra note 4.
120. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: SUSTAINABILITY
AND EQUITY - A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL, 19-20, U.N. Sales No. 11.III.B.1 (2011),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 2011_ENSummary.pdf- Mark Doyle,
Why is the African Continent Poor?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8215083.stm.
121. See Diamond Facts, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.diamondfacts.org/
facts/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
122. See KP Website, supra note 4.
123. THE DIAMONDS & HUMAN SEC. PROJECT, P'SHIP AFR. CAN., KILLING KIMBERLEY?
CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND PAPER TIGERS 3 (Jos6e L~tourneau & Ian Smillie eds., rev. ed.
2006) [hereinafter KILLING KIMBERLEY], available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents
/diamonds KP/15_KillingKimberley Revised%20EditionEng-Nov2006.pdf.
124. AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON THE REVIEW OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
CERTIFICATION SCHEME, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME THIRD YEAR
REVIEW 21 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter KPCS THIRD YEAR REVIEW], available at
http://www.gjepc.org/pdfl /trade information/KPCS_3rdYear reviewFinal report.pdf.
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Its greatest test, according to scholars and activists alike, was how
it would handle Zimbabwe's Marange Diamonds.125
PART II: ZIMBABWE'S MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS
The diamonds from Marange do not fit comfortably within the KP's
codified scope; no rebel group uses these diamonds to fund war. And
yet, assuming the allegations are true, similar atrocities are happening
today in Marange as happened during the 1990s in Sierra Leone.
Furthermore, while no "rebel movement" is directly linked to the
Marange diamonds, Zimbabwe's government faces significant
opposition.
A. Zimbabwe's Political History
A complete account of Zimbabwe's political drama over the past
decades is well beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief sketch
is necessary to understand the intersection between Marange and the
KPCS. Zimbabwe achieved independence from Britain in 1980.
Though there was initial competition, current president Robert Mugabe
and his Zimbabwe African National Union ("ZANU") party maintained
an uninterrupted, though violent, rule for twenty-eight years. 126
Following a horrific period of massacres between 1982 and 1985, ZANU
and its main political opposition, the Zimbabwe African People's Union
("ZAPU"), reached an agreement, which merged the two parties,
creating ZANU-PF and maintaining Mugabe's presidency. 127
Zimbabwe's economy suffered catastrophic damage as President
Mugabe focused on maintaining control. This triggered further
opposition to ZANU-PF. The Movement for Democratic Change
("MDC"), led by Morgan Tsvangirai and established in 1999, rapidly
gained support and effectively challenged President Mugabe.128 The
ZANU-PF government responded by further suppressing civil liberties
and intimidating its way through multiple fraudulent elections. 129
125. Thierry Vircoulon, Time to Rethink the Kimberley Process: The Zimbabwe Case,
INT'L CRISIS GRP. (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-
africalzimbabwe/op-eds/time-to-rethink-the-kimberley-process-the-zimbabwe-case.aspx.
126. Id.
127. See Zimbabwe Profile, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-africa-14113618.
128. Vircoulon, supra note 125.
129. INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT No. 93, POST-ELECTION ZIMBABWE: WHAT
NEXT? 1-2 (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/
africalsouthern-africa/zimbabwe/Post-Election%20Zimbabwe%2OWhat%2ONext.pdf.
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"Operation Restore Order" effectively displaced 700,000 mostly poor
MDC supporters from Harare, Zimbabwe's capital city.130
In the 2008 presidential elections, Tsvangirai received the most
votes, but not enough to secure the office after the first round of
Zimbabwe's electoral process.13 ZANU-PF's response was so violent,
immediate, and widespread that Tsvangirai withdrew. 132 However,
international pressure eventually convinced the leaders to establish a
transitional power-sharing agreement, in which Mugabe retained the
presidency and Tsvangirai became prime minister.133 Since September
15, 2008, this hotly contested and extremely controversial coalition has
been Zimbabwe's legitimate government.134 Regardless of the on-going
tensions between the two parties and the persistent divides, the
military forces that control the Marange diamond fields technically
answer to Zimbabwe's legitimate government. Therefore, according to
the KPCS and international law, Zimbabwe itself, not a particular
group, controls and uses the Marange diamonds.
B. Discovering the Diamond Fields
In 2006, local villagers discovered the Marange diamond fields in
the Chiadzwa district near the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border.135 These
fields are rich with alluvial deposits, which, in total, have an estimated
worth of up to U.S. $800 billion and could be a viable source of wealth
for the next 80 years. 136 For a country like Zimbabwe, which has
suffered from a crippled economy for decades, such a find could have
ushered in a new period of growth and prosperity.137 Unfortunately,
130. INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT No. 122, ZIMBABWE: AN END TO THE
STALEMATE? 4 (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africal
southernafricalzimbabwe/Zimbabwe%20An%2OEnd%20to%20the%20Stalemate.pdf.
131. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2; Zimbabwe: Tsuangirai Wins Parliamentary Vote,
ALLAFRICA (Aug. 25, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200808251079.html.
132. See Tsvangirai Withdrawal: Key Quotes, BBC NEWS (June 23, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil7468091.stm.
133. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Rivals Strike a Bargain to Share Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/worldlafrica/12zimbabwe.html?em.
134. LAUREN PLOCH, ZIMBABWE: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY 2-4 (Oct. 27, 2011), available at /www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34509.pdf.
135. Alan Cowell, Group Allows Limited Sale of Zimbabwe's Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/africa/17diamonds.html;
Ecologist, Export of Zimbabwean Diamonds Threatens Ethical Jewellery Trade,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment/2011/aug/08/zimbab
wean-diamonds-ethical-jewellery-trade.
136. Ecologist, supra note 135.
137. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1723.
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this did not happen.13 8 Some scholars examine this fact in light of the
modern economic concept of "resource curses." 139 Resource curses
"occur when an open market and an abundance of natural resources
combine to create or exacerbate a governance problem" - such as
internal conflicts.140 Marange diamonds are such a curse.
The Marange fields are unique in Zimbabwe; miners reach these
diamonds without complicated tools or expensive extraction methods.141
Rather than give private companies exclusive rights to these fields, 142
the government initially opened them and unlicensed miners
descended.143 Between late 2006 and October 2008, police financially
and physically exploited the miners; "killings, torture, beatings and
harassment," 144 as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions of local
miners were common. By the end of this period, the police established
elaborate syndicates to systematically increase the bribes they
demanded from miners.145 Then, in the summer of 2007, reports from
Zimbabwe indicated the illegal mining was under control. 146
However, tens of thousands of illegal diamond miners returned to
Marange in the last months of 2008. 147 In October 2008, the
Zimbabwean government sent in military forces - whether to combat
138. The discovery of significant alluvial diamond deposits in the Marange area of
eastern Zimbabwe [Manicaland Province] in June 2006 should have been a means of
salvation for the virtually bankrupt country after ten years of chaos that saw world record
inflation and the nation brought to its knees. Instead, it has led to greed, corruption and
exploitation on a grand scale, the use of forced labour - both adults and children -
horrifying human rights abuses, brutal killings, degradation of the environment and
massive enrichment of a select few; SOKWANELE, supra note 95, at 2.
139. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1723; Kersten, supra note 99.
140. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1718.
141. Alluvial diamonds do not require the same type of deep mines as kimberlite
deposits and are significantly easier to extract. Vetter, supra note 39, at 742. THE
DIAMONDS & HUMAN SEc. PROJECT, P'SHIP AFR. CAN., ZIMBABWE, DIAMONDS AND THE
WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY 3 (Jos4e Ltourneau & Ian Smillie eds., 2009) [hereinafter
ZIMBABWE, DIAMONDS AND HISTORY], available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents
/diamonds_KP/18Zimbabwe-DiamondsMarchO9-Eng.pdf.
142. African Consolidated Resources ("ACR"), British company, initially received
exclusive rights to the fields, but the Zimbabwe government revoked ACR's license when
they realized the extent of the Marange field's value. See Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
143. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2 (stating this discovery "unleashed a diamond rush
of 15,000 to 20,000 unlicensed artisanal miners and uncontrolled smuggling").
144. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE
MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS OF ZIMBABWE 19 (2009) [hereinafter DIAMONDS IN THE
ROUGH]. Critics regularly claim that reports from this type of organization is biased,
however newspaper articles (many cited below) suggest that much of this report is
accurate.
145. Id. at 21; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
146. See Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
147. DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH, supra note 144, at 27.
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the existing lawlessness or as a reward for dedication to Mugabe is
debated.148 The military initiated "Operation Hakudzokwi" (No Return)
on October 27, 2008. 149 Within three weeks, army helicopters and
soldiers shot miners and villagers indiscriminately in an attempt to
clear the area.150 The operation ended with more than 200 dead.151
Military forces smuggled diamonds, generally through Mozambique (a
non-KP Participant),152 and utilized forced child labor.15 3
C. Marange Today
The abuses continue.154 In addition to the BBC reports of torture
camps,15 5 the military forces, still in Marange,15 6 are allegedly involved
in illegal digging, trading, and smuggling.157 Local Focal Point ("LFP"),
a group established by the KP's Working Group on Monitoring to
independently monitor Zimbabwe, reported that security guards
protecting the Mbada mine in Marange set dogs on illegal miners,
children, and elderly villagers between August and October, 2011.158 In
response to the November announcement that KP officially lifted its
ban on Zimbabwe,159 Shamiso Mtisi, Coordinator of LFP, stated "[t]his
deal only reinforces the perception that there is no limit to how far the
KP is prepared to go in lowering the ethical bar on Marange .... Given
the chance to keep Zimbabwe to its previous commitments, the KP has
148. Id. at 29; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
149. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
150. DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH, supra note 144, at 30-34; Nokuthula Sibanda,
Zimbabwe: Harare Denies Diamond Field Abuses, RELIEFWEB (June 30, 2009),
http://reliefweb.int/node/315325.
151. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
152. Zimbabwe: End Repression in Marange Diamond Fields, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(June 26, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/26/zimbabwe-end-repression-marange-
diamond-fields.
153. David Smith, Children Forced to Mine Zimbabwe Diamonds, GUARDIAN (June 26,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/26/zimbabwe-diamonds-children-
mugabe ("It is estimated that up to 300 children continue to work for soldiers in the
diamond fields.").
154. Veneranda Langa, Mbada Diamonds Guards Brutalise Villagers: Report, NEWS
DAY (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-11-07-mbada-diamonds-
guards-brutalise-villagers-report.
155. See supra notes 1-17.
156. Despite agreeing to withdraw all troops under the Joint Working Agreement.
Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4.
157. Langa, supra note 154.
158. Id.; Marange Diamonds: Zimbabwe Denies 'Torture Camp', BBC NEWS (Aug. 9,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14468116 [hereinafter Marange
Diamonds].
159. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
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shown itself incapable of doing the right thing." 160 Human rights
abuses in Marange have decreased. 16 1 However, a reduction that leaves
abuses such as these in place is decidedly insufficient.
PART III: ZIMBABWE'S CERTIFICATION STATUS
Human rights activists immediately reported the first abuses and
the KP responded. 162 Their responses never satisfied the activists,
however. They consistently argued the KP could and should do more.
Yet, the steps the KP took and its eventual decision in November
clearly indicate that the KP does not believe it has any authority to
regulate the Marange diamonds.
A. KPCS Reactions - A Timeline
Human rights groups directly associated with the KP began
documenting the situation at Marange as early as 2006.163 Zimbabwe
denied any misconduct. 164 The KP responded with limited action: a
peer review visit in June 2007 indicated Zimbabwe had sufficiently
implemented KPCS minimum requirements and the abuse accusations
were not mentioned. 165 The following year, KP expressed "growing
concerns" about the Marange fields and recommended additional
monitoring. 166
160. Civil Society Activists Criticise Diamond Deal, SADOCC (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.sadocc.at/news/2011/2011-232.shtml.
161. Langa, supra note 154.
162. See Ecologist, supra note 135.
163. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771; Zimbabwe and its Diamonds: Forever Dirty,
ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18898238.
164. Edahn Golan, KP Meeting: Renewed Calls for Improvements in Monitoring as KP
Fails Where it's Critical, IDEX (June 25, 2009), http://www.idexonline.
com/portalFullNews.asp?id=32542; Marange Diamonds, supra note 158.
165. [T]hrough a dedicated and comprehensive effort, the Government of Zimbabwe
has managed to bring th[e] situation under control in the first half of 2007 . . . . It is the
view of the review team that the overall structure of the implementation of the [KPCS]
appears to be working in a satisfactory manner in Zimbabwe, and, in general, meets the
minimum requirements of the KPCS. Kimberley Process, Review Visit, Zimb., May 29-
June 1, 2007, Summary of the Report of the KP Review Visit to Zimbabwe 2, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberleyprocess/annualreports;jsessionid=471AC
C601453D3FDB607AE56637E5D11?p p id=110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3&p-plifecyc
le=0&p-p state=normal&p-pmode=view&p-p-col id=column2&p-pcol-count=2&_110
INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3_struts action=%2Fdocumentlibrary-display%2Fviewfile_e
ntry&_110INSTANCE7D81ln2qTtl3_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kimberleyproces
s.com%2Fweb%2Fkimberley-process%2Fannualreports%3Bjsessionid%3D471ACC601
453D3FDB607AE56637E5D11%3Fp-p-id%3D110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3%26p plif
ecycle%3DO%26p p-state%3Dnormal%26p p-mode%3Dview%26p-p col id%3Dcolumn-
2%26p_p_col count %3D2&_110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3_fileEntryld=17256.
166. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771.
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In June 2009, a review mission to Zimbabwe reported that it was
not compliant. 6 7 Their report recommended suspension and declared
that Zimbabwe must withdraw its army and immediately suspend all
illegal mining and sales. 168 At the November 2009 KP plenary meeting,
Zimbabwe and other Participants agreed on a Joint Work Plan. 169
Under this plan, Zimbabwe agreed to a ban on their exports until
monitors were in place and the government had demonstrated
progress.170 Progress was insufficient.
In 2010, a special monitor visited Zimbabwe and the Marange
fields twice. At the plenary meeting that June, the monitor reported
Zimbabwe was compliant, but the vote to adopt the report's
recommendation ended in a stalemate.171 The group agreed to meet
again the following month in Russia. Following that meeting, KP
authorized two sales of Marange diamonds.172 These sales involved
900,000 carats of diamonds worth $72 million and were met with
disapproval from the United States, European Union, Canada and
Australia. 173 No real progress occurred during the following year.
Then, on June 23, 2011, Mr. Mathieu Yamba, the then-K]P Chair
announced that Zimbabwe could sell from two specific mines in
Marange and that others would soon follow.174 Representatives of every
NGO present walked out of the meeting in protest. 75 The United
States and other Western countries declared the decision invalid
because it was not unanimous.17 6 While this led to confusion, even from
167. Sebastien Berger & Peta Thornycroft, Mugabe Escapes a Blood Diamond Ban,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 6, 2009, at 21.
168. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4.
169. KIMBERLEY PROCESS, JOINT WORK PLAN: ZIMBABWE 1 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133851.pdf [hereinafter JOINT WORK PLAN];
Celia W. Dugger, Group Won't Suspend Zimbabwe on Mining Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/worldlafrica/07zimbabwe.html.
170. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4; Zim Won't Export Marange Diamonds, FIN.
GAZETTE (Zimb.) (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/2081-zim-
wont-export-marange-diamonds.html.
171. Arthur Bright, Zimbabwe Restarts Diamond Sales Amid 'Blood Diamond'
Accusations, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/terrorism-security/2010/0812/Zimbabwe-restarts-diamond-sales-amid-blood-
diamond-accusations.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Chair's Notice of 23 June 2011 on the Zimbabwe Issue, in 35 OTHER FACETS Aug.
2011, at 2, available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/Other-Facets/OF35-eng.pdf.
175. Statement by Charmian Gooch, Founding Dir., Global Witness (June 27, 2011),
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-founding-director%E
2%80%99s-statement-ngo-coalition-walk-out-kimberley-process; Kersten, supra note 99.
176. Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs & Sec. Pol'y (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2011/11
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Zimbabwe's finance minister, Tendai Biti, 177 more Zimbabwe diamonds
entered the market. Finally, on November 3, 2011, the KP's ban on
Marange diamonds was officially lifted - Marange diamond fields are
now certified and part of the legitimate diamond trade.17 8
B. Possible Violations
Zimbabwe's actions may have violated the KPCS in two distinct
ways. The first involves its failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Scheme. The second directly addresses the abuses
committed to obtain these stones. This second argument can proceed in
either of two ways - 1) by forcing Marange diamonds into the existing
definition or 2) by relying on the underlying principles behind the
KPCS.
C. Exporting to Non-Participant State
KPCS Participants must meet certain minimal requirements to
remain in compliance and legally participate in the legitimate diamond
trade. Zimbabwe violated many of these basic requirements.
Zimbabwe diamonds arrive in Mozambique daily.17 9 Mozambique
neither produces diamonds itself, nor is a member of the KPCS.18o In
Vila de Manica, just across the eastern Zimbabwe border, the illegal
diamond trade flourishes with the complicity of both Zimbabwean and
Mozambican officials. 181 A Mozambican man living in Zimbabwe freely
admitted to a reporter that he walks across the border nearly every day
/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-high-representative-catherine-ashton-on-the-agree
ment-reached-in-kimberley-process-regarding-marange-diamonds/; Zimbabwe: Rampant
Abuses in Marange Diamond Fields, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/zimbabwe-rampant-abuses-marange-diamond-fields;
Ecologist, supra note 135.
177. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Diamond Exports Approved Over Objections, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/worldlafrica/25zimbabwe.
html.
178. Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
179. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 222; Cletus Mushanawani, Zimbabwe:
Mozambique's Diamond Capital, HERALD (July 14, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201007140397.html; Vircoulon, supra note 125.
180. Participants, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/weblkim
berley-process/kp-participants (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
181. Alex Bell, Zimbabwe: Army Leading Smuggling Operations Out of Chiadzwa, SW
RADIO AFR. (London) (July 26, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201007261469.html;
Sarah Childress, Diamond Trade Finds Regulatory Loophole in Mozambique, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125738837197329995.html; Tamas S. Kiss,
Illicit Trade Zimbabwean Blood Diamond Trade Continues, BUDAPEST REP. (Aug. 4,
2010), http://www.budapestreport.com/2010/08/04/illicit-trade-zimbabwean-blood-diamond
-trade-continues/; Vircoulon, supra note 125, at C.
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to sell diamonds to Lebanese buyers. 182 Traders from Israel, Somalia,
Nigeria, and Guinea reportedly make a great living in Manica, another
border town in Mozambique.18 3
The KPCS explicitly states that Participants cannot export to non-
Participants. 8 4 The complications surrounding the KPCS definition of
"conflict diamond" is irrelevant here because the KPCS bans
exportation of all "rough diamonds," which includes any "diamonds that
are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted . . . ."185 Furthermore,
the Zimbabwe diamonds arrive in Mozambique carried in pockets
without a valid KPCS certificate and clearly not in any type of "tamper-
resistant containers."18 6 Zimbabwe thereby violated sections 11(a) and
IV(c) as well. 187
These facts are not in dispute; they are not even discussed.
Undoubtedly, the issue of human rights violations is more important
and more pressing.188 Yet, these procedural violations are clear and far
less controversial. It might have been easy for the KP to justify its ban
on Marange diamonds in light of these violations. Of course, KP Chair
Yamba declared Zimbabwe in compliance and the ban is now entirely
lifted. 189 Furthermore, Zimbabwe argued that it complied with the
Joint Work Plan and other requirements under the KPCS. 190 Any
further recommendations by the KP are just that - unenforceable
recommendations, which Zimbabwe is under no legal obligation to
fulfill. However, the ban could be re-imposed and the United States
182. Childress, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. KPCS, supra note 5, § III(c).
185. Id. § I.
186. Id. §§ 11(a), IV(c).
187. Id.
188. Although KP investigators themselves have argued that this type of smuggling
operation creates illicit trading routes, which undermines the security of legitimate
international trading. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770-71 (citing Celia W. Dugger, War
Against Diamond Smuggling Is on the Line, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 2009, at 2
(quoting a confidential Kimberley Process report)).
189. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
190. Summary of the Report of the KP Review Visit to Zimbabwe, Kimberly Process
(May 29 - June 1, 2007), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-
process/annualreports?ppid=110INSTANCE&7D81ln2qTtI3&p_pjifecycle=0&p-p stt
e-normal&pp mode=view&p.p.colid=column2&p_pcol count=2&_110_INSTANCE_7
D81 ln2qTtl3_struts action=%2Fdocument_1ibrary-display%2Fview file entry&_110 IN
STANCE_7D81 ln2qTtl3 redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kimberleyprocess.com%2Fweb
%2Fkimberley-process%2Fannualreports%3Fppjd%3D11i0INSTANCE_7D81ln2q Ttl3
%26pp_1ifecycle%3DO%26p pstate%3Dnormal%26p-p-mode%3Diew%26p-p colid%3
Dcolumn2%26p.pscol count%3D2&_110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtl3_fileEntryId=17256.
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took over the Chair in 2012.191 This presents a prime opportunity for
the United States to act on its stated disgust over economically
motivated human rights violations.
D. Human Rights Violations
While Zimbabwe is violating some technical KPCS requirements,
the bigger concern is obviously the human rights abuses that facilitate
the trade of Marange stones. Scholars and activists have presented two
different arguments as to how these abusive acts violate the KPCS.
The primary issue is whether Marange diamonds can be excluded from
trade under the KPCS. The only such diamonds are "conflict
diamonds." As stated above, the KPCS definition of conflict diamonds is
"rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments . . . ."192 Since
no rebel groups use Marange diamonds to fund conflicts against state
governments, Zimbabwe and now the KP insist that Marange diamonds
cannot be conflict diamonds.193
This result is profoundly unsettling. How can diamonds obtained
through child labor, torture, and murder not be blood diamonds?
E. Marange Diamonds as KPCS Conflict Diamonds
Recognizing the difficulty in actually changing the definition of
"conflict diamonds," some seek to fit the situation in Zimbabwe into a
"typical" KPCS violation so the KP can exclude Marange diamonds from
the market. They avoid the rebel concern all together and argue that
while these diamonds may not be undermining a particular
government, the fact that illicit smuggling leads to illegal trade
channels hreatens the security of international trading itself. 194 The
response: these are still not conflict diamonds.
A more crafty and ambitious argument involves Zimbabwe's
prolonged political instability. According to this line of reasoning,
Zimbabwe's legitimate government is the coalition government formed
in 2008, when Tsvangirai became prime minister. 195 Many reports
indicate that the troops controlling Marange are loyal to Mugabe alone
191. Ford, supra note 6; Jeff Miller, U.S. to Chair Kimberley Process in 2012,
RAPAPORT (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticlelD=
37698.
192. KPCS, supra note 5, § I.
193. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
194. See Celia W. Dugger, Africa's Diamond Trade Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/worldlafrica/04zimbabwe.html; Dugger,
supra note 188, at 2.
195. See Ecologist, supra note 135.
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and want the coalition government to fail.19 6 Since these troops run the
torture camps and smuggle diamonds into Mozambique, some argue
they qualify as "rebels" looking to overthrow the coalition
government. 197
While this argument is appealing for those who want the KPCS to
solve the problem of Marange diamonds, it is clearly a very far stretch.
Rebels do not try to overthrow a government by ensuring that the
president of nearly thirty-two years remains in power. This twists the
definitions of "rebel" and "undermine" to an extent that would cause
even most lawyers to shake their heads. Pretending that a definition
covers more than it does only leads to confusion and further denial.
This is not the way to prove that Marange diamonds should be banned.
F. KPCS Principles
The KPCS contains more than narrow definitions. The document
and the process it developed explicitly acknowledge the "systematic and
gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated" in conflicts
fueled by conflict diamonds.198 The aim of the KP "is to exclude conflict
diamonds from international markets and to prevent diamond-fuelled
wars;"199 "[a]t its core, the KP is about stopping human rights abuse
linked to diamonds."200 At the KP meeting in June 2011, President of
the World Diamond Council, Eli Izhakoff stated that the KP was "about
humanity, not politics" 201 and urged all Participants to return to that
core principle:
196. See Eddie Cross, Does Zim Qualify for Kimberley Process?, ZIM. INDEP. (Nov. 10,
2011), http://www.theindependent.co.zw/opinion/33071-does-zim-qualify-for-kimberley-pro
cess.html; Dugger, supra note 177 (noting that "civic groups and leaders in Mr. Biti's
party are deeply concerned that the military, still entrenched in the Marange diamond
fields and loyal to Mr. Mugabe, will use diamond profits to finance a campaign of violence
against the Movement for Democratic Change in elections that seem likely to be held next
year."); Bruce Loudon, Robert Mugabe's Bloody Regime Set in Stone, AUSTRALIAN (Nov.
16, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.aulnews/world/robert-mugabes-bloody-regime-
set-in-stone/story-e6frg6ux-1226195986532 ('Mugabe's murderous army has become part
of the exploration and selling process. The army is pivotal to keeping Mugabe, and his
successor, in power."); see also Smith, supra note 153.
197. See Cowell, supra note 16.
198. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl.
199. GLOBAL WITNESS, RETURN OF THE BLOOD DIAMOND 5 (2010), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/return-blood-diamond-deadly-race-control-zimbabwe
s-new-found-diamond-wealth.
200. SOKWANELE, supra note 95, at 10.
201. KP is About Humanity Not Politics WDC President Tells Meeting in Kinshasa,
MARKET DIRECT (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.mdirect-business.com/content/
kimberley-process-about-humanity-not-politics-wdc-president-tells-meeting-kinshasa.
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At its core, the Kimberley Process is about protecting the
right of communities and individuals to derive properly
deserved benefit from natural resources. . . . First and
foremost, the Kimberley Process caters to the fundamental
needs of millions of ordinary men, women and children living
in developing areas, were diamonds are mined and processed.
. . . [W]hile we will not agree on everything, we . . . are
firmly committed to a trade in diamonds that is not tainted by
conflict . . .202
In the end, it should not matter what precise definition we use, the
Marange diamonds are covered in blood and should not be in the
market.
Unfortunately, while those who support the KP's authority to ban
Marange diamonds convincingly argue that the principle at issue is the
connection between diamonds and human rights abuses, the Preamble's
principles each reference "conflict diamonds" as defined within the
document. 203 The human rights activists and NGOs who helped create
this unique and impressive tool had to compromise and draw the lines
around "conflict diamonds" closely enough to gain the support of
diamond-producing nations and De Beers. 204 We are now seeing the full
cost of that compromise.
PART IV: ADDRESSING THE DILEMMA
Zimbabwe's Marange diamonds present a dilemma: they are
associated with precisely the type of violent conduct that triggered the
KPCS, yet they do not fit the well-established and politically defendable
definition. To get around the dilemma, we must either change the
definition or turn to a different mechanism that is not so limited.
A. Change the Definition
Diamonds other than conflict diamonds, as defined by the KPCS,
cause serious problems. 205 Zimbabwe proves that government-
controlled diamonds can come with as much spilled blood as the rebel-
controlled variety. Moreover, the conflicts these diamonds fuel and
their associated human rights abuses are not the only harms connected
to diamonds. Diamonds are regularly undeclared for tax evasion,
stolen, used for money laundering, smuggled, and used to fund
202. Id.
203. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl.
204. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
205. Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6.
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terrorism 206 and other crimes. 207 Diamonds that are technically conflict
diamonds make up only a very small portion of all illicit diamond
trading; other illicit diamonds do not receive sufficient attention. 208
With only minor alterations to its document, the KPCS could
change this; substitute the word "illicit" for "conflict," and neither
Marange diamonds nor the massive diamond frauds in Brazil and
Guyana, for example, could have the KP stamp of approval. 209 Yet
simple in theory does not mean simple in practice. Expecting one
regulatory system to manage all diamond-related crimes in the world,
especially one with so many additional challenges, 210 is unrealistic - not
to mention the political resistance that would face such a proposal. But
expecting it to regulate all blood-covered diamonds may not be. As
other scholars and activists have argued, conflict diamonds should be
defined as "all those diamonds that come from areas where diamond
mining is based on the systematic violation of human rights."211
Yet, some KP Participants argue that the system "was designed
only to halt conflict diamonds and not the wider problem of illicit
diamonds." 212 They are likely unwilling to accept even the narrower
definition change that would condemn violent abuses to acquire
diamonds, regardless of the perpetrator. And yet, virtually all of the
internal African conflicts that led to the KPCS are over. 213 Today's
"rebel movements" are unlikely to aim only at overthrowing individual
governments; large-scale terrorism has greater appeal. So, what do we
do? Wait for some old-school rebels to grab some diamonds?
B. Change the Tool
Or do we develop a new tool for a new reality? Do we admit the
KPCS has run its course, or acknowledge it was useful only in terms of
its original limited scope? The activists and NGOs themselves are split.
And if we do abandon the KPCS, where do we next turn our attention?
Global Witness now claims that the diamond industry itself is the
206. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 2
(2006) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251699.pdf.
207. Gooch, supra note 99, at 190-92; Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 7.
208. Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6.
209. KILLING KIMBERLEY, supra note 123.
210. See supra notes 91-96.
211. LUNDAS - THE STONES OF DEATH: ANGOLA'S DEADLY DIAMONDS: HuMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN THE LUNDA PROVINCES, 2004 18 (Rui Falcao de Campos & Rafael Marques, eds.
2005) [hereinafter STONES OF DEATH], available at http://www.medico.de/media/lundas--
the-stones-of-death-angolas-deadly-diamond.pdf- Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771.
212. Gooch, supra note 99, at 203.
213. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1167.
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greatest hope for addressing these human rights violations;
multinational corporate compliance regulations must eliminate the
current abusive practices. While this is undeniably accurate, there are
also other legal actions that the United States, strengthened by its
position as the new KP Chair, could utilize.
C. Multinational Corporate Compliance
Global Witness, one of the KPCS's founders, publicly declared the
system ineffective. 214 Ms. Dunnebacke of Global Witness, stated that
traders and dealers simply hide behind the KP, do not actually check
the sources of their diamonds, and that the KP has simply failed to
handle the situation at Marange. 215 Dunnebacke and Global Witness
now believe the solution to the problems of the diamond trade lie within
the industry itself: the focus must now be on requiring businesses and
companies to conduct business less abusively. 216
This tactic fits with a relatively recent United Nations ("UN") trend
to focus efforts on codifying expectations for international corporate
social responsibility. 217 In 1999, the UN's Global Compact became the
official initiative, actively encouraging corporations to volunteer to help
develop, adopt and implement principles of corporate social
responsibility. 218 The Global Compact's Ten Principles received
universal consensus and address appropriate corporate behavior in the
areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. 219
Principles 1 and 2 discuss human rights: "Principle 1: Businesses
should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights; and Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses."
Additionally important, two reports focused further attention on
developing comprehensive norms and positive obligations of
corporations with regards to human rights: the 2005 Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business
214. Eligon, supra note 22.
215. Id.
216. Message from Founding Director Charmian Gooch, Global Witness, Why We Are
Leaving the Kimberley Process (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
library/why-we-are-leaving-kimberley-process-message-global-witness-founding-director-
charmian-gooch; Simon Allison, Zimbabwe: Kimberley Process - Flawless it is Not,
ALLAFRICA (Dec. 6, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201112070600.html; Ford, supra
note 6.
217. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 26, at 410-11.
218. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html
(last visited May 7, 2012).
219. Id.
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Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 220 and the 2010 Ruggie
Report on Business and Human Rights.221 These reports strive to direct
all corporations to use acceptable practices and also directly refer to
international human rights instruments, thereby creating "a stronger
and more widely accepted basis of human rights responsibilities
generally, and a jus cogens basis regarding some human rights."222 As
such, multinational corporations such as De Beers and others in the
diamond industry have both the duty to refrain from activities that
could violate human rights and to actively promote such rights. 223 As
these norms develop further, and more corporations accept them, the
force of international law will, in time, make such practices enforceable.
Yet they will only be enforceable to the extent that other UN
declarations are enforceable or to the extent of voluntary compliance.
Though Dunnebacke correctly states that diamond companies must
monitor their product, and UN instruments exist to encourage this
behavior, international regulation of multinational corporations still
lacks a good compliance track record. Ironically, shortly after it was
established, the KPCS was applauded as a new and different attempt at
increasing international corporate responsibility for human rights. 224
Unlike prior (and subsequent) UN forays into corporate responsibility,
the KPCS incorporated multiple constituencies into the process early
and actively. 225 Further, the WDC's warrantee system designed to
regulate the gems once they reach industry representatives is
specifically intended to involve the corporate entities in such
compliance. 226 If traders and dealers currently hide behind the KPCS,
they probably hide behind the warrantee system as well. 227 And if they
220. U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Protection & Promotion of
Human Rights, Report on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2005/91; ESCOR,
61st Sess. (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/Reports.aspx.
221. James Harrison, 2010 Ruggie Report on Business and Human Rights, INT'L L.
OBSERVER (Apr. 29, 2010), http://internationallawobserver.eul2010/04/29/2010-ruggie-
report-on-business-and-human-rights/.
222. Surya Deva, Comment, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?,
10 ILSA J INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 498 (2004).
223. Wallis, supra note 26, at 413.
224. Id. at 389; Allison, supra note 216 (discussing the certification programs of the oil,
petroleum, and other mineral industries); Ford, supra note 6 ('The KP was seen as the
flagship in a new generation of hybrid regulatory efforts.").
225. Ford, supra note 6.
226. See WDC WEBSITE, supra note 110, at 11-12.
227. The warrantees were proving unsuccessful even in 2004. Press Release, Amnesty
Int'l, Conflict Diamonds: Jewellers Keeping Consumers in the Dark (Oct. 18, 2004),
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do that, what will prevent them from doing the same with a different,
voluntary, and toothless mechanism?
Moreover, the degree of leverage NGOs had over the diamond
industry when the KPCS formed has diminished. Neither the political
will nor the industry fear that existed in 2000 exists today. 228 The
United States is no longer the primary diamond purchaser on the
market as it was eleven years ago; 229 the controversial sales of Marange
diamonds in the summer of 2010 prove that India and China are more
than willing to purchase any diamonds the United States boycotts. 230
International corporate compliance and social responsibility is vital
to the success and sustainability of our society and its resources - both
human and non-human alike. It is a necessary tool for ending diamond
related abuses. However, it is not sufficient.
D. United States Laws and Policies
It is time we look to other available tools to supplement, but not
replace, the KPCS and international corporate compliance. In January
2012, the United States took over the rotating chair of the KP. This
may prove the best chance for the KPCS and for addressing diamond
related human rights abuses in general. 231 The United States initially
condemned the violence in Zimbabwe, 232 disclaimed KP's authorization
for the 2010 sales and advised consumers to boycott the gems.
Unfortunately, its silence following lifting the ban casts doubt on its
stance. Yet, the opportunity still exists.
Current U.S. legislation could stem the flow of bloody diamonds
and punish those who trade them. For example, the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), originally passed in 1789, allows non-American citizens to sue
"for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of
available at http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/POL30/038/2004/es/9f6b2886-faa9-
1ldd-b6c4-73blaal57d32/pol300382004en.pdf.
228. Wallis, supra note 26, at 401.
229. Id. at 399-400. In 2005, the United States still "[a]ccount[ed] for over half of
global diamond retail sales," though this number had already decreased. Fluet, supra
note 38, at 113.
230. See Jason Moyo, MDC Wants Marange Nationalized, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://mg.co.zalarticle/2011-11-25-mdc-wants-marange-nationalised.
231. Miller, supra note 191.
232. Diamond Revenue Should Be Supported By New Legal Framework, Zim Officials
Say, ISRAELI DIAMOND INDUS. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.israelidiamond.co.il
lenglishlNews.aspx?bonelD=918&objID=10361; Yoliswa Dube, Year 2012 Expected to
Present Better Opportunities for Zimbabweans, CHRONICLE (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.chronicle.co.zwlindex.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=28735:year-
2012-expected-to-present-better-opportunities-for-zimbabweans&catid=39:opinion-a-
analysis&Itemid=132.
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the United States." 233 Although debates regarding the ATS are still
prevalent, this statute provides a cause of action in U.S. courts for a
narrow set of claims asserting a violation of the law of nations.234 While
this set of claims was originally extremely limited, it is expanding.
Most relevant here, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit
concluded that the right to be free from torture was proscribed by the
law of nations. 235 The victims of the Diamond Base torture camps,
therefore, could possibly bring a cause of action against their torturers
under the ATS. 236
Furthermore, the United States has experience enacting legislation
to harshly sanction countries that participate in trade the United States
disfavors. For example, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(ILSA) authorized the President to penalize foreign companies,
individuals and sometimes nations trading with Iran or Libya, because
the United States deemed these nations sponsor terrorism. 237
Additionally, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act) 238 sanctioned corporations
who maintained specific trading relations with Cuba. The Act's stated
goal was to encourage a democratic Cuban government and was aimed
at preventing other countries from trading with Cuba until it created
such a government.239
Each of these Acts has critics and complications, but each, and the
lessons they hopefully taught, could provide the stricter enforcement of
clean diamond norms. 240 The United States should not go out and
sanction countries at will; yet in the current environment of relatively
weak international enforcement, domestic nations with the power and
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004).
234. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13.
235. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. There are additional requirements under the ATS, but going into such detail is
beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently heard oral
arguments in Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
248. On March 5, 2012, the Court ordered re-argument and additional briefs on the issue
of whether the ATS allows U.S. courts to hear lawsuits for violations of international law
committed on foreign soil. If the Court determines that such jurisdiction does not exist,
this would obviously prevent the type of civil suit that could so benefit victims of human
rights abuses at Marange. However, at the time of writing this article, the Court has not
made such a ruling. Raising public awareness about the benefits the ATS could provide
for enforcing human rights is now even more important.
237. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) [hereinafter ILSA].
See Fluet, supra note 38, at 120.
238. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021
(2006) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
239. Id. § 6021(11); see also Fluet, supra note 38, at 121
240. See Fluet, supra note 38, at 119-24.
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legal ability to combat the generally disregarded horrific violence in
Zimbabwe have the responsibility to take action. Given the United
States' role in the KP, its continuing - though weakened - importance
in the diamond market, and its relationships with members of the
diamond industry, it is time to take a greater stand against the
Marange atrocities.
PART V: ACTION STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION
Inaction and implied inability are no longer acceptable. By
adopting the following suggestions, important players in the
international effort to regulate diamond-related atrocities could both
eliminate the dilemma in Zimbabwe and direct international attention
on actually putting an end to such atrocities.
First, the Kimberley Process, the World Diamond Council and the
United States must each make public statements regarding their views
on the relationship between diamonds and human rights. Quite simply,
using systematic human rights abuses to mine or trade diamonds is
unacceptable. Each of these three bodies must then take decisive steps
to support this statement.
A. The Kimberley Process
At least two influential groups have publically declared that it is
time to abandon the KPCS. As detailed above, both Global Witness and
RapNet pulled out of the KP, citing Zimbabwe as final proof that the KP
is unable to address human rights violations related to diamonds. 241
Though neither group suggests disassembling the organization, both
believe that it is now incapable of handling today's true diamond
conflicts.
However, good arguments also exist for giving the KPCS an
overhaul and one final chance. Importantly, growing amounts of
evidence support the contention that illicit diamond sales help finance
global terrorism. 242 Leveraging and highlighting this evidence could
trigger the political will needed to make the necessary reforms. The
spokesman for the European Union's High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy wrote that the KP "may not be a perfect
241. Andersson, supra note 14; Rapaport, supra note 24.
242. "In early November 2001, the Washington Post broke the story that conflict
diamonds helped finance Al Qaeda .... " Feldman, supra note 10, at 853; Fluet, supra
note 38, at 103-04; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1158; Vetter, supra note 39, at 737; Ian
Smillie, Motherhood, Apple Pie & False Teeth: Corporate Social Responsibility in the
Diamond Industry, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT 4-5 (June 2003), availabie
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/secuirty/natres/diamonds/2003/0603-pac.pdf; Maggi, supra
note 114, at 536-37.
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instrument, but it is the best we have, and therefore all parties,
including civil society, should work to make it effective." 243 Achieving
this will require a significant overhaul involving changes to both
substantive and procedural aspects of the KPCS.
First, the KP must change the definition of conflict diamonds. The
original definition no longer accurately describes the realities of today's
diamond conflict. As described above, the KP could change the
definition in a number of different ways, reflecting varying degrees of
how comprehensively it wants to address diamond-related crime. For
now, the KPCS should continue to regulate only conflict diamonds.
Based on today's diamond conflicts, a conflict diamond should now be
any diamond that comes "from areas where mining is based on the
systematic violation of human rights."244 If at some later date the KP
decides it can address all illicit diamonds, it can add that provision
then.
Second, the KP must regain credibility. To do so, it must be truly
accountable for ensuring that it identifies all conflict diamonds, as
newly defined. It must also acknowledge the need to allow Participant
states' governments some degree of protection.
The KP should adopt a more quasi-judicial structure. The KP
investigative teams, which already act as fact-finders and submit
reports to the KP, should be responsible for making specific findings of
fact. In order for the KP to identify certain stones as conflict diamonds,
it should be required to make a specific finding that systematic human
rights violations are occurring with reference to specific mines. Only
after such a finding should KPCS certification be denied. Whether or
not the KP agrees with the investigation team's finding will still require
a consensus decision. This will clearly cause some of the same concerns
and challenges that currently exist. However, by becoming more
accountable for identifying systematic human rights violations in the
diamond context, and making specific findings of this nature, any KP
Participant who does not vote to ban diamonds from mines operating
with systematic human rights abuses will become the focus of
international pressure. Additionally, the KP should develop some form
of appeals mechanism, through which the owner of the identified mine
can object to the finding and be fairly heard.
243. Eligon, supra note 22.
244. STONES OF DEATH, supra note 211. Martin Rapaport's definition of "blood
diamonds" is also acceptable: "Blood diamonds are diamonds involved in murder,
mutilation, rape or forced servitude." Rapaport, supra note 24.
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B. The World Diamond Council
At the end of January 2010, Martin Rapaport, Chairman of the
Rapaport Group, resigned from the WDC. He explained his reasons in
a letter to the WDC and in an article published immediately following
his resignation. He specifically cites WDC's support of KP actions
regarding Marange and points to the difference between his group's
definition of blood diamonds and the KP's definition of conflict
diamonds as the cause of the problem:
To understand how this could happen, we must define "blood
diamonds" and compare our definition to the KP definition of "conflict
diamonds."
Rapaport definition:"Blood diamonds are diamonds involved in
murder, mutilation, rape or forced servitude."
KP definition:"Conflict diamonds means rough diamonds used by
rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining
legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or
in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future,
and as understood and recognised in United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which
may be adopted in future . . ."245
Rapaport recognized the fact that the KP definition of conflict
diamonds does not address human rights violations and does not
include all diamonds included under his definition blood diamonds -
such as those from Marange. 246 Later, following the KP announcement
in November 2011 that Marange diamonds were certified, RapNet
informed its 6,750 members that it had banned all trade of Marange
diamonds. 247 As stated above, RapNet is the world's largest diamond
trading network and it will now publically suspend, expel, and name
any company who violates the boycott of Marange diamonds. 248
The rest of the WDC needs to follow Rapaport and RapNet's lead.
The diamond industry, represented by WDC, must consider their
consumers; the average person who purchases a diamond is not
interested in legal technicalities. While not every customer considers
245. Rapaport, supra note 24.
246. Id.
247. Taurai Mangudhla, Rapaport Tightens Screws on Zim Diamond Trade, DAILY
NEWS (N.Z.) (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/business/35business
/6237-rapaport-tightens-screws-on-zim-diamond-trade.html.
248. Id.
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human rights when purchasing a diamond, those who do will identify
with Rapaport's definition and not the KP's. Such conscientious
customers will not support the idea that diamonds mined through
forced labor, murder, and rape are "Conflict-Free." By banning all such
diamonds from the legitimate trade, regardless of KP certification, the
WDC could demonstrate its commitment to truly responsible business.
As the green movement before it, customers will prove that responsible
business practices that take a stand against human rights violations
make good business sense.
To further this type of practice, the WDC must take an active role
in implementing effective corporate compliance measures in all its
members. The current system of WDC warrantees is insufficient. The
RapNet and the Responsible Jewellery Council ("RJC"), an
international non-profit organization with over 350 member companies,
each have corporate compliance structures and more effective
identification and certification procedures to ensure the ethical quality
of their companies and products. 249 By working with these
organizations, and others like Global Witness who are committed to
corporate compliance and ethical trade, the WDC could become a leader
in the field, ensure that blood diamonds are truly excluded from the
market, and increase profits for its members all at the same time.
C. The United States
The United States is currently in a position to take the lead in
combating blood diamonds. As chair of the KP, the U.S. should propose
an amendment to change the definition of conflict diamonds. This
would show that the U.S. is not just paying "lip service" to the notion
that people should not profit from inflicting serious human rights
abuses. Additionally, the U.S. should take additional steps to follow
and support RapNet's ban on Marange diamonds. While it is true that
a U.S. boycott would no longer have the same impact it once would
have, it would still have significant repercussions and serve as a
powerful statement.
The U.S. must also take advantage of the existing laws that could
influence those responsible for the atrocities in Zimbabwe. Recognizing
the fact that it would be difficult, the U.S. should turn its attention to
finding an appropriate way to bring a case under the Alien Tort
Statute. As noted previously, the U.S. Supreme Court just recently
249. See RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
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heard oral arguments on a case involving the ATS. 250 A suit brought
against perpetrators of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, with
public support from the U.S. government, would send the message that
the U.S. firmly believes that such crimes are unacceptable, even in the
name of profit, and that it is willing to hold people accountable for such
actions.
Each of these proposed solutions presents significant difficulties of
their own. Politics, policy, international relations and money will all
pose obstacles to the effective implementation and enforcement of each
of these suggestions. To deny this reality is naive. And yet, to let them
become paralyzing is unacceptable. It is just as unrealistic, and far
more irresponsible, to wait around for a group of power-hungry rebels to
steal some Marange diamonds.
PART VI: CONCLUSION
The "idealist's" understanding of symbolic value and the "realist's"
insistence on effective practicalities are trapped within the
conscientious International Human Rights lawyer. These competing
perspectives crash together in Zimbabwe. We do not want to see
powerful symbols of cooperation, such as the Kimberley Process,
abandoned simply because they are not as practically effective as we
had hoped. Yet, we need practical solutions. Global Witness pulled out
of the KP not because its absence will change KP's behavior, but
because of the symbolism of a founding member deserting a project it
now calls ineffective. If more organizations follow suit, it may well
prove a symbolic gesture with fatal consequences for the KPCS.
A comprehensive approach to ending diamond-fueled violence and
destruction requires a multilateral approach. 251 Both the KP and the
WDC should participate in that approach, but each is running out of
time to prove their willingness to address the diamond conflicts of the
21st century. Both organizations must strengthen their policies with
regard to diamonds mined through human rights abuses. The new U.S.
Chair must push to amend the definition of conflict diamonds to that
250. See discussion of Kiobel, supra note 236. Kiobel involves a group of twelve
Nigerians who brought suit under the ATS against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
seeking damages and other relief for the company's assistance and complicity in torture,
extrajudicial executions, and other violations of international law committed by the
Nigerian government. Originally, the main issue in the case was whether corporations
were immune from tort liability for such violations. Given the recent order for re-
argument, however, the primary issue will now focus on whether the ATS grants
jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear cases involving violations of international law that
occurred outside of the territorial United States.
251. Fluet, supra note 38, at 124.
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stated above: "all those gems that come from areas where mining is
based on the systematic violation of human rights."252
The WDC should adopt RapNet's definition of blood diamonds and
publically recognize that any diamond involved in rape, murder, or
other human rights violations simply is not "Conflict-Free."
Additionally, the U.S. should both use its existing law and develop new
elements to increase the pressure on those who seek to benefit from
illicit diamond trade. While the ATS currently stands on a threshold,
waiting to see whether or not the U.S. Supreme Court strips it of its
intended scope, public opinion can still exert real power. If, in the
upcoming term, the Court determines that the ATS only provides
jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear cases involving tortious violations of
international law occurring on American soil, then Congress must take
active steps to pass new legislation that would allow for U.S. civil suits
to condemn actions such as those in Marange.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is far from perfect, but
if we abandon every tool that does not provide all the solutions we hope
for, the time and energy spent creating them may have been wasted.
Giving up is not the answer; adapting and incorporating new
mechanisms may be. The Kimberley Process and the World Diamond
Council have one final opportunity to prove to the world that they are
concerned with all violent human rights abuses perpetrated in the
name of diamonds. If they cannot do this, then they should remain
committed only to preventing rebel forces from using diamonds to fund
civil war. And they should say as much. Lying to customers and the
international community by claiming that the Kimberley Process
ensures honestly conflict-free diamonds is unacceptable. The hypocrisy
must end, one way or another. The conflict of diamonds is complicated,
but it is a conflict we can overcome.
252. STONES OF DEATH, supra note 211.
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THE TROUBLE WITH WESTPHALIA IN SPACE: THE STATE-CENTRIC
LIABILITY REGIME
Dan St. John*
ABSTRACT
What happens when a satellite owned by a private company in one
state crashes into another state's satellite? International space law has
an answer. The solution, however, reflects a bygone, state-centric era
created by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. A better system must meet
demands of the emerging commercial space sector. The treaty
framework governing state activities in outer space reflects Cold War
fears. Consequently, the space liability regime favors diplomatic,
cooperative dispute resolution between states. States, therefore, must
sponsor private entities' claims. If the treaty process is ineffective,
state responsibility and international liability fill the gaps left by the
space liability regime. Today, space is increasingly crowded as
commercial ventures launch into space. For them, a state-centric
liability regime is ineffective. I conclude by suggesting that states back
commercial ventures by subsidizing liability insurance and encourage
the private sector to circumvent the treaty framework through
contractual allocation of risk.
INTRODUCTION
Outer space has awed humanity for centuries. People, across the
globe, turn their faces up to the night sky in wonder. Artists and
musicians seek inspiration from it. Scientists, who until recently
needed to look up for study, have found ways to break the chains of
gravity and travel beyond our globe. With this achievement, humanity
is reaching beyond the Earth's surface to place technology in space to
enhance our quality of life through communicating nearly
instantaneously throughout the global,' weather reporting,2 remote
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Economics and
International Relations, 2008, University of Southern California. Many thanks to
Lieutenant Colonel Dean Reinhart, USAF for helping me navigate the space treaties and
their policy implications. Professor Annecoos Wiersema, Professor Eli Wald, Alissa
Mundt, and Julie Nichols were invaluable in helping me string my thoughts together. My
parents, Katie and Dan, were unwavering in their support and always quick with
comments. To my friends, your jests enticed me to dig deeper into the field-for that I am
grateful. And finally, dear footnote reader, I appreciate your interest in liability on the
final frontier.
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sensing3 of the Earth's surface to better manage natural resources, 4 and
applying advances from space research and development here on
Earth.5 The horizon is bright for humanity if space is used in a
thoughtful, efficient manner. For this to happen, law must govern outer
space.
Before formal space law developed, prominent international law
scholars, politicians, scientists, and some science fiction authors6
considered how law and space would interact. This diverse collection of
thinkers helped set the stage for more formal legal talks and helped
cement the spirit of cooperation through the foundational legal
documents enumerating outer space law.7 These documents, although
crafted with an eye on cooperation and a brighter future, are products
of the Westphalian state system. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia
created the modern foundation of international law by building
international relations around organized states with geographic
boundaries. Consequently, solutions must come from the state-centric
international legal regime despite the focus on cooperation. This
cooperative spirit must continue and evolve to become a stabilizing
force that tempers national interest. A space law liability regime that
embodies this will likely be more effective than one where states
jealously guard their sovereignty.
In 1989, Space Services, Inc. changed the status quo of space law
when it becomes the first private company to launch a satellite into
1. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KoPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 55
(3d ed. 2008).
2. Id. at 53-54.
3. "Remote sensing" is the practice of observing and imaging land from above. With
the advent of satellite imaging, remote sensing can cover vastly larger areas than early
aircraft-based reconnaissance. Id. at 70.
4. Sergio Marchisio, Remote Sensing for Sustainable Development in International
Law, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 335, 335-37 (Gabriel
Lafferranderie & Daphn4 Crowther eds., 1997); e.g., Press Release, NASA, NASA and
USAID Pledge to Advance International Development with Science and Technology (Apr.
25, 2011), available at http://www.nasa.govfhome/hqnews/2011/apr/HQ-11-123_NASA
USAID.html.
5. See GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 18-22 (1989).
6. E.g., NAT SCHACHNER, SPACE LAWYER (1953). This is the story of a young,
hotshot space lawyer named Kerry Dale. After a dispute with his irascible boss, Dale
rockets around the solar system using his knowledge of the "star code" and brilliant legal
mind to best his former boss in business and woo the boss's beautiful daughter. In the
end Dale, of course, gets the girl.
7. See Jennifer Frakes, Comment, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and
the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations
Reach a Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 409, 422 (2003) ('The Outer Space Treaty was
based on politics and future visions of space exploration for all mankind .... ).
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orbit.8  Due to technological advancements in rocketry and the
retirement of the Space Shuttle, even more private space actors are
expected to launch payloads into space.9 Cooperation is increasingly
important1 0 because outer space is becoming more cluttered as states
and commercial ventures undertake other space missions and launch
more satellites and space stations.
Experts estimate that of the approximately "19,000 man-made
objects in orbit," only 900 of those objects are satellites." This junk,
which includes dead satellites, paint flecks, wrenches, and other
spacecraft detritus, is called "space debris" and poses a significant
danger to any operation in space.' 2 For example, a 0.2 millimeter in
diameter paint chip caused quite a scare when it pitted the Space
Shuttle Challenger's windshield.'8 If space debris is left unchecked,
scientists worry that low Earth orbit will become unusable.14 The
"Kessler effect" posits that at a certain point, a cascade of collisions will
envelop Earth and close off access to certain areas of space. Debris
mitigation policies, which ideally require space objects to not jettison
debris and be removed from orbit at end-of-life, are not uniformly
adopted by space powers. 15 The United Nations, however, made a large
leap forward in 2008 when the General Assembly adopted debris
mitigation guidelines with the intent to limit orbital hazards. 16
With more actors in space, there will be more collisions, which will
lead to more claims for liability.17 These claims will present a challenge
because, although international space law has a framework for
8. Andre G. DeBusschere, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 3 J. INT'L
L. & PRAC. 97, 104 (1994).
9. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 106; NANDASIRI
JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 321, 325-26
(1999); Irene Klotz, US Looks to Private Sector as Shuttle Program Ends, REUTERS, July
5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/uk-space-shuttle-commercial-idUSLNE
76404L20110705.
10. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 216.
11. Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rules of the Road for Space?: Satellite
Collisions and the Inadequacy of Current Space Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10009, 10010 (2010); Tariq Malik, Space Junk Around Earth on the Rise, Experts Say,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.space.com/news/090429-space-debris-safety.html.
12. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 127; BRUCE A. HURWITZ,
STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 1-3 (1992); Malik, supra note 11.
13. Due to the incredibly high speeds of objects in orbit, even the tiniest of debris can
cause significant damages. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 127;
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 321-22.
14. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 1985, 2637 (1978).
15. See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 308-10 (2009).
16. G.A. Res. 62/217, U.N. Doc. AIRES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008).
17. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121.
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assigning liability, it is a state-centric regime that does not address
private actors.18 General principles of international law, however, fill
the gaps left in the space liability regime. While state responsibility
and international liability do much to assuage liability concerns, they
are still unwieldy for private actors. Going forward, states need to
balance providing recovery to victims without stifling commercial space
development.
Part I of this paper discusses the development of outer space law
generally. The legal documents developed concurrently with leaps of
technological advancements, meaning foundational documents were
drafted with the future in mind. Coupled with the intent of tempering
Cold War fears, early space law documents built a highly aspirational
legal framework, which lead states to draft more workable laws guided
by the space treaties. Part II focuses on the liability framework
established by the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. In
particular, this section clarifies important terms, discusses the claim
process and the different liability regimes, explains how compensation
is made, and how a state limits its liability. Part III explores
traditional international law principles of state responsibility and
international liability, which gaps in the space treaties. Part IV then
discusses how Canada used the Liability Convention to make a claim
for damages caused by the crash of the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954
satellite. This is the only case where Liability Convention has been
used to solve a dispute. Although the procedures were not rigorously
applied, the Convention did help resolve the dispute. In conclusion, the
space liability regime must change to encourage private space
development. The state-centric regime serves an important purpose,
but it must relax in order to allow more commercial actors to develop.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE LAW
A. Enter Space Law
On October 4, 1957, a beach ball sized metal sphere called Sputnik
blasted into orbit and opened the eyes of the world to a new frontier of
scientific and technological exploration. The 1960s were a decade of
rapid advances in space technology as the United States and Soviet
Union launched larger manned rockets and planned more ambitious
space missions.19 Because of the rapid scientific and technological
strides, the law of outer space had to develop quickly. 20 In response,
the United Nations established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
18. See id. at 107; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 153; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at
325-26; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 301.
19. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING 1-3 (1972).
20. See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 216-17 (1997).
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Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959 to address the unique legal issues that
arise from space activities. 21 COPUOS's main goals were to promote
peaceful space activities, encourage cooperation, and establish a legal
regime.22
After eight years of debate, the Committee proposed the Outer
Space Treaty,23 which laid out a general framework for governing space
activities. 24 The treaty came into force in October 1968 and, as of
January 2006, 125 states have agreed to be bound by its terms. 25 In
1972, COPUOS added more details to the Outer Space Treaty's liability
provisions through the Liability Convention. 26 As of January 2006, 108
states follow the Liability Convention's regime. 27 To give more force to
these treaties, 28 in 1976 the Registration Convention set up a structure
for states to register and track spacecraft.29
In total, five treaties govern activities in outer space,30 while five
General Assembly non-binding resolutionS31 further clarify principles of
international law in outer space. 32 Despite the relative youth of space
law, several core concepts have crystallized into customary
21. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), 1(a)(iii)(b), U.N. Doc. RES 1472(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959); see DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR
& KoPAL, supra note 1, at 3.
22. Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), U.N. Doc.
RES 1348(XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), supra note 21. See also DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 2-3.
23. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 205, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
24. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 3; REYNOLDS &MERGES,
supra note 5, at 49. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 215-85, for a detailed account of the
drafting of the Outer Space Treaty.
25. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23-24.
26. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention];
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 178.
27. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 35.
28. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 44-45; REYNOLDS & MERGES,
supra note 5, at 204-05.
29. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Sept. 15, 1976,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
30. Treaties cover the following topics: general principles, astronaut rescue, liability,
registration of space objects, and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Henry
Hertzfeld, The 'Law of Outer Space" is at a Crossroads: Current and Future Issues in
International Space Law, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 328-29 (2009).
31. These resolutions discuss: basic legal principles, direct broadcasting by satellites,
remote sensing, use of nuclear power sources, and how outer space benefits are to be used.
See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 41-50.
32. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 150-62; Stacey L. Lowder, Comment, A State's
International Legal Role: From the Earth to the Moon, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253,
254-57 (1999), for a thorough account of the development of space law from 1961 to the
present.
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international law through state practice.3 3 Customary international
law is state practice accepted as law. 34 It is a formative process where,
over time, states give certain customs the force of law.3 5 The customary
international laws relating to space are that space is governed by
international law;36 national appropriation in space is forbidden; 37
space and its resources are to be used for the benefit of humanity;38
states are responsible for their actions in space; 39 states are liable for
damage; 40 and space objects have free transit over a state's "subjacent
territory," meaning that a satellite may freely pass over a state's
territory so long as the satellite is in orbit. 41 These rules of customary
law, therefore, are binding on all states. 42
The Outer Space Treaty was a success partly because it was
drafted by blending science and jurisprudence. 43 Including scientists in
the drafting process helped form a legal framework that incorporated
technological necessities. 44  However, technological development
progresses quickly and the treaty-making process is slow. Drafters of
the space treaties, for example, could not have fathomed the drastic
increase in commercial space activities. 45 States, therefore, must now
increasingly rely these on informal principles, guided by the
aspirational documents, to govern their activities.
33. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6, 11-12; LYALL & LARSON,
supra note 15, at 71.
34. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 10; 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8, at 26 (R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM].
35. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 11; OPPENHEIM, supra note
34, at 26.
36. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. III.
37. See id. art. II.
38. See, e.g., id. art. I.
39. See id. art. VI.
40. See, e.g., id. art. VII; Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. II, III; LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 15, at 71.
41. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 54. "Subjacent transit" means that, for
example, satellites in orbit may freely pass over territory of a state without permission.
Although seemingly necessary for effective space activities given the vast number of
states a satellite in orbit transit, this legal principle is opposite of the analogy from air
law. Aircraft need a state's permission to transit another sovereign's airspace.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6; Joseph A. Bosco, International Law
Regarding Outer Space - An Overview, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 620 (1990).
42. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 10; V.S. Vershchetin &
G.M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L.
22, 23-24 (1985).
43. See Jay H. Ginsburg, The High Frontier: Tort Claims and Liability for Damages
Caused by Man-Made Space Objects, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 515, 532 (1989).
44. See id. at 534.
45. See Frakes, supra note 7, at 422-23.
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Space law, fundamentally, is a specialized body of law within
international law. 46  Sources of space law are the same as other
international law: treaties, customary international law, general
principles of international law, and scholarly writing and judicial
decisions.4 7  However, "an automatic extension to outer space and
celestial bodies of international law" would not work because
international law does not address all the unique challenges posed by
outer space. 48 In the 1960s and 1970s, states cobbled together a legal
framework for space based on analogous principles from other
specialized bodies of law, such as maritime and air law,4 9 international
law in general when possible,50 and crafted new rules when not.5 1 For
example, the concept that a state has exclusive sovereignty over its
airspace 52 was discarded in favor of allowing satellites free transit over
a state's territory. 53
In contrast, other lex specialis, notably admiralty law, developed
incrementally over several centuries as trade practices formed to
resolve business disputes, which were eventually formalized into
modern maritime law. 54 Air law developed much faster; however, its
founding documents are more specialized.5 5  Regardless, no great
declaration of principles paved the way for either body of law. Space
law, on the other hand, started afresh at the international level with
broad declarations of principles. 56
B. Rules of the Road: Informal Law
Despite the number of treaties and resolutions governing outer
space, space law is not as formal as other areas of international law. 5
46. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 2.
47. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993; see DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5-7; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 31-32.
48. LACHS, supra note 19, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 27-28.
50. See LACHS, supra note 19, at 15; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327 (listing sources
and inspirations for space law principles).
51. See LACHS, supra note 19, at 15 n.9.
52. See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 (declaring that states have exclusive sovereignty over their airspace).
53. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 6; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 54; Bosco, supra note 41, at 620.
54. Admiralty law grew out of technical necessities reflected by early trade law. In
Britain, the complexities of admiralty law eventually led to the creation of specialized
maritime tribunals. This process took centuries. Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 518-19.
55. See id. at 520-24.
56. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 5; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 1.
57. Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 331.
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In place of international law, many space activities are governed by
codes of conduct and best practice guidelines drafted by "national
agencies and professional experts."5 8 Because of the law's informality,
disputes are resolved diplomatically or, for licenses or contract disputes,
in national courts.59 States, however, generally abide by international
principles regarding space.60 This informalism can be traced to the
same issues that influenced early space treaties: a rapidly changing
technological field and a focus on idealism in the law.
The excitement of the Space Race was tempered by the lurking fear
that space was to be the next battlefield for the Cold War. 61 The
driving issues of the 1960s and 1970s framed the debate about space
law, which is reflected in the foundational documents. 62 Nuclear
weapons were on the forefront of drafters' minds. 63 Conflict in the final
frontier was not out of the question. Therefore, space law documents
are written with highly aspirational goals 64 such as space being the
"province of mankind" and that space resources are most efficiently
used when used cooperatively. 65 International cooperation is a
principle found in all space treaties and statements of principles.6 6 All
of the space treaties were drafted within COPUOS using the consensus
method. Because the treaties were not opened for signature until all
the drafting states reached consensus, this encouraged compliance with
the rules once the treaties entered into force.6 7 Despite all states not
being satisfied on every issue, space law as a whole is stronger because
there are no reservations detracting from the consistency of the law.
58. Gerardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the
Quiet Development of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009); see also
JASENTULIYAYA, supra note 9, at 5-14.
59. This explains why there is so little litigation on the finer points of "space law."
See Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 331.
60. See Goh, supra note 58, at 729-30.
61. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 195; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327.
62. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 71; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327.
63. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 71; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327-28.
64. See Goh, supra note 58, at 731-32; Myres S. McDougal & Leon S. Lipson,
Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 429-30 (1958).
65. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 23; JASENTULYANA, supra
note 9, at 1; Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 327-28. See also, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 23, arts. I, II, IX ("States ... shall conduct all their activities ... with due regard to
the corresponding interest of all other States Parties to the Treaty.").
66. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 23; Hertzfeld, supra note
30, at 327-28; Chukeat Noichim, International Cooperation for Sustainable Space
Development, 31 J. SPACE L. 315, 324 (2005).
67. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 215; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 534.
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II. CREATING LIABILITY IN OUTER SPACE
A. Developing Outer Space Liability
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space began exploring the problem of liability for space activities in
1958.68 The negotiations wavered between the Soviet position that a
space liability treaty would be superfluous, given liability rules existing
in international law, and the desire for states without space operations
to see a treaty that guaranteed prompt, equitable compensation.69 To
give COPUOS guidance on crafting a liability regime, the General
Assembly passed a resolution declaring that states "bear international
responsibility" for space activities and are liable for damage caused by
their space actives. 70  The General Assembly's guidance, made
immediate by the first controlled landing on the Moon by the Soviet
Union's Luna-9, spurred the Soviet Union and United States into
agreeing to codify basic space law principles in the Outer Space
Treaty.71
Drafters also disagreed about what would qualify as "damage" for
liability purposes. The dispute centered on (1) the types of protected
interests, (2) the type of conduct giving rise to liability, (3) whether a
different principle should govern in space and on Earth, (4) the extent
of the launching state's liability, and (5) whether joint and several
liability was appropriate. 72 The Outer Space Treaty briefly addressed
several of these issues, 73 but not in a comprehensive manner. 74
B. Liability Convention: Providing Further Clarification
When the Liability Convention entered into force in 1972,75 it
expanded and clarified the Outer Space Treaty's liability regime.76 The
68. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 3; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra
note 5, at 49; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 537. See generally CHENG, supra note 20, at
215-85 (discussing the negotiations and provisions of the 1967 Space Treaty and the 1968
Astronauts Agreement).
69. CHENG, supra note 20, at 289.
70. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) 1 5, 8, U.N. Doe. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
71. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 291.
72. See Carl Q. Christol, The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an
Illusive Concept and Applying it to World Needs, in 18 COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER
SPACE 42, 52-53 (1976).
73. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, arts. VI, VII (establishing state responsibility
for the actions of state and non-governmental entities and establishing international
liability for damage in outer space, airspace, and on the surface).
74. See MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 49, 54 (1982).
75. Liability Convention, supra note 26, at 188.
76. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 324.
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treaties generally work together.77 When there is a conflict, however,
the rules of treaty interpretation suggest that the Liability Convention
supplants conflicting provisions in the Outer Space Treaty.78 The
impetus for drafting the Convention was primarily a concern for
damage caused by space objects to individuals and property on Earth.79
This focus, while understandably important, left the question of liability
for damage in space unclear.80
Understanding the liability regime for space must first start with
understanding important terms used in space law. The Liability
Convention establishes a claims process, which lays out a state may
recover damages. Claims differ based on whether the incident
happened in space or on Earth's surface. If liability attaches, the
injured state is entitled to compensations. Launching states, however,
can limit their liability or exonerate themselves completely if certain
criteria are met.
1. Important Terminology
Before moving to what constitutes a claim under the Liability
Convention, it is important to define certain terms used throughout.
Space law has several important concepts on which the rest of the body
of law is built.
Liability in space law is predicated on harm inflicted by a "space
object."8 1 However, the Liability Convention inconveniently does a poor
job laying out what exactly is a "space object." 82 Under the Convention,
a "space object includes component parts of a space object as well as its
launch vehicle and parts thereof."83 These "component parts" include
anything normally regarded as components of a spacecraft; for example,
cowlings from rockets, fuel tanks, an astronaut's glove, dropped
77. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 147. But see HURWITZ,
supra note 12, at 10 (noting that this is not true if all states involved are not party to both
treaties).
78. This assumes that claims are brought between states party to both treaties.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
Stanton Eigenbrodt, Out to Launch: Private Remedies for Outer Space Claims, 55 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 185, 193 (1989).
79. DeBusschere, supra note 8, at 100; Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered
Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1157 (1995).
80. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 11; Williams, supra note 79, at 1157. Cf.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 178 (explaining that the Liability Convention
provides for liability where space objects are damaged elsewhere than on the surface of
the earth).
81. Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. II, III; HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE
DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 62 (1989); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 37.
82. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 324-26.
83. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(d) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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wrenches, paint chips, and lost bolts. 84  Natural objects, such as
meteorites, are not included in this definition.8 5
It is unclear where the line is drawn between a launch vehicle
space object and something else.8 6 Must a space object be intended for
space, or can it merely facilitate a launch? Are spacecraft built in orbit
space objects? The Liability Convention leaves these questions
unanswered.87 Regardless of the definition, states cannot abandon a
space object.88 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty says that states
"shall retain jurisdiction and control over such objects."8 9
Who can make a claim is a vestige of the Westphalian system and
is defined by the treaties. In most disputes, there will be two parties:
the "claimant" state and the "launching" state. Each is defined
relatively specifically in space law. Taking the claimant state first,
there can be three possible states: (1) the state, or its natural person,
suffering damage (natural state); (2) the state in which the damage
occurred (territorial state); and (3) the state whose permanent residence
suffered harm (state of permanent residence).9 o Under the second and
third possibilities, a state makes a claim on behalf of an individual
whose state did not chose to assert its rights9 1-befitting a victim-
oriented regime. 92 Although the Liability Convention seems to put
claimant states in the hierarchy listed, a lower-ordered state is not
prohibited from making a claim. 93 But, if no state chooses to advance
an individual's claim, that individual has no recourse in international
law.94 However, to mitigate the negative effects of the state-centric
system, the injured party may pursue a claim in municipal courts. 9
84. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 9; HURWITZ, supra note 12,
at 24-25; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at
10010.
85. BAKER, supra note 81, at 62; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at
37.
86. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 325.
87. See id.; HURwITZ, supra note 12, at 23.
88. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 204-05; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 67.
89. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VIII.
90. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII. See also CHENG, supra note 20, at
307; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111. Consider this hypothetical: a Swiss
national, legally residing in Colombia, is injured at a Kazakh spaceport by an American
company's rocket. Three states may assert a claim for this individual: Switzerland, as his
national state; Kazakhstan, as the state having territorial jurisdiction over the location of
the injury; and Colombia, as his state of legal permanent residence.
91. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 49-50.
92. CHENG, supra note 20, at 307.
93. Id.
94. HURWlTZ, supra note 12, at 50. See also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 70 (Feb. 5); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J.
4, 13 (Apr. 6); MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
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The launching state is more straightforward because the
definitions in the Outer Space Treaty96 and the Liability Convention97
have been interpreted to mean the same thing.9 8 There are four
possible launching states: (1) the state that launches the space object;
(2) the state that procures the launching; (3) the state from whose
territory the launch happens; and (4) the state from whose facilities the
launch happens.9 9 These definitions work if a state successfully inserts
a space object into outer space. If the launch fails, however, the state
remains responsible. 100 Drafters had seen many failed launches, which
is the most dangerous part of the process, and it would be unreasonable
for a failed launch to vitiate liability. A technicality would not excuse
liability for any damage. 101
Because there can be multiple states responsible for damages, they
are jointly and severally liable to the victim. 102 "Joint and several"
liability means that victims may pursue a claim against, and recover
from any one culpable state, regardless of the culpability of other
states. 103 Drafters contemplated two situations giving rise to joint and
several liability:104 (1) when damage is caused to a third party as a
result of a collision between other states' space objects' 05 and (2) when
damage is caused by a space object with more than one launching
state. 106 In these cases, the state paying damages may seek
indemnification from the other jointly responsible state-although it is
unclear how the liability is apportioned. 107
COMMENTARY 373 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that individuals generally cannot assert
claims under international law; that is the purview of states).
95. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
96. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII.
97. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(c).
98. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 309-10; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86.
99. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 309-10; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra
note 1, at 35-36; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 86.
100. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. I(b); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 20-21.
101. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 20-21.
102. Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. IV, V. See also CHENG, supra note 12,
at 329; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at
37.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 (2000). See also
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 37.
104. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 328-31; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 36.
105. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm, 9th Sess., 149th
mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR/132-51 (July 29, 1980). This was addressed by the
Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. IV.
106. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. Rep. on its 9th
Sess., June 8 - July 3, 1970, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85 (July 3, 1970). This was
addressed by the Liability Convention, supra note 25, art. V.
107. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. V; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 38.
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2. Making a Claim
The Liability Convention is a tool for resolving international
disputes.10 8  Consequently, as an international tool based on the
Westphalian system, only states may assert claims.m Unique to space
law,1 10 however, is that a state is responsible for "national activities in
outer space, regardless of whether . . . those activities are conducted by
government or private entities."111 Therefore, an injured private entity
must petition its government to make a claim on its behalf. 112
The space treaties encourage diplomatic solutions to disputes.113
The Outer Space Treaty calls on states to "undertake appropriate
international consultations" before conducting activities that could
potentially impact other states.114  Parties can also use dispute
resolution mechanisms provided in other international organizations;
for example, a dispute about spectrum allocation for space
communication would be best resolved by the International
Telecommunication Union.115  However, if there is no diplomatic
solution within one year of the filing of a claim, then either state may
request that a Claims Commission be formed. 116 The process for
initiating a claim 117 and forming the Claims Commission" 8 is laid out
in the Liability Convention, but the Commission operates like an
arbitration tribunal." 9 It renders an award based on international law
that also takes "principles of justice and equity" into account.120
108. The Liability Convention does not "apply to damage caused by a space object of a
launching state to: (a) nationals of that state; [or] (b) foreign nationals" participating in
the operation of that space object. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VII; see also
CHENG, supra note 20, at 308.
109. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VIII (describing how a state may
make a claim); Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 196.
110. States traditionally bear no responsibility for the actions of nationals. See LYALL
& LARSEN, supra note 15, at 66.
111. Williams, supra note 79, at 1153. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VI;
IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART 1) 165-66
(1983); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36.
112. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 36, 107-08;
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 325-26.
113. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 220; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112.
114. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. IX; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at
218.
115. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 216-17.
116. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIV; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
15, at 112.
117. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. VIII-X.
118. See id. arts. XV-XX.
119. See id. art. XII; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, at 198-99.
120. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XII. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 15, at 113.
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However, awards are "recommendatory" unless the parties agree to be
bound by them. 121
If a party needs more certainty than the Liability Convention's
claims process can provide, the treaty structure allows injured parties
to assert claims in other venues. 122 Injured parties do not need to
exhaust municipal remedies before asserting a claim under the Liability
Convention, although they may not simultaneously pursue a claim in
multiple venues.123 This is consistent with the Liability Convention's
victim-oriented approach. 124
3. Location Matters: The Different Liability Schemes
The extent to which a state is responsible for damage depends on
where the damage occurred. If the damage was done on the Earth's
surface or in airspace, a state is held absolutely liable for damage.125 If
damage is done in outer space, including on celestial bodies, the state is
liable under a fault-based regime.126
i. Earth-based Damage
If a space object causes damage "on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight," the launching state is absolutely liable for damage. 127
Article II of the Liability Convention addresses the drafters' concern for
damage done on Earth's surface-the standard is clear and
responsibility is relatively easy to determine.128 Additionally, the
absolute liability standard reflects the ultra-hazardous nature of space
activities. 129 This doctrine of "dangerous things" properly puts the
burden of ensuring safety on the launching state because of the complex
nature of launches, the difficulty third parties have avoiding a launched
121. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIX(2); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR &
KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40-41.
122. For example, the injured party can use dispute resolution mechanisms provided
in other treaties, arbitration, or domestic courts. See Liability Convention, supra note 26,
arts. IX, XI; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 216-17; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 75.
123. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(1); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
124. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10, 84 n.19, 207; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
125. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. II.
126. Id. art. III.
127. Id. art. II.
128. See DeBusschere, supra note 8, at 100; Williams, supra note 79, at 1157. Cf.
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 49 (explaining that negotiators did not know what
to expect from space activities; therefore, planning a legal regime to govern unexpected
events could lead to incomplete law).
129. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 37; JASENTULIYANA, supra
note 9, at 35 n.40; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at
516.
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space object, and because the launching state can best control the
circumstances surrounding launch.130
ii. Space-based Damage
If damage, however, occurs "elsewhere than on the surface of the
earth to a space object," the launching state is liable only if the damage
is the state's fault.13 1 Fault-based liability places the burden on states
to avoid collisions in orbit.132 This assumes states have a mutual
interest in protecting their space assets as well as the technological
capability to take preventative measures. 133 Some satellites, however,
cannot perform collision avoidance maneuvers and others are too small
to easily track.134 Unlike the doctrine of "dangerous things," the risks
are potentially easier to control in space. Although some space objects
can neither be tracked nor moved, states are more likely to be able to
avoid damage.135 To establish liability through space law, a claimant
must show (1) that the space object belongs to the responsible state and
(2) the damage was "caused by" that space object. 3 6
4. Fault and Causation
First, the space object must be attributable to a particular
launching state, which requires that the space object be identified.137
But the Liability Convention does not provide a method to identify the
state responsible for the errant space object.138  The Registration
Convention, however, is part of the legal structure that facilitates the
finding of fault by requiring states to register their space objects so that
the objects can be identified later, should a collision occur.' 39 However,
neither the Outer Space Treaty nor the Liability Convention base
liability on whether a space objects listed in the registry.140 Assuming
the space object causing the damage is identified and the launching
130. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 37; HURWITZ, supra note
12, at 28, 30; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108.
131. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. III.
132. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 34.
133. Id.
134. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 297.
135. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 34.
136. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 202.
137. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VIII (stating that space objects
remain under the jurisdiction and control of the launching state).
138. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 326.
139. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, art. IV; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR &
KoPAL, supra note 1, at 44-45; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 544.
140. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 46; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 326-27.
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state is at fault, it is then responsible for the damage. If there is no
fault, liability does not attach. 141
Proposals to include a broad definition of damage, however, were
rebuffed.142 Some scholars argue it is improper to read liability for
indirect damages into the treaties because indirect damages are not tied
directly to the event creating liability. 14 3
However, identifying the launching state of a space object is
extremely difficult.144 First, these international space registries are
neither up to date nor consolidated. 14 5 States often fail to register older
space objects or smaller component parts. 146 Second, some space objects
are extremely small and cannot be tracked. 147 Debris or trash, for
example, is often far too small to track. Yet, as with the Space Shuttle
Challenger's windshield, tiny debris can cause significant damage,
especially to astronauts on spacewalks.148 If the party responsible for
damage cannot be identified, liability cannot be assigned.14 9
After the responsible state has been identified, the state must then
be found liable for causing the damage. The problem with the space law
liability regime is that there is no standard of care against which a
state's conduct can be measured.150 This is a fundamental flaw in the
Liability Convention 15 ' because fault cannot be measured without the
yardstick of standard of care.152 Several theories, however, have been
put forward. 153
One proposal suggests that fault should be based on a state's
objective intent because liability for a breach merely restates
141. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 36; DeBusschere, supra note 7, at 102-03.
142. Aldo Armando Cocca, From Full Compensation to Total Responsibility, 27
COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER SPACE 157, 158 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Edward R. Finch, Jr., Outer Space Liability: Past, Present, and Future,
14 INT'L LAW. 123, 126 (1980).
144. Williams, supra note 79, at 1158.
145. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 89.
146. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 327.
147. See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 10010.
148. BAKER, supra note 81, at 11.
149. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 36.
150. See BAKER, supra note 81, at 84; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 323; Williams,
supra note 79, at 1159-60.
151. See BAKER, supra note 81, at 84; Williams, supra note 79, at 1159-60.
152. See Robert F. Stamps, Orbital Debris: An International Agreement is Needed, 32
COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER SPACE 152, 154 (1990) ("In order to establish whether a
State is at fault for a collision . . . there must first be an accepted standard of care for
traffic in outer space, and a breach of that standard of care.").
153. For example, Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, the Director of the United Nation's Office
for Outer Space Affairs and President of the International Institute of Space Law, has
called for an expert panel to develop appropriate standards for space activities. See
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 208.
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international law. 154  If fault attached at an objective breach of
international law, a state would be free to act however it wanted to,
unless there is an international law prohibiting the act. 155 The
"reasonableness" of a state's action, on the other hand, is predicated on
the foreseeability of the damage.156 Given the difficulty of tracking
satellites and the environmental uncertainties in space, it is difficult to
foresee all circumstances when a space object can be damaged.15 7 As it
stands now, adjudicators will have to find analogies in other areas of
international law and municipal law to determine the appropriate
standard of care. 158
Another argument, however, centers on causation. In order for
fault to attach, there must be a causal connection between a state's
action and the damage suffered.15 9 Scholars argue the "caused by"
language in the Liability Convention merely requires a connection
between the accident and the damage.' 6 This conforms with the
liability structure laid out by the German American Mixed Claims
Commission after World War I. Under international law "it matters not
how many links there may be in the chain of causation . . . provided
there is no break in the chain" and the loss can be traced "link by link"
to the wrongful action.16 Allowing causation to flow through a series of
related links from the initial proximate cause is befitting a victim-
oriented recovery regime. 6 2
Another model comes from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In
2011, the Court created Optional Rules for Disputes Relating to Outer
Space Activities, which parties may use to resolve outer space
disputes.163 Article 27 establishes that each party has the burden of
154. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 38-40.
155. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 44 (Sept. 7); see also
Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 537.
156. See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 96 (1982).
157. Cf. S.E. Doyle, Reentering Space Objects: Facts and Fiction, 6 J. SPACE L. 107, 110
(1978) (describing the inherent difficulties in predicting a dead satellite's trajectory).
158. See FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 81; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 208.
159. Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 346, 361 (1980).
160. CHRISTOL, supra note 156, at 97.
161. Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 29-30 (Ger.-U.S.
Mixed Claims Comm'n 1923), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaalcases/vol_VII/23-
32.pdf.
162. See Christol, supra note 159, at 351.
163. PCA Adopts New Rules of Procedure, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?nws~id=323&pag-id=1261&ac=view.
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proving their own claims. 164 This requirement grants tribunals "broad
discretion" to determine claims "in light of justice and equity."165
5. Compensation
Space law operates under the principle of full, restorative
compensation. 166 Article XII of the Liability Convention declares that
compensation will be determined according to international law and
principles of justice and equity. 16 7 The reparation will restore the
damaged person, entity, or state "to the condition which would have
existed if the damage had not occurred."1 68 This article reiterates16 9 the
rule of customary international law articulated in the Chorzow Factory
case. 170
The nature and extent of recoverable damages, however, has not
been precisely determined. Direct damage is recoverable.1 71 However,
indirect damage-lost profit or mental suffering-is not expressly
mentioned in the Convention. 172 Some argue that indirect damages can
be recovered through proximate causation.173 International tribunals
and agreements have allowed indirect damages, so long as the damage
can be attributed to the state's wrongful act.174 Others, however, note
that it is best to use a direct damage model because the connection
between the wrongful act and the indirect damage is often too
tenuous.175 Additionally, the Liability Convention provides no clear
guidance and a staggering amount of indirect damage could potentially
be attributed to a state. 176 For example, in 2005, Canada expressed
164. Permanent Court of Arbitration, OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES
RELATING TO OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES, art. 27, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=1774.
165. Christol, supra note 159, at 361.
166. See Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 540-41.
167. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XII.
168. Id.
169. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-39; Eigenbrodt, supra
note 78, at 194-95.
170. Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)
("[Rieparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.").
171. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-9; HURwITZ, supra note
12, at 13-14.
172. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 12-14; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 188.
173. See CHENG, supra note 20, at 323. This includes "loss of profits, interruption of
business activities, reasonable costs for repairs or medical expenses, loss of services of a
third party, or other damages." See Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 539-40.
174. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter
Arb. Trib., 1938 & 1941). See also HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 16-18.
175. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 16.
176. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38-39; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, at 195 (explaining that, while indirect damages are recoverable in the United States,
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concern that a Titan IV rocket booster launched from Cape Canaveral
would fall near an oil platform in Newfoundland. Evacuating the
platform would have been an arduous process, costing $250 million. If
the spent booster did not hit the platform, the Liability Convention
would not apply. If, however, the booster hit the platform, it is unclear
whether Canada could claim lost profits. The uncertainty of what
constitutes damages under the space liability regime counsels parties
seeking more certainty to resort to municipal law. 177
6. Limiting Liability and Exoneration
The Liability Convention generally does not allow parties to
exonerate themselves from properly attributed absolute liability.178
Although this situation has yet to arise, the Liability Convention allows
a state to reduce its liability when the injured state acted recklessly and
contributed to the damage.179 In order to exonerate itself from absolute
liability, the launching state must show that the damage "resulted
either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act or
omission done with the intent to cause damage on the part of the
claimant State."180 This blurs the line between absolute and fault-
based liability by allowing the launching state to reduce its liability
because of the claimant's negligence. 181 However, this exemption is
tempered by Article VI(2), which forbids exoneration if the launching
state acted contrary to international law.182 These rare situations
where a state can limit its liability again reflect the Liability
Convention's victim-oriented recovery scheme. 183
III. SPACE LAw LIABILITY V. INTERNATIONAL LAW LIABILITY
Space law, unlike space objects, does not operate in a vacuum. The
space treaties are not universally accepted and the nuances of liability
claims have not become customary international law binding on all
states. Nor do they address every dispute that may arise in outer
space. The space treaties, however, added to an already established
the Soviet Union measured damages based on "societal costs such as hospitalization,
schools, and State pensions rather than personal loss.").
177. See Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 196; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 540.
178. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL,
supra note 1, at 38; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 32, at 110.
179. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 38; FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 81; HURWITZ, supra note 11, at 40.
180. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI(1); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL,
supra note 1, at 38.
181. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 41.
182. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. VI(2) (mentioning specifically the United
Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty as sources of international law). See
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 38.
183. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 40; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
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framework for solving international disputes. In this sense, the space
treaties are built on top of the more established, yet less precise,
Westphalian state system.
This section outlines the general international law on state
responsibility and international liability, which fill the gaps left by the
space liability regime. It then discusses the major difference between
the general international law and space law liability regimes. Finally,
the section tries to answer the question of which regime states should
use.
A. Liability Under International Law
There are two different concepts governing restitution for injury to
other states: state responsibility and international liability. Both deal
with compensating the victim for harm, but they are triggered in
different ways. Unfortunately, the concepts of responsibility and
liability have often been confused and switched.184 When the
International Law Commission (ILC) debated state responsibility, they
discussed "[i]nternational liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts not prohibited by international law." 185 This, as Brownlie
points out, was inappropriate because state responsibility deals only
with wrongful acts.186 The ILC, however, did not resolve this confusion
until 2001.187 Consequently, the space treaties seemingly use "liability"
and "responsibility" interchangeably. 8 This confusion is exacerbated
because French and Spanish, two official languages of the United
Nations, use the same word to describe both concepts. 189
The simplest way to distinguish these concepts is to note that state
responsibility arises due to a breach of an international obligation.
International liability, on the other hand, arises when one state harms
another; no breach of a duty is necessary. State responsibility is tied to
a wrongful act of state; liability is triggered by harm.
184. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability Versus Responsibility in Space Law:
Misconception or Misconstruction?, in 34 COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 363,
363 (1991).
185. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See id. at 49-50.
187. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 75-76 (2002).
188. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 50; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 148-49; von der
Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
189. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 148; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
French and Spanish, both official United Nations languages, use "responsabilit6" and
"responsabilidad," respectively, to capture the idea of state responsibility and
international liability.
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1. State Responsibility
State responsibility is a law of obligations.190  It holds states
responsible for "internationally wrongful acts" done against another
state or its citizens.191 This allows an injured state to protect its
citizens from abuses by other states. 192 In order for state responsibility
to arise, the responsible state must commit an internationally wrongful
act that is properly attributable to the breaching state. 93  An
internationally wrongful act is either an act or omission attributable to
a state under international law or a breach of a state's international
obligation. 194
An act is attributable to a state only if the act was committed by
the state or has the state's authorization. 9 5 Private acts are almost
never attributable to states. 96
The breach of an international duty, properly attributed to a state,
triggers the secondary obligation to make reparations for injury caused
by the breach. 97 Reparation follows the Chorzow principle, 98 which
seeks to wipe away the harm caused by the responsible state.199
Reparation can, theoretically, be made in three ways: first, as state can
undo the wrong that caused the injury;200 if that is not possible,
monetary compensation is an acceptable substitute; 201 finally, if the
harm is non-monetary, satisfying the injured party by way of apology or
official recognition will count as reparation. 202
190. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 77; Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility
and International Liability Under International Law, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821,
828 (1996); von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
191. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 23; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
192. See Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 823.
193. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 36; CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 81; von der
Dunk, supra note 184, at 363.
194. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 61-68 (May 24) (holding that states can incur responsibility
for an individual's acts if the state fails to exercise "due care" in preventing private acts
that breach an international obligation); BROWNLIE, supra 111, at 30; CRAWFORD, supra
note 187, at 81; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 363-64.
195. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. Rep. 3, $ 80; BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 36; CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 94,
100; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
196. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 165; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
197. CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 201; Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 825.
198. CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 201-02; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
199. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13).
200. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 210-12; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
201. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 222-24; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
202. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 208-09; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
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2. International Liability
International liability arises when a state injures an entity beyond
its jurisdiction through an act that is not internationally wrongful.203
This rule is an offshoot of state responsibility, 204 which forbids states
from actively harming their neighbors and requires states to prevent
harm in neighboring territories. 205 States are required to exercise "due
care" to prevent such harm. 206 This standard, however, is poorly
defined and rings hollow because it is not adequately defined. 207 The
ILC, when debating international liability, did not address the standard
of care and tied liability to harm; therefore, if harm occurs, the duty has
been violated.208 Therefore, a state can be liable for acts that are,
subjectively, not its fault.209
If a state is held liable for damage, it must pay compensation for
that damage. 210 This differs from state responsibility's "reparation"
because compensation merely requires that the liability be removed by
repairing the damage-there is no requirement to put the individual in
the same place he would be had the harm not occurred and no punitive
damages.211 Holding a wrongdoer responsible for harm inflicted,
however, is ultimately a good thing because it deters states from acting
in a way that could harm another state.
B. Distinctions Between Space and Standard Liability
International law provides a general scheme for recovering for an
international wrong. The space liability regime was built on top of this
structure. Both, however, are products of a state-centric regime. The
Soviet Union, for example, thought the international legal structure in
place was sufficient to govern space activities. Drafters, however,
decided a specific regime would better serve the needs of states in
space. State responsibility and international liability, however, still
linger in the background to fill gaps left by the space treaties.
203. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 75-76; Sucharitkul, supra note 190, at 828.
204. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 149; Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on
the International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited
by International Law, 11 19-21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 (1980).
205. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1963-65 (Trail
Smelter Arb. Trib. 1938 & 1941); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
206. HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 147; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
207. See BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 49-50.
208. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 151; von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
209. See von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 365.
210. Id. at 364.
211. N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Responsibility and International
Liability, 4 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 47, 51-53 (1991); von der Dunk, supra note 184, at 364.
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Adapting to the needs of space, the liability regime crafted by the
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention is different in two
important ways. 212
First, under international space law, states are responsible for the
actions of their nationals.213 The standard state-centric international
law regime does not usually hold states responsible for their
nationals. 214  This unique requirement, however, is logical when
considering the nature of what space law is trying to regulate. Space
activities are inherently dangerous. 215 Because of this, and the state-
centric nature of international law, states regulate private national
actors. 216 Additionally, this liability scheme should be considered in the
light of the times when it was drafted. When scholars began addressing
space liability in the late 1950s, private space actors were not on the
drafters' minds. 217
Second, a state need not exhaust all domestic remedies before
asserting a claim under the Liability Convention.218 Traditional
international law, on the contrary, requires that a party exhaust all
domestic remedies before resorting to an international tribunal.219 In
space law, a claimant state can elect to pursue claims in the launching
state's municipal courts. 220 However, the claimant cannot seek "double
damages" by trying to recover damages for the same harm in different
tribunals. 221 This suggests that, although a claimant may try to recover
in multiple venues, it could not pursue parallel claims. 222
C. Which Regime Governs Space Claims?
States potentially have four avenues to pursue a claim for damages
in space: (1) the Liability Convention, (2) the Outer Space Treaty, (3)
212. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
213. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. VI; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 36; Williams, supra note 79, at 1153.
214. BROWNLIE, supra note 111, at 165; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 66.
215. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 37; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 35 n.40; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 108; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 516.
216. E.g., Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7) (2010); see
JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 404-05; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 104-05; see
also Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 528-32 (discussing the development of U.S. space law and
the processes for holding private actors responsible).
217. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 49-50; DeBusschere, supra note 8, at
103.
218. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(1); HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 52.
219. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
220. Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XI(2); see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
15, at 111.
221. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
222. See id.
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standard recovery proceedings under international law, and (4)
municipal courts. 223 Which regime, therefore, governs?
There is no requirement that states resolve disputes through the
space treaties. 224 Some scholars argue that because the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention are lex specialis developed to deal
exclusively with space liability claims, those treaties should provide the
only remedy for claims for damage by space objects.225 The
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility
suggest a specialized regime of international law controls as to the
exclusion of general international law. 226 This rationale makes sense,
given the space liability regime addresses unique situations in space.
This argument, however, disregards the cooperative nature of space
law. The space treaties do not preclude parties from using other
venueS227 and, in fact, encourage diplomatic solutions to disputes. 228
Only after diplomacy fails does the Claim Commission process begin. 229
Because only states may bring a claim under the space liability
regime, 230 having other avenues for relief recognizes the weaknesses in
the Westphalian system and promotes the victim-oriented nature of
space liability by allowing a non-state victim to recover even if the state
elects not to make a Liability Convention claim. 231 Therefore, it is best
to permit victims to use any of the four recovery avenues.
IV. SPACE LIABILITY IN PRACTICE
De-orbiting space debris is no longer a rare occurrence.
Fortunately, given the vastness of the oceans, most detritus falls
harmlessly into the seas. 232 In 1979, the United States had a close call
when Skylab fell remarkably close to Esperance, a small town eastern
Australia.233 Anticipating damages and in accordance with treaty
requirements, NASA prepared to respond to damage claims; however, it
223. See id. at 66-67.
224. HURwITZ, supra note 12, at 75; cf. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1,
at 147.
225. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 306-08; Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 201.
226. See CRAWFORD, supra note 187, at 306.
227. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, arts. IX, XI; JASENTULIYANA, supra note
9, at 216-17; HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 75; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 111.
228. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XJV ("If no settlement of a claim is
arrived at through diplomatic negotiations as provided in Article IX . . ."); DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 40; JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 220; LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 15, at 112.
229. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. XIV.
230. See id. art. VIII (describing how a state may make a claim); Eigenbrodt, supra
note 78, at 196.
231. See HURWITZ, supra note 12, at 10, 207; Bosco, supra note 41, at 617.
232. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 117.
233. Id.
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received none. 2 34 The closest "liability" was a light-hearted A$400 fine
for littering issued by a small Australian town.235 However, as the
skies become more crowded, debris will become more of a danger and
the Liability Convention will no doubt be put to the test. 236
A. Liability Convention Claim: Cosmos 954
The Liability Convention has been used, officially, only once. On
January 23, 1978, the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954 satellite fell from
orbit and crashed into a remote area of northwestern Canada. 237 The
satellite's nuclear power source used 65 kilograms of radioactive
material, which survived reentry and scattered over the crash area.
Canada conducted a massive clean-up operation that swept 124,000
square kilometers for radioactive material. 238 Although the Soviet
Union offered to assist the clean-up, Canada refused assistance and
later submitted a claim to recover clean-up and recovery costs using the
Liability Convention and general international law. 239 Couching the
demand in Article II terms, Canada invoked the Soviet Union's
responsibility as the launching state to compensate harm incurred. 240
The process began diplomatically, as the Liability Convention
intends. 241 The two states fought over the amount of compensation and
mitigating circumstances, but eventually reached an agreement in
1981.242 The Soviet Union paid Canada C$3,000,000 as a "full and final
settlement." 243 This agreement, however, did not acknowledge Soviet
liability. 244
Staunch advocates of a separate, clear space liability regime would
not be happy with this result. The Liability Convention provides the
234. Id.
235. The United States government, incidentally, never paid the fine. Ian O'Neill,
Celebrating July 13, "Skylab-Esperance Day", DISCOVERY NEWS, July 14, 2009,
http://news.discovery.com/space/celebrating-july-13-skylab-esperance-day.html.
236. See DIEDERIKs-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 141; Merges & Reynolds,
supra note 11, at 10010.
237. Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 200.
238. Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 546-47.
239. See Canada's Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage
Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, Annex A, TT 14-20, Jan. 23, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 899
[hereinafter Canada Claim]; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 547.
240. See Canada Claim, supra note 239, Annex A, 14; Ginsburg, supra note 43, at
548.
241. See Canada Claim, supra note 239, Annex A, t$ 4-12; Ginsburg, supra note 43,
at 548.
242. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 42; Ginsburg, supra note
43, at 548.
243. Protocol on Settlement of Canada's Claim for Damages Caused by "Cosmos 954",
Can.-U.S.S.R., art. 2 Apr. 2, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 689 [hereinafter Cosmos Protocol]. See
Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 548-49.
244. See Cosmos Protocol, supra note 243, art. 1; Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 200.
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framework for initiating the claims process, but the parties did not
follow the Convention's one-year claims initiation process. 245 Because
the Claims Commission was not activated, there were no mechanisms
that facilitated recovery; Canada had to actively pursue relief, which
some argue is contrary to the purpose of having a liability separate
regime. 246 However, international space law does not provide a clear
process for prosecuting a space liability claims. The treaties merely
provide guidance on how claims should be made and what a state is
potentially responsible for. International cooperation, emphasized by
the Article IX requirement that claims be submitted through diplomatic
channels, was upheld.247 In the end, this dispute was solved; the Soviet
Union compensated Canada for the harm incurred. 248 Even though the
process was not exact, the Liability Convention served its purpose by
facilitating negotiations that led to a solution. 249
CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE SPACE ACTOR
Space science constantly advances; ideas unimagined in 1967 are
now feasible, which create unanticipated issues not addressed by the
treaties. This will challenge the Westphalian underpinnings of
international space law. For example, there are no treaty provisions
specifically addressing commercial ventures. 250 Space tourism is just
over the horizon 251 and, now that the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA
will rely on other states and the private sector for launch capabilities. 252
Questions of liability, insurance, and regulation are just a few issues
that need to be resolved. 253 Problems like debris removal in orbit
demonstrate the lack of enforceable legal obligations.254
The current space liability regime was based on a state-centric
model and designed for a world where outer space was dominated by
the United States and the Soviet Union.255 The treaties made states
245. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 42; Eigenbrodt, supra note
78, 201-02.
246. See FORKOSCH, supra note 74, at 12-13 (decrying the Liability Convention for
promoting a "self-help" regime).
247. See Liability Convention, supra note 26, art. IX; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 42.
248. See Cosmos Protocol, supra note 243, art. I-II; DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL,
supra note 1, at 42.
249. See Eigenbrodt, supra note 78, at 202.
250. Hertzfeld, supra note 30, at 330.
251. Tiffany Gabbay, Richard Branson Wants to Take You into Outer Space, BUSINESS
INSIDER (July 5, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-07-05/lifestyle/3002336
3_1_space-travel-zero-gravity-spaceport.
252. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121; Klotz, supra note 9.
253. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 121-22; Hertzfeld, supra
note 30, at 330.
254. See Goh, supra note 58, at 737; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 10010.
255. See Debusschere, supra note 8, at 103.
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responsible for damage because states had deep enough coffers to pay
the extraordinary costs for a space-related disaster. 256 Today, however,
outer space is increasingly crowded with other states and many private
actors. 257 States are still jointly and severally liable for satellite
networks owned and operated by multinational corporations. 25 8 The
state-centric regime is increasingly unworkable for private entities.
While more accessible for companies, general international law
principles do not provide the accessibility commercial ventures need.
Because of this, states are beginning to actively support commercial
space ventures. Many states require private companies to secure
insurance to protect both the company and the state from liability. 259
The United States' Commercial Space Launch Act, for example,
requires commercial ventures to obtain liability insurance. 260 If the
statutorily mandated insurance coverage is unavailable, the "maximum
liability insurance available on the world market at a reasonable cost"
is sufficient. 261 Liability insurance for space activities, however, is
always expensive and sometimes cannot be obtained. 262 And because of
the Westphalian structure, it is states that are ultimately liable for
damage under the space treaties. Consequently, national space policies
must balance protecting the state from liability with unnecessarily
chilling domestic commercial space ventures. 263
Government, however, may underestimate the ingenuity of
business. Perhaps "lawyers' fascination with liability issues" overly
emphasizes the importance of an international legal regime. 264
Commercial ventures, such as Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic and
Elon Musk's SpaceX, see a future in space. Already, companies are
finding ways to resolve disputes extra-judicially by contracting around
liability issues. 265 Companies insert cross-waivers of liability, whereby
each party agrees to bear its own risk. 266 When something goes awry,
256. See Christol, supra note 159, at 348.
257. See JASENTULIYANA, supra note 9, at 321; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 11, at
10010.
258. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KoPAL, supra note 1, at 107; Debusschere, supra
note 8, at 104-05.
259. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 113-14; JASENTULIYANA,
supra note 9, at 404-05. The following states require some form of insurance in their
municipal space codes: Australia, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the
United States. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 114-16.
260. 51 U.S.C. § 50914 (2012).
261. Id. § 50914(a)(3). The statutory minimums are $500,000,000 for third parties'
damage and loss claims and $100,000,000 for damage or loss to the Government.
262. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 114.
263. See id. at 115.
264. REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 5, at 187.
265. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 15, at 33.
266. DIEDERICKS-VERSCHOOR & KOPAL, supra note 1, at 115.
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the contract pulls the dispute into municipal court.267 This, at least,
gives parties some certainty about the law governing the dispute.
Business will not let an imperfect treaty structure hinder space
development.
States cannot completely withdraw from liability disputes in space,
given the state-centric structure of international law and the huge sums
of money potentially involved in damage. However, states should
continue to foster commercial development by requiring companies to
have substantial liability insurance. In exchange for that protection,
the state would back the company in the international arena. This
protects the state from the brunt of liability while allowing companies
to resolve disputes through international channels.
267. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int'l Telecomm. Satellite Org., 978 F.2d 140,
141 (4th Cir. 1992).
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